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This thesis examines fragmentation in asset markets.  A taxonomical framework is developed 
to characterise the motivational factors behind the innovations that result in market 
fragmentation.  Drawing on this framework and the relevant literature this thesis empirically 
examines the relationship between fragmentation and one of the motivational factors, 
reductions in information asymmetry, otherwise known as price discovery, within equity and 
cryptocurrency markets.  Rational expectations theory is a cornerstone of the efficient market 
hypothesis and the basis of models proposed by Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and their derivatives.  The theory suggests that investors use available information, past 
experiences, and their own rational expectations to make decisions that influence asset 
valuation.  Tests regarding whether market fragmentation contributes to the dispersal of 
fundamental price adjusting information are imperative in determining the role competition 
amongst exchanges plays in the market’s ability to maintain prices at efficient levels.  If 
prices are to remain efficient, and information asymmetry kept to a minimum, exchanges must 
incorporate relevant information across all trading platforms.  Such a process is made more 
difficult and time-consuming as information becomes more decentralised or fragmented.   
The term ‘market fragmentation’ is used heterogeneously within the literature to refer to 
events that segregate market participants from one another or when prices across trading 
platforms deviate from the fundamental equilibrium.  Competitive fragmentation describes 
events that place investors trading a common asset into separate trading pools due to 
competition among exchanges.  Fragmentation based on investor type differentiates between 
investors based on characteristics such as geographic location and investor class.  
Substitutionary fragmentation occurs when markets present investors with the option to 
purchase derivative products or assets that are considered direct substitutes for existing 
products.  Financial fragmentation refers to periods when assets deviate from their 
fundamental value across a subset of exchanges. 
The first study adapts and expands upon the taxonomies presented by Avlonitis, 
Papastathopoulou, and Gounaris (2001) and Tufano (1989).  It establishes that most 
innovations that lead to competitive, investor based and substitutionary fragmentation, are 
motived by a desire to reduce transaction costs, with reductions in information asymmetry 
playing a supporting role.  These innovations are often modifications or extensions to existing 
services.  Modern motivational factors exert greater influence over recent fragmenting 
innovations and represent the formation of new products or trading methods.  Technological 
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shocks and globalisation are most responsible for fragmenting events involving dark pools, 
cryptocurrencies, and high-frequency trading.   
The second study investigates the role of order book transparency on the relationship between 
price discovery and market fragmentation.  It utilises Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share 
and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share to measure price discovery across 120 
stocks from six European countries (2008-2016).  Panel-regression results support existing 
theory on price discovery in equity markets in that displayed (lit) order book prices contain 
substantially more information than non-displayed (dark) prices (Zhu, 2014).  Dark market 
share coefficients, which measure competitive fragmentation between lit and dark exchanges, 
provide additional support that dark transactions are substantially less informed than lit 
transactions. Informed investors are discouraged from trading in dark pools due to high levels 
of non-execution risk.  Fragmentation is associated with greater adverse selection risk in 
quoting exchanges as informed investors use their informational advantage to supply liquidity 
(Rindi, 2008).  
Mid-quotes on lit exchanges are also more informative than lit prices (Bloomfield, O’hara, & 
Saar, 2005; Boulatov & George, 2013). Increases in fragmentation among quoting (lit) 
exchanges lead to a decrease in the informativeness of lit trades versus dark trades in both the 
primary and consolidated lit markets.  The informativeness of exchange trades as compared to 
quotes deteriorates with greater competitive fragmentation across lit exchanges suggesting 
that lit fragmentation is associated with higher levels of adverse selection.  The negative 
relationship between price discovery and volatility further supports this claim and is 
consistent with the notion that the most profitable uninformed trades are being ‘skimmed’ by 
informed liquidity providers (Bessembinder & Kaufman, 1997; Easley, Kiefer, & O'Hara, 
1996). 
The final study applied existing research on competitive fragmentation and price discovery to 
cryptocurrency markets in order to test its applicability to a new asset class.  Bitcoin (BTC) 
transaction and order book data is collected across six exchanges for both United States 
Dollar (USD - $) and Euro (€) order books (2017-2019).  A panel-regression model on a 
multivariate version of Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share is employed.  Results confirm 
previous findings that market share has a positive relationship with the informativeness of 
exchange prices (Madhavan, 1995).  Consistent with the previous study, this is attributed to 
informed investors migrating to competing exchanges to better conceal and profit on their 
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superior information.  This, in turn, increases events of information asymmetry as exchange 
prices become more informative and dispersed across an increasing number of exchanges. 
The results contained in this thesis suggest that competitive fragmentation is in part, 
motivated by the intention to reduce information asymmetry.  However, in practice 
information asymmetry increases.  Competing exchanges attract a disproportionate amount of 
uninformed trading, though some informed investors follow the uninformed to competing 
exchanges in order to capitalise on their informational advantage.  Finally, consistencies are 
found between equity and cryptocurrency markets suggesting that theories developed around 
traditional asset classes are transferable to the newly formed market for cryptocurrencies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Market Fragmentation – An Overview 
Markets for goods and services exist because it is more efficient to trade via a marketplace 
than one-on-one transactions. Initially, individuals bartered and traded with each other, but 
this is time-consuming and inefficient for both parties. The adoption of fiat currency as a 
medium of exchange revolutionised trading allowing buying to be separated from selling 
through the exchange of “trade value” rather than other goods or services. This also allowed 
merchants to specialise and for trade centres or markets for the exchange of goods to develop, 
typically around transport and population centres. In addition to these logistical forces, the 
history of institutional arrangements have shaped market development and that informal and 
fragmented markets have had a persistent role in trade (Casson & Lee, 2011). 
This thesis investigates various aspects of financial market fragmentation.  It begins by 
looking at the motivational factors that lead to fragmented financial markets and investigate 
the impact these changes have on a market’s ability to maintain accurate prices. Financial 
markets exist to facilitate the exchange of investable assets. The formulation of explicit rules 
that govern and control this process are of crucial importance to efficiently pricing traded 
assets. Market crashes and similar financial crises have spurred regulatory bodies into passing 
a number of regulations. However, in their haste to avert the recurrence of such events, 
governing bodies may potentially promulgate sub-optimal regulations.  
If prices are to be efficient, the price formation process has to incorporate new information as 
quickly and accurately as possible. Prices may not immediately reflect the information 
arriving in a market. Trading rules can create bottlenecks; for example, if the stipulated 
minimum change or tick is too large, small amounts of incoming information will not 
immediately be incorporated. Such information must be accumulated until there is a sufficient 
quantity to warrant a change. The widespread availability of information is another issue that 
influences price formation. Differences in the distribution of information, that is, when 
participants are denied equal access to information, result in information asymmetry. Such 
flaws tend to make prices inefficient. Thus, price discovery is sensitive to the trading rules or 
structure of markets. Any regulations that affect any of these rules would, in turn, affect the 
price discovery process. 
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Over the past two decades, investors have evolved the way they access liquidity.  Previously, 
traditional limit order markets allowed investors access to a single quote driven exchange in 
which they can view advertised prices and quantities available for the sale or purchase 
financial assets.  In contrast, market participants today are consistently accessing liquidity 
across multiple markets resulting in an environment in which investors no longer cluster 
around a single trading venue.  In addition to this, markets are further fragmenting by 
allowing investors access to both traditional and un-advertised liquidity, herein referred to as 
‘lit’ and ‘dark’, respectively.  Dark liquidity differs from lit liquidity as it offers no pre-trade 
transparency.  This study investigates the impact that fragmentation within and across lit and 
dark markets has on the price discovery process.  Most notably, does market fragmentation 
cause valuable information regarding the fundamental value of an asset to leave the primary 
exchange and impair investors’ ability to formulate accurate prices? 
Technological advancements such as the creation of Smart Order Routing Technology 
(SORT) allow investors simultaneous access to multiple trading pools. SORT improves the 
probability of trade execution by finding multiple smaller counterparties to a trade across 
several exchanges as opposed to waiting on a perfectly complementary trade in a single 
location.  This results in markets favouring smaller trade sizes as opposed to large block 
trades. It also ensures trades are executed in a timely fashion by circumventing the need for 
markets to remain concentrated around a single trading venue. 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is a European market regulatory 
policy that was first implemented on November 1, 2007.  As a replacement for the 
Investments Services Directive (ISD) of 1993, MiFID established a single regulatory 
framework for the European Economic Area.  The goal of this framework is to create a 
unified set of policies to which all competing trading venues, both lit and dark, are subject to 
in order to promote cross-border competition for liquidity.  The three major directives that 
MiFID established to achieve this goal are i) the abolishment of the default and concentration 
rules which force trades that meet certain criteria to execute on the primary exchange; ii) 
increases in mandatory pre- and post-trade transparency requirements; iii) the introduction of 
the best-execution rule, requiring crossed trades, such as those originating from dark liquidity 
providers, to be executed at the midpoint of bid-ask spread.    
It is the policies mentioned above that have fostered competition across not only lit exchanges 
but dark exchanges as well, most notably dark pools.  Unlike traditional exchanges, dark 
pools are trading venues that offer no pre-trade transparency in that they do not advertise bid 
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and ask quotes and their corresponding quantities to potential market participants.  This 
exemption from pre-trade transparency rules implies that at any given time throughout the 
trading day the status of the order book is unknown.  When two complementary trades enter 
the dark order book, the transaction is executed and reported.  Trade execution occurs at a 
pre-determined time set by the operator at a price determined externally by either the primary 
exchange or the consolidated market order book, herein referred to as the National Best Bid 
and Offer (NBBO) and European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO), respectively. 
L. E. Harris (1993), Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) and Gresse (2006) find that markets 
fragment to serve the different types of trading requirements of different classes of investors.    
They confirm that the ability to serve different classes of clientele is a clear benefit of 
fragmentation. There are, however, two conflicting views on market structure and competition 
regarding the extent to which fragmentation is necessary and should be controlled.  The first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics (Loury, 1979) talks of Adam Smith’s Invisible 
Hand, whereby a monopoly should be restrained in favour of promoting a competitive market 
structure.. On the other hand, Schumpeter (2010) states that momentary monopoly power is 
functional and naturally eroded over time through entry, imitation and innovation. Exchanges 
should be allowed to compete without the need for specific rules to protect competition.  An 
anti-trust policy that promotes static competition is not necessarily superior to a laissez-faire 
attitude. The optimal market structure involves a finite number of firms and endless 
competition is not necessarily beneficial.  In markets, access to liquidity is key. If liquidity is 
not sufficient, alternatives must be found to improve access through better prices, self-
regulation or sharing of access to order book with other firms.  Otherwise, clients will be 
exposed to non-execution risk and will leave the exchange due to not being able to transact. 
Globally, regulators have been unsure regarding what actions, if any, to take in order to stem 
the levels of fragmentation in equity markets resulting from recent policy changes and 
technological advancements.  The cost of competition amongst equity providers, particularly 
those offering dark liquidity, has yet to be fully explored.  MiFID II recently proposed 
limiting dark trading to 8% for any particular stock (4% in a single dark pool). 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
Regulations, such as MiFID, play a role in shaping market microstructure.  However, they 
may not be the only factors that influence market fragmentation. It is important to identify the 
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other factors that cause markets to fragment in order to then study their impact on market 
conditions such as price discovery.  Therefore, the first question investigated in this thesis is: 
RQ1: What are the motivating factors that lead to the fragmentation of financial markets? 
To answer this question the first study adapts the models of Avlonitis et al. (2001) and Tufano 
(1989).  It develops a unifying framework whereby various forms of fragmentation in 
financial markets are classified according to their degree of innovation and the motivations 
behind such events, respectively.  Key papers relevant to the discussion are identified for each 
fragmentation event.  The findings of the key papers, both theoretical and empirical, are 
summarised and interpreted regarding the impact of such events on their respective financial 
markets.   
Existing literature on price discovery resulting from dark liquidity transactions is limited.  
Along with studies measuring fragmentation across multiple exchanges. However, price 
discovery and the reduction of information asymmetry amongst investors is important to 
maintaining an efficient market where investors feel comfortable trading.  The first study 
shows that fragmentation in equity markets is in part, motivated by the desire to reduce 
asymmetric information.  Therefore, the second research question investigated in this thesis 
is: 
RQ2: How does competitive market fragmentation affect the equity market’s ability to 
efficiently price assets and convey price disseminating information to the public? 
This study differentiates itself from previous works by taking a more detailed look at the 
structure of both lit markets.  It also takes into consideration the structure of the dark liquidity 
market itself rather than simply its market share.  This study investigates the effects that 
competition for liquidity across dark liquidity exchange has on the price discovery process in 
the traditional visible exchange.  In addition to observing the effects in the primary sovereign 
exchange, it also investigates the effects in the consolidated order book when all exchanges 
transacting in a particular equity stock are accounted for and treated as a single market. 
The final study investigates the applicability of established microstructure theory in equity 
markets to cryptocurrency markets.  Existing research on this topic is limited due to how new 
cryptocurrency markets are.  However, both markets operate pre-trade transparent (lit) order 
books and facilitate transactions in a similar way.  Much like events of competitive 
fragmentation in equity markets, fragmentation in cryptocurrency is also partly motivated by 
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the desire to reduce levels of information asymmetry.  Therefore, using established research in 
equity markets, this third study aims to answer the question: 
RQ3: How does competitive market fragmentation affect the cryptocurrency market’s ability 
to efficiently price assets and convey price disseminating information to the public? 
 
1.3 Research Contribution 
This thesis contributes to existing research in several ways.  The first study expands upon 
existing reviews of fragmentation in financial markets such as Gomber, Sagade, Theissen, 
Weber, and Westheide (2017).  Gomber et al. (2017) focus primarily on pre-trade transparent 
(lit) equity markets, and to a lesser extent non-pre-trade transparent (dark) equity markets as 
well.  They identify and discuss the events that lead towards the formation of new equity 
exchanges.  This thesis expands upon their ideas by covering fragmentation events across not 
only equity markets, but also cryptocurrency and debt.  Focussing on more asset classes 
allows for an increase in scope when identifying and classifying the different ways in which 
the term fragmentation is applied to financial markets.  Focussing on a wider range of 
definitions also allows for more detailed comparisons across markets.  It also allows for 
greater identification of the similarities behind motivating factors leading to fragmentation, 
the degree of innovation introduced, and their resulting impacts. 
This thesis, particularly the second and third studies, contribute to the regulatory discussion 
by investigating various forms of fragmentation in equity and cryptocurrency markets across 
Europe and how they impact the market’s ability to adjust prices to new information in a 
timely manner.  European markets are no longer limited by their location and can participate 
in cross-border trading.  The pan-European market is considered to be a virtual market with 
multiple entry points  (O'Hara & Ye, 2011). By using data from six European countries over a 
long study period (November 1 2008 to October 31 2016) a more complete picture of the 
affects fragmentation has on price discovery is formed, compared to other studies.  This is 
crucial as policies such as MiFID, and more recently, MiFID II, are applied across all 
members of the European Union (E.U.).  Analysing equity data from a single geographical 
location does not provide insight regarding which policies regulators should focus on in order 
to provide the greatest protection to E.U. investors.  In line with previous studies (Degryse, 
De Jong, & Kervel, 2015; Gresse, 2017), the second study analyses results from both the 
primary exchange and the global (pan-European) consolidated market.  Primary and global 
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parameters are used in order to distinguish between the effect faced by local investors, who 
predominately access the national exchange in their country and institutional investors who 
can access multiple exchanges simultaneously. This aids in distinguishing how fragmentation 
impacts both retail investors who largely access the dominant exchange in the market and the 
consolidated market as a whole where more sophisticated institutional investors can access 
liquidity from multiple markets simultaneously. 
Dark pools have come under scrutiny with regards to the role they place in the price discovery 
process.  In May 2009, James Brogagliano of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
stated that dark pools could impair the price discovery process by drawing valuable order 
flow away from the public quoting market.  He also added that anything that significantly 
detracts from the incentive to display liquidity in the public market could decrease the 
available liquidity in the market.  This would, in turn, harm price discovery and lead to 
increased short-term volatility.1   
By using the lit market order book prices as a crossing point, researchers argue that the dark 
market does not contribute directly to price discovery.  The goal of the traditional dark pool 
customer is to execute a large order without affecting the market price during the sale. They 
are intended to be passive investment funds that are interested in adjusting their position.  
However, recently we are observing the prevalence of small transactions that likely originate 
from algorithmic trading systems such as SORT (Nimalendran & Ray, 2014) and contain 
some amount of price adjusting information. Many dark pools allow for prices to deviate from 
the midpoint through the use of limit orders.  Alternatives to mid-point prices allow investors 
to gain a more favourable price or improve the speed of the transaction by sacrificing a 
portion of their price advantage.  As a result, dark trades do emit some amount of information 
(Kaniel & Liu, 2006). 
The second study contributes to the price discovery research with a focus on dark liquidity in 
several ways. It begins by continuing to explore the effects resulting from inter-market 
fragmentation of lit and dark orders. However, it extends this literature to empirically study 
the effects of intra-market fragmentation within the dark market in a similar fashion to which 
existing studies focus on intra-market fragmentation within lit exchanges.   
                                                 




The second study is also only the second study to measure fragmentation in the dark pool 
market utilising the same constructs previous studies have applied to lit exchanges. It is, 
however, the first to apply this construct to study price discovery. This thesis complements 
the empirical work of Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) who use Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) data to conclude that dark trading harms markets by increasing adverse 
selection risk on lit exchanges.  They also find that high levels of dark trading can impede 
informational efficiency.  Other papers focus on the liquidity implications of dark trading and 
lit market fragmentation.   Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) analyse United States (U.S.) data 
on 11 dark pools and find that liquid stocks tend to be more attracted to dark pools.  Stocks 
tend to favour dark pools on days with high volume, high depth, low volatility, and low 
absolute returns.  Increased dark pool use also has a positive impact on market quality 
measures such as spreads, depth, and volatility. Nimalendran and Ray (2014) use data on 32 
U.S. dark pools and find that algorithmic trades for illiquid stocks are associated with higher 
spreads and price impact.  Dark trades are found to contain less information than lit trades and 
algorithmic trading is used to spread activity across both lit and dark exchanges.  Degryse et 
al. (2015) use data on Euronext Amsterdam (AEX) mid and large-cap stocks over a two-year 
period from November 1 2007 to November 1 2009.  Their timeframe aligns with the 
introduction of MiFID policies.  They find that lit fragmentation improves liquidity across the 
global order book, though it does so at the detriment of local liquidity on the primary 
exchange.  Dark trading, however, is largely detrimental to liquidity.   Gresse (2017) studies 
data on eight stock exchanges in conjunction with a trade reporting facility for the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and Euronext listed equities.  They find that lit fragmentation is 
detrimental to the depth of smaller stocks while neither dark trading nor lit fragmentation is 
found to harm liquidity. 
Finally, the third study is the first to measure the level of fragmentation in the cryptocurrency 
market and study its relationship to the price discovery process.  It is also the first study to 
apply established research surrounding rational expectations theory and the efficient market 
hypothesis to cryptocurrency markets.   Therefore, the third study is the first to apply these 
techniques, largely used for equity markets, and test the extent to which they, and existing 
theory on competition, applies to the cryptocurrency market. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis addresses the question surrounding the factors which lead to the fragmentation of 
financial marks and how these events affect a market’s ability to convey price disseminating 
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information to the public. The thesis is structured in three chapters, each which represent a 
distinct body of material related to the underlying research question. The following chapter, 
Chapter 2, develops a framework based on the prior literature through which is used to 
investigate various forms of fragmentation and how they relate to financial innovation.  
Chapter 2 draws upon the taxonomies of Avlonitis et al. (2001) and Tufano (1989) and 
extends these works to consider various financial innovations that cause markets to fragment. 
The framework is used to identify and categorise the various forms of fragmentation 
discussed in the literature. Chapter 2 identified four fragmentation classes: competitive market 
fragmentation, fragmentation based on customer type, substitutionary fragmentation, and 
financial fragmentation.  The literature reviewed reveals instances of innovation in all 
fragmentation classes, with the exception of financial fragmentation, to be internally 
motivated and result in permanent changes to financial markets.  Financial fragmentation is 
temporally determined and relates to periods when markets are in disequilibrium, which 
naturally correct over time. 
Chapter 2 then drills down into subclasses within each fragmentation class and finds that most 
innovations leading to fragmentations are motived by a desire to reduce transaction costs.  A 
reduction in information asymmetry plays a supporting role in many instances of 
fragmentation.  We observe that the modern motivational factors, such as technological 
shocks and globalisation, exert greater influence over more recent fragmenting innovations, 
especially for fragmentations relating to dark pools, cryptocurrencies, and high-frequency 
trading.  Another dimension to the framework is the degree of innovation associated with 
various types of fragmentation which vary among fragmentation types.  Competitive market 
fragmentation events involve modification of existing services while fragmentation based on 
customer types involve the extension of services.  Finally, substitutionary fragmentation 
results in new innovations that differ widely from existing financial products.  
The framework developed in Chapter 2 forms the background for two empirical studies 
detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 explores fragmentation in equity markets, examining 
the price formation process in lit and dark markets. Chapter 4 investigates the price formation 
process in the fragmented cryptocurrency market. Each of these empirical chapters are 
discussed below. 
Chapter 3 reports on an empirical study which tests existing theory on price discovery in 
equity markets. The study finds that lit prices contain substantially more information than 
dark prices and that mid-quotes on lit exchanges are more informative than lit prices.  The 
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study tests and supports the hypothesis that increases in fragmentation among quoting (lit) 
exchanges lead to a decrease in the informativeness of primary market lit trades versus dark 
trades.  However, it rejects the hypothesis that global consolidated market trades become 
more informative as lit markets fragment.  The finding that dark transactions are substantially 
less informed than lit transactions is further supported by the dark market share coefficients. 
These measure the inter-market fragmentation between lit and dark exchanges.  The study 
shows that informed investors are discouraged from relying on dark pools as they tend to 
experience greater non-execution risk as they cluster on the heavy side of the market.  The 
study shows that fragmentation is associated with greater adverse selection risk in quoting 
exchanges as informed investors use their informational advantage to supply liquidity (Rindi, 
2008). The results show that the effects are greater in local exchanges as global market benefit 
from a more diverse subset of investors. Dark market fragmentation is therefore associated 
with a concentration of informed order flow in quoting exchanges.   
The empirical study in Chapter 3 shows that greater intra-market lit fragmentation increases 
the informativeness of exchanges trades as compared to quotes deteriorates. This suggests that 
intra-market lit fragmentation is related to increased adverse selection in the lit market. A 
negative relationship between price discovery and volatility is observed which further 
supports this finding. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that informed 
liquidity providers ‘skim’ the most profitable uninformed trades (Bessembinder & Kaufman, 
1997; Easley et al., 1996). 
Chapter 4 reports the results of the third study. This study empirically examines fragmentation 
in the cryptocurrency markets and the impact on price discovery. The results suggest that 
increased market fragmentation either leads to an increased concentration of informed 
investors on the dominant cryptocurrency exchange or the introduction of informed investors 
on smaller satellite cryptocurrency exchanges.  The implication is that investors can no longer 
look towards a single exchange to gather all relevant price adjusting information.  The process 
of price discovery, that is, the process of forming an accurate opinion of prices levels, 
becomes more difficult. The more the market becomes fragmented the more investors protect 
themselves against the risk of information asymmetry and adverse selection by widening bid-
ask spreads. This leads to a reduction of market quality factors such as bid-ask spreads.  The 
widening of bid-ask spreads is seen as a negative outcome to cryptocurrency market 
fragmentation as it increased the cost of a round-trip transaction for investors.  
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The lower Frag coefficients for less liquid exchanges also explains supports the notion that 
these exchanges find it more difficult to locate a counterparty for the informed traders when 
compared to more liquid exchanges (Mendelson, 1987). So, when markets fragment, and 
smaller exchanges entice some investors to transact in their order books, the increases in 
fragmentation they cause is able to support some trading activity.  But once again, these 
smaller exchanges largely attract uninformed traders. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the results and relates the findings to the key research 
questions.  Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the thesis for theory, policy, practice, and 
education.  It also highlights the limitations of the study and proposes ideas for future research 
in market microstructure. 
In summary, the thesis builds a framework of the factors motivating the development of 
innovations that lead to market fragmentation. (Chapter 2).  The thesis then empirically 
examines the price discovery implications resulting from fragmentation in equity and 
cryptocurrency markets. Using the taxonomy developed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 studies the 
relationship between fragmentation levels and one of the motivating factors, reductions in 
information asymmetry (price discovery). Chapter 4 extends this research to the fragmented 
cryptocurrency market. Once again, price discovery is made more difficult and bid-ask 
spreads widen to compensate. The overarching implication for price discovery is that 
fragmented markets make it more difficult to consolidate all relevant pricing information and 




Chapter 2: Financial Innovation and Market Fragmentation 
2.1 Introduction 
Market fragmentation is motivated by innovations in products and services.  This chapter 
focuses on the role that innovation plays in fragmenting financial markets.  A key paper by 
Miller (1986) on the financial innovations of the 1960s to the 1980s shows a significant 
incidence of financial innovations in that 20-year period and argues that the trend in financial 
innovation is unlikely to subside.  History supports this prediction as financial markets have 
introduced numerous new products, processes and market types.  Products such as 
cryptocurrencies and exchange-traded funds and processes such as dark pools, retail investor 
programs, and high-frequency trading are the tip of the iceberg and represent only a subset of 
the more successful programs.  Innovation is a continuous process anchored by the market’s 
willingness to experiment in its efforts to provide participants with new or modified services 
aimed at filling a void in the existing market’s offerings. 
 
Figure 2-1: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Overview) 
This chapter adopts the models of Avlonitis et al. (2001) and Tufano (1989) and develops a 
unifying framework of market fragmentation. Various forms of fragmentation in financial 
markets are classified according to their degree of innovation and the motivations behind such 
events (see Figure 2-1).  To develop the framework, key papers pertaining to each 
fragmentation event are identified and discussed.  This chapter discusses how the existing 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, interpret the impact of such events on their 
respective financial markets. Finally, the chapter identifies two current type of competitive 
market fragmentation for further empirical study that form the focus of the remainder of the 
thesis. 
This chapter expands upon existing reviews of fragmentation in financial markets such as 
Gomber et al. (2017) in several ways.  Gomber et al. (2017)  focus primarily on pre-trade 
transparent (lit) equity markets, and, to a lesser extent, non-pre-trade transparent (dark) equity 
markets.  They identify and discuss the events that lead to the formation of new equity 
exchanges.  This chapter expands upon the work of Gomber et al. (2017) by covering 
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fragmentation events across cryptocurrency and debt markets in addition to equity markets.  A 
wider range of asset classes allows for an increase in scope when identifying and classifying 
the different ways in which studies apply the term ‘fragmentation’ to financial markets.  This, 
in turn, allows for greater comparison across markets and identify similarities behind their 
motivations, the degree of innovation, and their resulting impacts. 
In addition to exchange-based fragmentation events, this chapter identifies fragmenting events 
in financial products.  Product-based fragmentation events are defined by the introduction of 
new product classes or direct substitutes to existing offerings. Concentrating on products, in 
addition to services, allows for a more comprehensive review of how innovation leads to 
fragmentation across financial markets as a whole.  Excluding product-based fragmentation 
would limit the scope to exchanges and other tools offering investors a medium for the 
exchange of financial assets.   The goal is to show that innovation is a leading factor behind 
the numerous occurrences of fragmentation across financial markets. 
Innovation is widely used to describe both shocks to financial markets and how markets react 
to such shocks.  In general terms, financial innovation is synonymous with the creation of 
new financial products as well as the tools used by market participants to transact in those 
products.  Avlonitis et al. (2001) and Tufano (1989) classify forms of innovation into either 
‘product’ or ‘process’.  Product innovations involve the creation of new types of financial 
instruments based on existing offerings.  Derivatives such as options and futures are a 
common example of product innovations.  Product innovation also includes the formation of 
new financial instruments outside the scope of existing offerings such as cryptocurrencies.2  
Process innovations pertain to the creation or modification of new methods by which financial 
securities can be distributed and accessed by investors.  Some examples of these include the 
formation of new exchanges and the introduction of new investor classes. 
Figure 2-2 presents a general taxonomy of market fragmentation and classifies the general 
forms of market fragmentation investigated in this study under both the ‘product’ and 
‘process’ innovation categories.  The general forms of market fragmentation include 
competitive market fragmentation, fragmentation based on customer types, and 
substitutionary fragmentation.  Competitive market fragmentation is classified as a process-
based event as it pertains to fragmentation across exchanges that provide access to financial 
products.  These exchanges include lit equity exchanges, dark equity exchanges, other-off 
                                                 
2See Section 2.4 for an in-depth discussion on both forms of product innovation.   
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exchange providers, and cryptocurrency exchanges.  Fragmentation based on customer types 
is also a process-based event as it identifies changes to how investors access liquidity within a 
particular exchange.  Fragmentation events based on customer type include the separation of 
retail and institutional orders, as well as the inclusion of foreign investors and high-frequency 
traders.  Substitutionary fragmentation is predominantly a product-based event as it involves 
the creation of new investment products which often compete with exist investor offerings.  
We identify equity substitutes, such as derivative products, and the creation of competing 
(alternative) cryptocurrencies as the main forms of Substitutionary fragmentation currently 
discussed within the literature. 
 
Figure 2-2: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Product and Process) 
The final form of fragmentation discussed in this chapter, financial fragmentation, exists 
outside of the process and product innovation classification of Avlonitis et al. (2001) and 
Tufano (1989). Unlike the three previous forms of fragmentation, financial fragmentation is a 
result of external market shocks and represents the consequence resulting from changes in 
market conditions.  The previous forms of fragmentation are considered internally driven 
whereby they would not exist were it not for the explicit actions of market participants.  
Internally driven fragmentation factors represent the conscious actions of participants aiming 
to permanently change the structure of the market, while externally driven fragmentation 
factors are often a temporary symptom of market conditions.  Therefore, we propose ‘pricing’ 
as a third classification innovation and financial fragmentation.  The result is what we refer to 
as the three Ps of fragmentation, as depicted in Figure 2-3: process, product, and pricing. 
Tufano (1989) argues that markets innovate to correct for imperfections in existing offerings.  
These imperfections include, but are not limited to, taxes, transaction costs, and informational 
asymmetries.  Tufano (1989) states that the presence of these imperfections encourages 
participants to seek alternatives to fill gaps in the existing financial offerings.  Doing so 
makes markets more complete and brings us closer to a state in which further innovations no 
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longer benefits individual participants, nor the market as a whole.  Miller (1986) suggests that 
subsequent attempts at innovation lead to neutral mutations.  While providing an alternative to 
existing offerings, neutral mutations do not provide additional benefits.  Instead, they provide 
alternative methods to achieve a state that is complementary to the existing one. 
 
Figure 2-3: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Three Ps) 
Tufano (1989) uses a combination of existing financial innovations classifications and 
historical events and presents six key motivational factors behind various events of financial 
innovation.  This study uses these six factors to evaluate the motivation behind recent market 
fragmentation events.  These six factors, depicted in Figure 2-4, are as follows: i) minimise 
transaction, search and market costs; ii) address agency concerns and information asymmetry; 
iii) complete incomplete markets; iv) response to taxes and regulation; v) globalisation and 
risk management; vi) technological shocks.  Historically, the first four factors are the 
predominate forces motivating innovation that leads to market fragmentation.  However, 
globalisation and technological shocks play a greater role in more modern instances of 
fragmentation, particularly in the dark equity and cryptocurrency categories, the foci of this 
thesis.  In addition to the six factors proposed by Tufano (1989), a seventh factor, economic 
shocks, is proposed as a contributor to reactionary and externally driven fragmentation events, 
most notably financial fragmentation. 
Finally, the model presented by Avlonitis et al. (2001) is adapted to reflect the degree of 
innovation within the market as a whole.  Originally, Avlonitis et al. (2001) classify the 
degree of innovation at a firm level. Therefore, their taxonomy differentiates between firm-
level and market-level innovations.  As an example, the model distinguishes between 
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innovations that are new to the firm itself or represent a new offering that is unlike anything 
currently available across the market as a whole.  For simplicity, the proposed taxonomy only 
considers market-wide innovations resulting from fragmenting events.   The three degrees of 
innovation considered in this study are modifications, extensions, and new innovations.  
Figure 2-4 presents the degrees of innovation in ascending order of their contribution to 
innovation.  Modifying existing offers is the least innovative as it can be as simple as 
modifying a single parameter of a product or process.  Extensions to product lines are 
considered to be more innovative as they require the addition of new features into existing 
product or service offerings.  Finally, the creation of new products or services is considered 
the most innovative as it is the most labour intensive and the least likely to resemble anything 
currently available to market participants. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Framework) 
The classifications represented by Avlonitis et al. (2001) have a commonality in that they 
correspond to a permanent change in market conditions.  However, some innovations, such as 
financial fragmentation, represent a temporary deviation from market integration.  Therefore, 
we propose a fourth classification, disequilibrium, as a temporal innovation resulting from 
financial fragmentation.    
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In summary, the taxonomy proposed in Figure 2-4 provides a framework through which to 
examine events that lead to the fragmentation of financial markets.   The taxonomy extends 
upon internally driven process and product-based fragmenting events to include externally 
driven pricing-based events.  This results in the three Ps of fragmentation: process, product, 
and pricing.  Six motivating factors leading to market fragmentation presented by Tufano 
(1989) are used to explain internally driven innovations.  Internally driven fragmenting events 
are classified based on their degree of innovations according to the categories proposed by 
Avlonitis et al. (2001).  Finally, this chapter introduces new categories to supplement those 
presented by Tufano (1989) and Avlonitis et al. (2001) to allow for the classification of 
externally driven fragmenting events.  Economics shocks complement the categories 
presented by Tufano (1989) and represent a reactionary motivation for pricing-based 
fragmenting events.  Temporal innovations, that is, deviations from accepted equilibrium 
values, complement the more permanent degrees of innovations proposed by Avlonitis et al. 
(2001). 
The remainder of this chapter further explores the different forms of fragmentation presented 
in Figure 2-4.  This chapter identifies specific motivational factors that contribute to each 
fragmentation event and discusses the degree of innovation they represent.  The impact these 
events have on market conditions, particularly their influence on liquidity and the price 
discovery process, is also explored.  Finally, this chapter summarises the results and discusses 
the key points of the proposed taxonomy. 
2.2 Competitive Market Fragmentation 
This section focuses on what is considered to be the most widely accepted definition of 
fragmentation in financial markets, competitive market fragmentation.  Competitive market 
fragmentation refers to the introduction of new exchanges, or modifications to existing 
exchanges, which modify how investors access liquidity.  Competition of this nature splits the 
consumer base into distinct pools. As a result, investors are isolated from potential trading 
partners and are no longer able to access all available liquidity in a particular asset.  The 
proposed taxonomy groups events into four distinct categories spanning two asset classes to 
investigate exchange-based fragmentation events. The two asset classes included in this study 
are equities and cryptocurrencies.   
This section, as summarised in Figure 2-5, proposes that competitive market fragmentation 
events result in permanent changes to market structure.  While these innovations may lead to 
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the formation of new exchanges, these exchanges are not new services. Instead, they largely 
consist of modifications to existing services.  New exchanges position themselves 
competitively in the market by offering investors improved transaction and search costs.  
They also help complete the market by targeting various subsets of heterogeneous investors 
by creating access to features that are unavailable in existing exchanges. Finally, more 
modern exchanges classes, such as dark pools and cryptocurrency exchanges, are capitalising 
on recent technological advancements such as improvements in network infrastructure and the 
development of distributed ledgers. 
 
Figure 2-5: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Competitive Market Fragmentation) 
Section 2.2.1 discusses fragmentation in equity exchanges which are pre-trade transparent, 
herein referred to as lit markets.  These events represent the most traditional instances of 
exchange-based fragmentation.  Section 2.2.2 investigates instances of fragmentation in non-
pre-trade transparent markets, herein referred to as dark pools.  Section 2.2.3 focusses on 
equity markets by studying other off-exchange activities such as over-the-counter markets and 
hidden orders.  Finally, Section 2.2.4 studies competition amongst cryptocurrency exchanges. 
2.2.1 Lit Market Fragmentation 
Multiple factors motivate lit market fragmentation resulting from the competition amongst 
equity exchanges.  Section 1.1 has already discussed the influence of regulatory changes on 
market fragmentation so this section will focus on other factors. This section discusses 
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existing research to support the claims that lit market fragmentation is primarily motivated by 
a desire to reduce transaction costs and to promote market completeness.  
Transaction Costs 
Many studies that form the foundation for modern fragmentation theory argue that exchanges 
are natural monopolies.   Participants benefit from economies of scale that lower transaction 
costs through their superior ability to match buyers and sellers (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991; 
Mendelson, 1987; Pagano, 1989).  Investors gravitate towards the most liquid market 
resulting in a positive feedback loop which further improves liquidity in the dominant market 
(Pagano, 1989).  Greater participation by investors leads to improvements in both the 
probability and speed of execution, resulting in lower search and transaction costs.  This, in 
turn, attracts more investors and fuels further improvements in the quality of trade execution.  
Therefore, any innovations which lead investors to use alternative exchanges will adversely 
affect liquidity (Pagano, 1989).  
Recent studies, however, favour fragmented markets and argue that competition amongst 
exchanges benefits customers as it helps lower trading costs.  O'Hara and Ye (2011), using 
data on 265 stocks over six months in 2008, find that higher levels of fragmentation are 
inversely related to both transaction costs and the speed of execution.  New exchanges use 
cost savings as a means of attracting liquidity and maintaining acceptable execution speeds 
for their clients.  Execution speeds are critical in maintaining an active investor pool and 
protecting investors from adverse price changes.  While the creation of competing exchanges 
leads to permanent changes to the landscape of the market, an inability to maintain sufficient 
trading volume levels can cause a reversal of these events.  Lower exchange fees allow 
liquidity suppliers and investors to transact at prices closer to the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread. Thus, cost savings materialise on exchanges through improvements in liquidity such 
as tighter bid-ask spreads.   Monopolistic trading environments often result in non-
competitive behaviour and the introduction of a competitor aids in improving trading costs in 
the form of tighter primary exchange bid-ask spreads as increased competition forces liquidity 
suppliers to improve their prices (R. H. Battalio, 1997; B. Boehmer & Boehmer, 2003; 
Colliard & Foucault, 2012; Foucault & Menkveld, 2008).    Madhavan (1995) also finds that 
large traders front-run their own trades in a consolidated market resulting in greater execution 
costs for the average investor.  
19 
 
Recent regulatory changes such as the Regulation National Market System (RegNMS) in the 
U.S. and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in Europe have led to a 
resurgence in research surrounding fragmentation and transaction costs.  Studies such as 
Degryse et al. (2015) and Gresse (2017) show that the desire to reduce transaction costs 
motivates innovations that contribute towards market fragmentation.  Using a sample of 52 
large and midcap stocks from the Amsterdam Exchange (AEX) from 2006 to 2009, Degryse 
et al. (2015) find that fragmentation in lit markets results in lower bid-ask spreads.  However, 
the authors find that these improvements are largely exclusive to new exchanges.  The 
primary exchange in the country does not experience such improvements as they do not feel 
the need to lower fees to remain competitive and maintain an active investor base.  Therefore, 
the desire to lower transaction fees in order to divert investors away from the dominant 
exchange motivates innovations leading to the formation of new exchanges.  Gresse (2017) 
finds similar results using a sample of large and midcap United Kingdom (U.K.) and Euronext 
stocks.  However, unlike Degryse et al. (2015) they find that local primary exchanges 
experience some improvements to costs through tighter bid-ask spreads as major exchanges 
lower fees in an attempt maintain their dominance. 
Post Trade Transparency 
The completion of incomplete markets also motivates lit market fragmentation.  Research on 
the differences in trade disclosure rules shows that because traders are heterogeneous in their 
trading requirements, markets will fragment to meet their demands (L. E. Harris, 1993). 
Madhavan (1996) argues that differences in trade disclosure rules encourage the 
fragmentation of investors.  When trade disclosure is left to the discretion of the investor 
markets are more likely to fragment permanently into multiple exchanges.  Conversely, 
markets that consist of exchanges with similar requirements surrounding trade disclosure, 
particularly those that require disclosure, tend to consolidate as investors gravitate to the 
cheapest and most liquid alternative. 
Fragmentation in lit markets motivated by market completeness is separate from events 
motivated by the reduction in transaction costs.  Madhavan (1995) finds that intraday bid-ask 
spreads widen upon the migration of investors to exchanges with less restrictive trade 
disclosure requirements.  This is due to dealers facing greater levels of uncertainty resulting 
from the absence to potentially price adjusting information.  Madhavan (1996) and de Frutos 
and Manzano (2005) provide support for these results, which are also consistent with the 
experimental findings of Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999, 2000). Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999, 
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2000) find that greater market transparency, most notably trade disclosure, improves market 
liquidity and reduces price volatility.  Their findings imply that transparency increases price 
efficiency.   
Information Asymmetry Reduction 
The reduction of information asymmetry is also a contributing factor towards the 
fragmentation of lit markets.  Existing research supports the notion of fragmentation in pre-
trade transparent exchanges leading to greater adverse selection.  The result is an impedance 
the price discovery process (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991; Madhavan, 1995).  Madhavan (1995) 
also proposes that differences in trade disclosure rules motivate the fragmentation of markets 
and that exchanges with similar requirements tend to consolidate.  Greater fragmentation 
affords informed investors the ability to more easily conceal their trades from investors 
wishing to take advantage of their superior information.  It also allows dealers to be less 
competitive.  Both of these factors contribute to price volatility.    
Empirical research supports the idea that greater levels of lit market fragmentation lead to less 
efficient prices.  Critics of market fragmentation in displayed order books argue that 
fragmentation is inversely related to price efficiency.  Bennett and Wei (2006) study 39 stocks 
that transfer their primary listing from a fragmented market (NASDAQ) to a consolidated 
market (NYSE) between 2002 and 2003 and conclude that the transition results in 
improvements to price efficiency and liquidity provisions.  They also observe additional 
improvements to price efficiency through reduced volatility and a contraction of quoted, 
effective and realised spreads.  Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones (2008) also find that 
consolidating orders leads to more efficient pricing. Easley et al. (1996) and Bessembinder 
and Kaufman (1997) use the concept of cream-skimming to explain the adverse effects on the 
price discovery process.  They argue that the price discovery deteriorates in fragmented 
markets as informed investors pick off the most profitable uninformed trades. 
In summary, the desire to spur competition through the offering of reduced transaction fees 
and search costs motivates markets to create services that lead to events of competitive market 
fragmentation.  Opportunities which allow exchanges to cater to a unique set of investors, that 
is, they contribute towards completing the market, are also influential, as are changes in 
regulatory policy.  While such events lead to the creation of new equity exchanges, such 




2.2.2 Dark Market Fragmentation  
Dark pools represent a modification of existing services as they are exempt from pre-trade 
transparency requirements.  The introduction of dark pools alongside traditional pre-trade 
transparent exchanges is a type of competitive market fragmentation that has grown in 
popularity in the last decade.  Section 1.1 discusses the importance of changes in regulation 
for the development of dark markets.  Therefore, the remainder of this section focuses on 
other major and supporting factors.  
Liquidity/Market Quality 
Dark pools offer improved pricing on trades as they allow investors to transact at the midpoint 
of the bid-ask spread.  Transacting at the midpoint saves both buyers and sellers half of the 
bid-ask spread when trading in dark pools compared to traditional lit exchanges.  However, 
while dark pool participants benefit from lower transaction costs, the resulting impact on lit 
markets is mixed. The majority of studies argue that the benefits from dark pools come at the 
expense of reduced liquidity on lit exchanges.   
Recent studies report mixed results surrounding the liquidity impact of dark pools.  Buti, 
Rindi, and Werner (2017) develop a theoretical model in which traders can submit their order 
to either a limit order book or a dark pool.  They conclude that upon the introduction of a dark 
pool alongside a limit order book, investor welfare, consisting of factors such as bid-ask 
spreads and execution speeds, increases for both retail and institutional traders.   However, 
this effect only applies to liquid stocks. The improvements to institutional investors’ welfare 
are consistent with the findings of previous studies such as Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal 
(2003).  Retail traders’ welfare, however, is always found to decrease.  The authors find that, 
for liquid stocks, both limit and market orders migrate to the dark pool, resulting in tighter 
spreads, thereby improving transaction costs.  However, competition for illiquid stocks lowers 
the probability of execution of limit orders and results in a widening of spreads.  
Other studies present more uniformity in their results. O'Hara and Ye (2011) find a negative 
relationship between dark pool market shares and bid-ask spreads.  Comerton-Forde and 
Putniņš (2015), Degryse et al. (2015), and Hatheway et al. (2017) observe that bid-ask spreads 
widen as dark pool market shares increase while O'Hara and Ye (2011) and Ready (2014) find 
the opposite.   Buti et al. (2011) use 2009 data from 11 U.S. dark pools and conclude that dark 
pool activity exhibits a positive relationship with bid-ask spreads.  The results of a time series 
analysis show that increases in the market share of dark pools causes bid-ask spreads to widen 
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and negatively impacts volatility, returns, and order imbalance.  Zhu (2014) models the 
relationship between dark pools and quoting exchanges and attributes these negative effects to 
informed traders.  Due to their tendency to transact on the same side of the order book, 
informed investors have difficulty finding counterparties in dark pools.  The result is a 
concentration of price adjusting information to traditional lit exchanges.  While this leads to 
prices becoming more informative, any improvements to price discovery come at the cost of 
greater adverse selection risk and wider bid-ask spreads.   
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) reach a similar conclusion to Zhu (2014) when they study 
the interaction between dealer networks and passive crossing networks.   They also find that 
any improvements in price efficiency on lit exchanges come at the expense of wider bid-ask 
spreads as dark pools gain market share.  However, Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)  
attribute the result to investors who use the dealer market as a last resort.  They argue that 
such activities coerce dealers into widening bid-ask spreads.  They also propose that traders 
who exclusively participate in non-pre-trade transparent markets can help tighten spreads on 
lit exchanges.  Spreads tighten, and transaction costs improve, as traders coerce informed 
investors into leaving lit exchanges.  This leads to the opposite effect than the one previously 
discussed where a contraction in spreads comes at the cost of price efficiency.   
Hendershott and Jones (2005) and Nimalendran and Ray (2014) provide empirical support for 
the former of the two outcomes previously discussed in Hendershott and Mendelson (2000).  
Their results are in line with the predictions outlined by Zhu (2014).  Hendershott and Jones 
(2005) and Nimalendran and Ray (2014) find that the reduction in transparency leads to an 
increase in transaction costs and adverse selection on the primary exchange.3   Dark pools 
reduce the primary exchange’s market share as they lure investors to their alternative trading 
venue.  Investors take with them information that is relevant to the formation of accurate trade 
prices as they migrate away from the primary exchange.  This impedes the price discovery 
within the primary exchange, which primarily impacts retail investors who are less likely to 
have access to alternative exchanges and their corresponding liquidity pools.  Competing 
exchanges, however, benefit from the change through a reduction in trading costs.  Degryse et 
al. (2015) attribute this increase in adverse selection to instances of ‘cream-skimming’ 
resulting from a dark pool’s ability to attract largely uninformed order flow. 
 
                                                 




Price discovery is a proxy for the levels of asymmetric information in the market. Research 
shows that fragmentation associated with dark markets is not associated with the 
dissemination of price revealing information.  M. Ye (2012) extends the classical rational 
expectation model by Kyle (1985).  They study the effects of presenting informed traders with 
the option of sending their trades to either a displayed limit order book, operated by a 
traditional exchange, or a crossing network, a particular type of dark pool. Informed investors 
value the ability to conceal their trade intentions from the market.  Doing so allows them to 
realise the maximum profit from their superior information.  This, in turn, motivates them to 
continue to generate new information which is essential to the price discovery process.  By 
routing orders to a crossing network, informed investors protect their information at the 
expense of a reduction in price discovery resulting from pre-trade transparent transactions. 
Price discovery is impeded to a greater extent for stocks with higher fundamental value 
uncertainty.  M. Ye (2012) concludes that informed investors will continue migrating their 
trades to dark liquidity pools until they are indifferent between the increased execution 
probability risk, they are exposed to in the crossing networks and the price impact in the 
traditional exchange. 
Zhu (2014) develops a similar model to M. Ye (2012) but assumes that liquidity traders are 
exogenous in their choice of trading venue. Zhu (2014) improves on other models that 
exogenously fix the strategies of informed traders (Hendershott & Mendelson, 2000) or fail to 
consider the role asymmetric information plays regarding the value of the asset (Buti et al., 
2017; Degryse, Van Achter, & Wuyts, 2009).  Zhu (2014) argues that informed investors face 
lower execution probability in dark pools relative to uninformed investors.  This occurs 
because orders submitted by informed investors are positively correlated with the value of the 
asset, and therefore each other.   As a result, informed investors cluster on the heavy side of 
the market resulting in increased competition amongst each other for access to liquidity 
offered by their uninformed counterparts.  This results in traditional pre-trade transparent 
exchanges becoming more attractive to informed investors.  The price discovery process is 
improved as permanent price-adjusting information concentrates on the lit exchange.  
However, this comes at the cost of wider bid-ask spreads and greater adverse selection risk for 
uninformed investors. As liquidity orders are less likely to correlate with each other, dark 
pools become more attractive to uninformed investors.  Uninformed investors are able to 
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maintain a higher probability of execution as their trades are less likely to correlate with each 
other.   
L. Ye (2016) extends upon Zhu (2014) to include the presence of noisy information.   While 
their results are more in line with those of M. Ye (2012), their findings are not as one sided as 
M. Ye (2012)  and Zhu (2014).   L. Ye (2016) find that price discovery effects are largely 
dependent on the inherent noise levels in equity trades.  In the presence of noise, L. Ye (2016) 
finds that the informed traders prefer to route their orders to dark pools. The result is an 
impediment in the price discovery process as relevant price-adjusting information is 
concealed from investors until after a successful transaction.  In contrast, the presence of low 
levels of noise where the level of information risk is low causses informed to prefer traditional 
pre-trade transparent exchanges over dark pools.   This result coincides with that of Zhu 
(2014) and leads to an improvement in price discovery. Unlike the model presented by M. Ye 
(2012), L. Ye (2016) model also allows uninformed traders to choose between exchanges.  
Removing this choice aligns the results with that of M. Ye (2012). 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) provide empirical support for Zhu (2014) in their study 
on the impact of dark liquidity on the price discovery process.  They use Australian data from 
the ASX All Ordinaries index from 1 February 2008 to 30 October 2011 and focus on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and Chi-X exchanges.  Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 
(2015) reveal that aggregate price discovery is impeded, and prices become less efficient as 
order flow migrates from lit to dark trading venues.  However, this effect is only realised 
when the proportion of non-block dark trading consists of 10% or more of all transactional 
volume.  Lower price efficiency disincentivises informed traders from participating in costly 
information acquisition.  This, in turn, leads to a further reduction in the informational 
efficiency of prices.  As uninformed trading in the lit market reduces disproportionally, high 
levels of dark trading also lead to increases in adverse selection and a widening of bid-ask 
spreads in the primary lit market. These results are corroborated by Hatheway et al. (2017), 
whose study consists of 59 NYSE and 57 NASDAQ stocks over three months beginning 
January 3rd 2011. In contrast, Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) find that dark liquidity can 
improve price discovery within the primary exchange, which is beneficial for retail investors 
when the market share of dark liquidity is below 10%. The opposite effects surrounding the 
10% dark market share threshold imply that price discovery is an increasing concave function 
(Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015).   
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In summary, dark pools have grown in popularity due to their ability to offer reduced 
transaction costs for investors. Regulatory changes play a pivotal role in dark market 
fragmentation due to their focus on investor protection through policies such as the best-
execution rule (see Section 1.1). Dark pools also help complete markets by providing 
investors with additional trading options regarding the dissemination of trade information.  
Recent technological developments also support growth in these markets.  As dark pools 
operate in a black box, they are devoid of any human interference when matching orders.   
Matching orders at such a large scale would not be possible without improvements to 
computing speeds as well as networks which allow for remote electronic order submission.  
The intent to reduce information asymmetry is not a leading motivational factor in the 
formation of dark pools.  By their very nature, dark pools will attract some level of informed 
activity from the pre-trade transparent exchange (see Figure 2-5). 
2.2.3 Other Off-Exchange  
This section focusses on activities, apart from dark pools, that remove liquidity from the 
centre limit order book (CLOB).  We investigate over-the-counter transactions and hidden 
orders.  While these activities can resemble dark pools, they operate with slightly greater 
levels of pre-trade transparency.  Over-the-counter transactions experience greater pre-trade 
transparency than their dark counterparts as they require the involvement of a third party who 
is aware of the request.  Hidden orders can allow for a portion of the order to be published to 
the CLOB.  As a result, neither of these two options operate entirely within a black box.  
In summary, the desire to reduce transaction costs is a driving factor behind the development 
of off-exchange liquidity pools.   Unlike traditional CLOB transactions, off-order book trades 
allow investors to negotiate prices.  Off-exchange activity is also motivated market 
completeness as brokers can locate unadvertised liquidity.  Access to unadvertised liquidity 
also comes with the added benefits of reduced search costs and investors take advantage of 
brokers’ investor networks. As with dark pools, the intent to reduce information asymmetry is 
not a leading motivational factor behind the formation of off-exchange liquidity pools.  By 
design, off-exchange liquidity pools will attract some level of informed activity (see Figure 2-
5). 
2.2.3.1 Over-the-counter/Upstairs Market 
Many stock exchanges today, including the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), offer investors the 
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flexibility of transacting in either the downstairs or the upstairs market.  The downstairs 
market is exclusively automated and order-driven, operating within the central limit order 
book (CLOB) which is visible to all potential participants.  However, the upstairs market 
consists largely of broker-dealers who operate outside the CLOB.  The result is a process-
oriented innovation which leads to the fragmentation of the market where clients transact in 
the liquidity pool they feel is most suitable to their trade requirements.  Innovation leading to 
the fragmentation of investors as a permanent modification to existing services. The upstairs 
market operates on many of the same principles as the downstairs market.  However, it is not 
considered an extension of traditional exchanges as it does not add to and maintain the 
existing features of the downstairs market.  By operating on the same principles as the 
traditional downstairs market, it is not a new innovation, rather an extending modification. 
The search for lower transactions costs predominately motivates the innovation of upstairs 
markets. This section presents several studies that argue that investors save money when 
conducting certain trades in the upstairs market when compared to the downstairs market 
(Grossman, 1992; Madhavan & Cheng, 1997; Seppi, 1990; B. F. Smith, Turnbull, & White, 
2001).  Upstairs market trades predominately consist of large block over-the-counter (OTC) 
transactions where prices are negotiated amongst trading parties (Madhavan & Cheng, 1997).  
Broker-dealers choose to execute client orders against their own account, acting as a principal 
to one side of the trade, or act on behalf by the client by ‘shopping’ the order and searching 
for interested counterparties.  Executing trades outside of the displayed order book allows for 
all shares to transact at a single price.  Therefore, investors are not exposed to predatory 
trading activities as they exhaust the offerings at multiple levels of the order book.  
Involving a third party means that upstairs market participants are not subject to the same 
levels of anonymity as their downstairs counterparts.  However, by operating outside the 
CLOB, they circumvent pre-trade transparency requirements and can conceal their intentions 
from the market in the event that the transaction is not successful.  This implies that the goal 
of reducing information asymmetry is not a motivating factor behind the formation of upstairs 
markets. Excluding orders, whether successful or not, from the centralised display order book 
widens the level of information asymmetry as not all investors are privy to the knowledge of 
the existence of such orders.   As a result, they are unable to infer the intentions behind the 
orders and react accordingly in their trading activities. 
Seppi (1990) is a seminal work studying competition between specialists in the downstairs 
market and brokers in the upstairs market.  The model consists of a multi-period market and 
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focusses on the existence of equilibria when there is information-based block trading.  
Participants in the model include the specialists and dealers mentioned above as well as a 
single large investor, who may be informed or uninformed, and several small noise traders.  
Seppi (1990) concludes that brokers can use the lack of anonymity in the upstairs market to 
their advantage.    Informed and uninformed traders can be identified based on their reputation 
and brokers use this advantage to only trade with uninformed investors.  This occurs as there 
exists a separating equilibrium for block sizes below a critical threshold.  Markets fragment as 
uninformed investors choose to transact large blocks with a dealer while informed investors 
favour breaking the block into several smaller components using market orders on the 
exchange to execute them.4  Also, by imposing additional restriction to the trade including the 
requirement for the investor to not trade the stock within a certain period of time, the dealer 
can further identify the uninformed nature of the trade. 
Grossman (1992) also develops a model involving specialists and brokers in downstairs and 
upstairs markets, respectively.  Grossman’s (1992) model focusses on how brokers act as a 
repository for information pertaining to unexpressed liquidity.  Knowledge of unadvertised 
liquidity gives brokers’ clients access to deeper liquidity pools when compared to the CLOB.  
Brokers attract clients by using this information to their advantage.  While both brokers and 
specialists have access to information regarding orders in their respective markets, only 
brokers know the identity of the investors placing the orders.  Unlike specialists, this allows 
them to maintain contact with clients keep a record of potential future trade counterparties.   
However, the deeper liquidity pool in the upstairs market comes at the disadvantage of having 
to negotiate prices with no guarantee that they will transact at a price that is as, if not more, 
favourable than the one on the exchange.   
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) find empirical support for Seppi (1990) in their analysis of 
block trades of Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) stock on the NYSE.  They study the 
role upstairs and downstairs markets play in liquidity provision and find that uninformed 
investors do indeed transact in the upstairs market when they can successfully express their 
uninformed status.  The ability to isolate for uninformed orders encourages investors to 
supply liquidity.  The upstairs market is effective in executing large liquidity-driven orders at 
a lower cost than those executed on the CLOB.  Such improvements to execution costs 
suggest that reducing transaction fees is a significant motivating factor in the development of 
upstairs markets.  However, in contrast to Grossman’s (1992) model, Madhavan and Cheng 
                                                 
4 Some components can also be directed towards the upstairs market as well. 
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(1997) find that specialists and other investors trading on the exchange provide a similar level 
of liquidity compared to the upstairs market.  As a result, the two markets are similar in terms 
of their permanent price changes. 
B. F. Smith et al. (2001) perform a similar analysis to Madhavan and Cheng (1997) using 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) data.  They also find support for Seppi (1990) in that the 
upstairs market is effective in identifying and executing large uninformed orders whose 
motivations are liquidity driven.  They also find that the upstairs market attracts trading in less 
liquid stocks.  Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) present two more studies in support of 
Seppi (1990) using Helsinki Stock Exchange (OMXH) and Paris Bourse data, respectively.  
They provide further evidence that upstairs trades are less informed than their CLOB 
counterparts and execute at a lower cost, with Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) 
showing that upstairs execution costs are 65% lower than those in the CLOB. 
B. F. Smith et al. (2001) also show support for the model developed by Grossman (1992).  
They find that a substantial number of upstairs market trades transact at prices that are more 
favourable than those available in the downstairs market.  Grossman (1992) argues that this is 
a result of upstairs market dealers having greater access to liquidity, particularly unexpressed 
liquidity, due to their knowledge of customer identities and previous trading activity. This 
provides evidence that the competition of incomplete markets is a supporting motivational 
factor behind this type of off-exchange fragmentation.  While upstairs orders may not initially 
interact with the CLOB, investors maintain the option to access that investor pool once all 
other off-exchange counterparty choices are exhausted.  Burdett and O'hara (1987) and Keim 
and Madhavan (1996) concur with Grossman (1992) as their models also indicate that having 
the ability to locate several trade counterparties results in a more favourable trading price. 
Grammig, Melvin, and Schlag (2001) provide additional empirical support for Grossman 
(1992) in their study of the German stock market.  They compare traffic across IBIS, an 
anonymous limit order book that operates as a proxy for the downstairs market in Grossman 
(1992), and the floor-based Frankfurt Stock Exchange, a non-anonymous and trading system 
that operates as a proxy for the upstairs market.  They find that the bid-ask spread charged by 
market makers is noticeably lower in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange compared to IBIS, and as 
a result, the upstairs market proxy offers more favourable prices. 
Unlike the previous studies, Fong, Swan, and Madhavan (2001) find that upstairs market 
activity is driven by the needs of the investor and the characteristics of the individual markets, 
as opposed to a broker’s preferences and liquidity provisions.  Using Australian Stock 
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Exchange (ASX) data, they find that two factors largely influence trades that occur away from 
the exchange.  First, the presence of institutional traders steers activity away from the 
exchange as they attempt to minimise the price impact felt from transacting large orders.  
Second, trading activity migrates towards the upstairs markets if the exchange is not 
sufficiently liquid and displays high bid-ask spreads with shallow depth.   B. F. Smith et al. 
(2001) also find a positive correlation between upstairs market volume and CLOB bid-ask 
spreads.  Similar to Fong et al. (2001), Friederich and Payne (2007) find that participation in 
the CLOB is low when the market is illiquid in terms of depth and spreads.    Using data from 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) where broker-dealers firms compete for liquidity with the 
CLOB, they also find that both high asymmetric information risk and high execution risk 
drives investors toward the upstairs market.  
There is also evidence to support the informational effect of trading in the upstairs market.  
Kraus and Stoll (1972) investigate the price impact of large trades and find that block trading 
does indeed affect the market.  They find that block trades can result in both an informational 
effect on prices, whereby the changes are permanent and pertain to information revealed 
regarding the stock’s fundamental value, as well as a distributional effect, in that price 
changes are temporary and as a result of order flow.  Seppi (1990) and Grossman (1992) 
suggest that upstairs market trades have a lower informational effect than downstairs trades as 
they largely consist of uninformed liquidity-driven orders made by uninformed investors.   B. 
F. Smith et al. (2001), Booth, Lin, Martikainen, and Tse (2002) and Bessembinder and 
Venkataraman (2004) support this and find that upstairs trades have a significantly lower 
price impact (informational effect) than downstairs trades. Using vector error correction 
models (VECM) Booth et al. (2002) also find that a large percentage of the price discovery is 
conducted within the CLOB, providing further evidence of the informed nature of CLOB 
trades.  Madhavan and Cheng (1997) find that permanent price changes are similar for both 
upstairs and downstairs market trades on the NYSE. 
Westerholm (2009) uses data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange (OMXH) and benefits from 
having access to a dataset with unique identifiers for institutional investors.  The study further 
confirms Grossman (1992), finding that upstairs market trading is largely uninformed and 
able to access unexpressed liquidity.  As a result, the information effect of upstairs trades is 
lower than those that originate from the exchange.  Westerholm (2009)  also finds investors 
rely more on the upstairs market when the CLOB present investors with high transaction 
costs, high volatility, and low liquidity.  A later study by Rose (2014) uses Australian Stock 
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Exchange (ASX) data and finds that the informational effect of trades is noticeably higher in 
the CLOB.   This supports Seppi (1990) and Rose (2014) and implies that uninformed 
investors activity migrates to the upstairs market. Rose (2014) correlates higher upstairs 
market volume with lower transaction costs, higher volatility, and greater liquidity.  This 
shows that, except for volatility, fragmentation instituted by the upstairs market has a 
predominately positive impact on traditional exchanges. 
2.2.3.2 Hidden Orders 
Hidden orders allow traders to hide the entirety or a portion of their order from the market.  
Their use fragments the displayed (visible/lit) order book and removes accessibility to 
potentially price adjusting information.  As a result, they are similar to upstairs market orders 
in that they are not motivated by the desire to correct for instances of information asymmetry. 
Hidden orders are now found across many equity markets including the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX), Euronext, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX), to name a few.  However, the level of anonymity is not uniform across all 
markets.  For example, Euronext requires investors to employ the use of iceberg orders when 
concealing liquidity. Iceberg orders reveal only a portion of a limit order which, much like 
their namesake, obfuscate their true size.  Other exchanges use the time priority, or lack 
thereof, of hidden orders to promote transparency and encourage traders to reveal liquidity.  
This is achieved by delaying the execution of hidden orders until after all displayed liquidity 
orders at that price level have been exhausted. As a result, the taxonomy classifies hidden 
orders as a modification of traditional displayed liquidity. 
As hidden orders are pre-trade transparent, they represent a form of on-exchange dark 
liquidity.  True market depths and best prices are obscured leaving traders unaware as to the 
exact state of the order book.  Once again, this increases the level of information asymmetry 
in the market.  Compounding in the distortion occurs as hidden orders discourage potential 
counterparties from entering the market.  L. Harris (1997) introduces the concept of ‘reactive’ 
traders who monitor the order book until presented with opportune trading conditions.  L. 
Harris (1997) implies that excess use of hidden orders impedes a market’s capacity to attract 
previously unadvertised liquidity.  Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009) find 
support for this in their study of Euronext stocks.   They conclude that hidden orders are 
associated with a decrease in the probability that an order will be fully executed, in addition to 
longer order completion times.  The implication is that hidden order use lowers overall 
transactional volume and prevents traders from participating in the market (Harris, 1997).     
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In contrast, Moinas (2010) finds that excess limit order usage reduces execution probability as 
defensive traders cancel their existing positions.  Anand and Weaver (2004) find that the 
expulsions and reintroduction of hidden order on the TSX in 1996 and 2002, respectively, has 
no impact in quoted depth.  This suggests that hidden order represent liquidity that would 
otherwise not be accessible and is consistent with the findings of Grossman (1992).  
Grossman (1992) argues that the upstairs market, which operates outside the displayed order 
book similarly to hidden orders, is also a repository for unexpressed liquidity. This, in turn, 
provides the support that, similar to upstairs market transactions, hidden orders contribute to 
completing incomplete markets by expanding the pool of potential counterparties. 
Other traders take a more aggressive position and actively search for hidden liquidity.  They 
submit limit orders in the hopes of executing against hidden orders J Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2002).  If after a few seconds a counterparty is not found the investor cancels their limit 
order, after which they repeat the process.  If hidden liquidity is partially exposed through the 
use of iceberg orders, detecting such orders causes traders to demand more liquidity than is 
advertised at the best price (De Winne & D'hondt, 2007; Pardo & Pascual, 2012).   
While the use of hidden orders increases the likelihood of traders making mistakes regarding 
perceived demand and supply of shares, it is a valuable tactic for those looking to mask their 
activities. Should other market participants infer that a trader possesses superior private 
information upon submitting a limit order, they may be encouraged to either cancel standing 
limit orders or refrain from submitting new ones (L. Harris, 1997).  Even worse, they may 
decide to ‘front-run’ the order by submitting their own at a more favourable price. L. Harris 
(1997) argues that the larger the exchange tick-size, the less likely it is that exposed orders 
will be front-run due to the cost of doing so.   Using Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) data,  
Aitken, Berkman, and Mak (2001) confirm that larger tick sizes encourage investors to expose 
their positions. 
Moinas (2010) and Buti and Rindi (2013) provide support for the findings of Harris (1996).  
In their model, Moinas (2010) confirms that fast traders can benefit from using new public 
information faster than a limit order trader can cancel their now mispriced order.  Moinas 
(2010) and Buti and Rindi (2013)  find that both informed and uninformed liquidity traders 
can reduce transaction costs by using hidden orders to minimise the impact of their trading 
activities. However, Pardo and Pascual (2012) find that the execution of iceberg orders on the 
Spanish Stock Exchange do not have adverse effects on liquidity or volatility.  The lack of 
price impact suggests that these orders are largely uninformative.  
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2.2.4 Cryptocurrency Exchanges 
Bitcoin (BTC), the world’s first modern-day cryptocurrency, launched in 2009 following the 
release of a 2008 whitepaper published under the name Satoshi Nakamoto.  Advancements in 
networking technology fuelled Bitcoin’s key market innovation, leading to the creation of its  
decentralised and distributed structure. Bitcoin distinguishes itself from other previously 
developed digital and virtual currencies by being the first currency to operate under such a 
decentralised structure. 
Cryptocurrency exchanges operate under many of the same principles as lit equity exchanges 
but make some modifications due to the nature of the product itself, which we classify as a 
new innovation (see Section 2.4.2).  Some exchanges execute customer orders using deposits 
that customers have made into the exchange.  Others operate as a matching platform, similar 
to a traditional equity exchange, where customers submit buy and sell limit orders, and trades 
execute upon the identification of a suitable counterparty.  Most exchanges also offer 
continuous trading throughout the day, but the highest levels of activity typically occur during 
local equity market trading hours (Dyhrberg, Foley, & Svec, 2018).  Higher levels of 
volatility and lower spreads during local trading hours implies the most trades are executed 
manually by retail investors as opposed to trading algorithms (Dyhrberg et al., 2018).   
While cryptocurrency exchanges represent a modification to existing lit equity exchange 
structures, we classify them separately from the previously mentioned equity-based forms of 
competitive market fragmentation.  This allows for comparison in the motivating factors 
behind competitive market fragmentation across investor pools and asset classes.  In this 
section we find the creation of new cryptocurrency exchanges is largely motivated by 
globalisation and risk management, and the technological advances that allow for such 
changes.  However, the creation of new lit equity exchanges, with which they share many 
characteristics, are motivated by changes in regulations that allow for a reduction in 
transaction and search costs achieved through market completion. 
On March 17, 2010, the first Bitcoin exchange, BitcoinMarket.com, began operations.  It 
allowed users to purchase and redeem Bitcoin, using PayPal as a means of transferring value 
between Bitcoin and fiat currencies.  These actions would not be possible without recent 
technological advancements in online payments and the development of blockchain-based 
distributed ledgers.  Technological shocks are a significant motivating factor behind 
fragmentation among cryptocurrency exchanges. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency 
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transactions have since evolved from a monopolistic market dominated by a single exchange 
to a fragmented market with over 246 major exchanges in operation as of March 2019.5   
In December 2013, cryptocurrency trading was more consolidated around a single currency 
with USD trading representing 82.2% of all transactional volume (Brandvold, Molnár, 
Vagstad, & Valstad, 2015).  Figure 2-6 displays the market share, according to trading 
volume, by the top 18 cryptocurrency exchanges as of January 2019.  P2pb2bUSD is a peer-
to-peer exchange and represents the dominant means of transacting with 26% market share 
followed by bitstampUSD with 13%, and krakenUSD, coinbankGBP and krakenEUR all with 
7% each.  The majority of transactional volume, 54%, is completed with U.S. dollars 
followed by the Japanese Yen, Euro, and British Pound Sterling with 18%, 13%, and 8%, 
respectively (Figure 2-7). The fragmentation of orders across a wide range of sovereign 
currencies represents a major change in international cryptocurrency trading.    Four 
exchanges (p2pb2bUSD, bitstampUSD, krakenUSD, and coinsbitioUSD) are responsible for 
51% of the 54% market share of U.S. dollar transactions.  This shows that the cryptocurrency 
exchange market, while fragmented overall, is dominated by a handful of major exchanges. 
Since many exchanges also transact across multiple currencies, this study proposes 
globalisation also to be a motivating factor behind their creation, resulting in the subsequent 
fragmentation of cryptocurrency markets.  Doing so also reduces search costs for traders as 
they need only participate in a single exchange to access liquidity from counterparties across 
the globe. 
However, formal exchanges are not the only places to trade cryptocurrencies. Fink and Johann 
(2014) find that of the total daily number of Bitcoin transactions, only 13% occur through 
market exchanges.  The results originate from comparing the total volume in the Bitcoin 
network to trading volume on exchanges.  Most transactions are as a result of direct trading 
between Bitcoin users. 
 
                                                 




Figure 2-6: Cryptocurrency Volume Distribution (Exchange) 
Source: Bitcoincharts.com (March 2019) 
Exchange Survival 
The state of cryptocurrency exchanges is not stagnant.  Rather, it involves the formation and 
closure of several exchanges over time.  Exchanges close for various reasons including 
illiquidity, fraud and theft, among others.  Moore and Christin (2013) are among the first to 
research Bitcoin exchanges.  They gather data on 40 different markets and study the factors 
that influence their sustainability.  Of the 40 exchanges included in the study, they find that 18 
of those exchanges ceased operations during the three-year study period.  Of the 11 exchanges 
for which Moore and Christin (2013) were able to retrieve information regarding 
reimbursement, six of exchange closures resulted in customers losing the balances contained 
within their accounts, with the most famous closure being Mt. Gox.  Mt. Gox is widely 
viewed as the first major Bitcoin exchange and accounts for roughly 80% of all trading 
activity during the early stages of the Bitcoin trading (Fink & Johann, 2014).  The exchange 
filed for bankruptcy in February 2014 following the revelation of the theft of USD 350 
million worth of Bitcoins from the exchange. 
In support of the theory presented by Pagano (1989), Moore and Christin (2013) find that 
exchanges which maintain healthy levels of transactional volume are most likely to continue 
operating.  These exchanges thrive as customers value the ability to transact quickly and 
finding a suitable counterparty in a timely fashion is easier when presented with a larger 
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investor pool.   Technological advancements provide critical support in improving the 
timeliness of transactions.   
 
Figure 2-7: Cryptocurrency Volume Distribution (Fiat Currency) 
Source: Bitcoincharts.com (March 2019) 
However, Moore and Christin (2013) find that operating a popular exchange attracts the 
attention of criminals as popular exchanges are more likely to experience security breaches.  
Fraudulent activity is another factor responsible for the closure of a Bitcoin exchange.  This 
provides further support that technological shocks are highly motivational in the formation of 
new exchanges.  Exchange operators use advancements in security technology as a means of 
promoting themselves and differentiating their offerings from competitors. 
Price Discovery 
Fink and Johann (2014) study the pricing dynamics and their relation to the microstructure of 
Bitcoin markets.  The authors focus on the following major exchanges, with their respective 
currencies presented in parentheses, to determine the extent to which they contribute to price 
discovery: Bitstamp (USD), Btce (USD and EUR), Btcn (CNY) and Mt. Gox (USD and 
EUR).  Using a vector-error-correction-model (VECM), they conclude that before the 
bankruptcy of Mt. Gox (nearly) all exchanges have at least a 10% level of influence on the 
prices of their competitors.  The one exception to this is Mt. Gox (USD) which does not 
appear to be noticeably influenced by any of its competitors.    The absence of external 
influences leads to the conclusion that they are a price leader.  Being the market leader in 
transactional volume at the time is consistent with theory by Hasbrouck (1995) who argues 
that the dominant exchange is the source of the majority of price forming information.  New 
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exchanges contribute to the process of maintaining efficient price levels across 
cryptocurrencies.  Therefore, reductions to information asymmetry play a supporting role in 
motivating exchange-based fragmentation in cryptocurrency markets.  
Adapting Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share (CS) measure Fink and Johann 
(2014) find confirmation that Mt. Gox (USD) dominates its competitors in terms of its 
contribution of permanent price adjusting information.  Mt. Gox (USD) displayed a CS of 
33.14 %, implying that the other exchanges adjust their prices to the information presented by 
the dominant exchange.  Fink and Johann (2014) exclude results on Hasbrouck’s (1995) 
information share (IS) from analysis as the large discrepancy between lower and upper 
bounds do not allow for drawing of dependable interpretation. 
Brandvold et al. (2015) also focus on price discovery in Bitcoin exchanges.  They select five 
major exchanges as well as two minor ones in an attempt to account for differences in 
behaviour resulting from exchange size.  The major exchanges included in the study are 
Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Btce, Btcn and Mt. Gox, and all but Btcn trade in USD currency pairs; 
Btcn is a Chinese Yuan exchange.  Except for Bitfinex, these exchanges match those used in 
Fink and Johann (2014), though the latter study also includes some Euro pairs as well.  The 
two minor cryptocurrency exchanges are the Canadian Virtex and the Polish Bitcurex 
exchanges and, while smaller, are still apart of the ten largest exchanges at the time of the 
study.   
Brandvold et al. (2015) find that Btce and Mt. Gox prices are more correlated future market 
returns compared to past market returns.  Correlations with future returns indicates that Btce 
and Mt. Gox are price leaders.  Btce and Mt. Gox transactions also trade at more informative 
price points.  Positive covariances between fundamental price changes and idiosyncratic 
shocks, the basis for the IS measurement, indicate price informativeness.  Mt. Gox was the 
overall leader with a starting IS of 0.667.  This result at least partially conforms with the 
findings of Fink and Johann (2014) who also find Mt. Gox to be a price leader.  Two of the 
three foreign currency pairs do not lead the market in terms of correlation with future returns 
with Virtex and Btcn proving themselves to be price followers.  However, Btcn saw its IS 
increase from 0.040 in April 2013 to 0.325 in December 2013 as Chinese firms began to 
accept Bitcoin as payment.  This figure would subsequently drop to 0.124 following the 
Chinese government’s ban on such payments in January 2014, thus providing further support 




In summary, recent technological advancements in online payments and the development of 
distributed ledgers, that is, ledgers relying on blockchain technology, motivate innovation 
leading to the formation of new cryptocurrency exchanges. Globalisation is also a motivating 
factor as investors continually need only participate in a single exchange to access liquidity 
from counterparties across the globe.  Reducing search costs is a supporting motivational 
factor behind new exchange innovations and is realised through the globalisation of investor 
networks. Globalisation also brings with it the added benefit of reduced information 
asymmetry through the consolidation of international investors onto a single trading platform.  
However, exchanges continue to operate distinct order books based on unique fiat currencies 
(see Figure 2-7). 
2.3 Fragmentation Based on Customer Types 
Fragmentation occurs within markets when exchanges differentiate between investor classes.  
While many exchanges attempt to cater to as wide an array of investors as possible, other 
actively isolate different groups of investors.  Some markets differentiate between retail and 
institutional liquidity while other may restrict the use of automated trading software.  
Sometimes the fragmentation of investors is not intentional.  Firms must take explicit actions 
to consolidate geographically diverse investors through international cross-listing and expand 
their investor pool.  Investors choose to trade in markets with varying degrees of customer-
based fragmentation as no single market can serve the interests of all types of investors.   For 
example, institutional investors employing passive trading strategies may be interested in 
concealing their intentions from the market.  Retail investors, on the other hand, might be 
motivated by minimising transaction costs and investors protection policies that protect them 
from predatory traders.  In this section, we explore various forms of customer-based 
fragmentation and classify the innovations leading to such events. The driving factors behind 




Figure 2-8: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Fragmentation Based on Customer Type) 
The taxonomy in Figure 2-8 depicts that fragmentation of investors into distinct liquidity 
pools based on customer type is an extension of existing services.  Exchanges distinguish 
between clients based on their level of expertise (retails vs. institutional investors), location 
(foreign investors), and use of technology (high-frequency traders).  Regardless of the 
customer type, these investors continue accessing liquidity like traditional equity market 
participants.  However, due to a distinguishing feature, they are given the option to access 
liquidity in a manner that is unique to them. That is, they are granted superior protection 
against adverse selection risk or can execute transactions at a greater velocity.  Policies that 
reduce transaction fees motivate markets to fragment customers based on unique 
characteristics.  Technological advancements fragment customers based on their execution 
speed without the need for a unique order book.  Market completeness is also a driving force 
behind the desire to allow foreign investors access to local equities.  Doing so increases the 
level of oversight and reduces information asymmetry by consolidating information from a 
wider investor pool.  
2.3.1 Retail vs. Institutional 
Financial exchanges promote fragmentation in investor classes when they limit access to 
liquidity to investors that fall within specific guidelines.  One particular investor class that 
exchanges choose to isolate from general liquidity pools are retail investors.  Exchanges offer 
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liquidity providers the option to advertise trading opportunities exclusively to investors who 
trade on their own accord using personal accounts.  Retail investors are generally considered 
to be less informed compared to institutional investors.  Retail investors have a limited 
capacity to anticipate stock demand as well as formulate high-quality private information 
regarding fundamental asset valuation.  Liquidity providers find this desirable as executing 
retail trades makes it easier for them to maintain a neutral level of market exposure.  These 
practices are extensions to existing services offered by equity exchanges.  Investors have the 
option to continue trading within the standard, advertised, order book or divert their 
transactions to a protected order book. Such policies fragment the market as they create 
liquidity pools from which some investors are isolated, while other investors maintain access 
to the consolidated order book.   
Retails liquidity programs (RLPs), also commonly referred to as retail price improvement 
programs (RPIs), are a form of market structure policy that promotes the fragmentation of 
retail investor liquidity within quote-driven and competitive exchanges (Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam, 1995; Kandel & Marx, 1999; Parlour & Rajan, 2003).  They encourage the 
migration and isolation of retail activity by offering improvements to transaction costs 
compared to trades submitted to the consolidated order book.  In order to submit a limit order 
to the RLP, liquidity providers must offer retail investors the opportunity to transact at prices 
that improve upon the best bid and offer prices available in the standard order book.  Retail 
brokers are also charged lower fees by exchanges for routing client orders to RLPs and benefit 
from executing small orders which are typically balanced evenly on both sides of the other 
book.  Therefore, a desire to reduce transaction costs for retail investors and liquidity 
providers motivates innovations that lead to the separation of retails and institutional orders.   
Several exchanges across the globe have adopted RLPs including Alpha Exchange (2011) and 
Aequitas (2015) in Canada, BATS (2012) and NASDAQ (2013) in the US, and the NYSE 
Euronext (2012) in Europe. 
RLPs are closely related to dark pools as they traditionally operate without pre-trade 
transparency.  Trade prices and quantities are not publicly advertised in the absence of pre-
trade transparency rules.  As a result, trade information is only made available following a 
successful transaction.  One reason for operating outside of the advertised order book is that it 
allows for liquidity providers to offer improved prices without the need to conform to tick 
size restrictions.  Exemptions from tick size restrictions are particularly useful when bid-ask 
spreads span a single tick.  Price improvements would not be feasible without the 
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circumvention of such restrictions.  Early research into payment for order flow argues that the 
practice is only viable given tick size limitations and would disappear should the tick size 
reduce to zero (Chordia & Subrahmanyam, 1995; Kandel & Marx, 1999; Parlour & Rajan, 
2003).  However, not all researchers agree, as R. Battalio and Holden (2001) show that 
payment for order flow endures the introduction of decimalisation.   
Theory on order flow segmentation focusses on the routing decisions of brokers.  Parlour and 
Rajan (2003) study the phenomenon surrounding brokers who are willing to pay for order 
flow.  Their model finds that payment for order flow leads to wider bid-ask spreads as brokers 
attempt to recuperate losses resulting from said payments.  Payment for order flow also leads 
to an increase in transaction costs for market makers which has an unfavourable effect on 
market quality.  R. Battalio and Holden (2001) do not predict such a one-sided outcome.  
They find that the order flow internalisation is contingent on the degree of competitiveness of 
the broker.  Therefore, while cost reduction motivates the creation of programs that separate 
retail liquidity from the consolidated pool, research shows that the intention does not always 
align itself with the outcome.  R. H. Battalio (1997) provides empirical evidence that 
transaction costs improve upon implementation of these changes.  However, Bloomfield and 
O'Hara (1998) provide experimental results that contrast these findings and align themselves 
more the theoretical results presented by Parlour and Rajan (2003). 
R. H. Battalio (1997) studies the events surrounding the entry of a third market broker-dealer 
who focusses on purchasing and executing retail investor orders.  The author finds that bid-
ask spreads improve upon the firm’s entry into the market and that the fragmentation of such 
retail trades did not result in any significant adverse effects on market liquidity. The results 
also show that changes to adverse selection risk are not economically significant as a result of 
retail order fragmentation.  In contrast, Bloomfield and O'Hara (1998) use an experimental 
analysis to show that payment for order flow leads to wider bid-ask spreads. 
The theoretical dark pool model of Zhu (2014) is related to the existence of RLPs as RLPs 
often operate without pre-trade transparency.  The Zhu (2014) model also finds that, like 
RLPs, dark pools incentivises the segmentation of informed and uninformed orders flow.  Zhu 
(2014) predicts that the migration of uninformed trades to a separate liquidity pool improves 
price discovery on the traditional exchange through the concentration of informed trading.  
However, such benefits come at the cost of reduced liquidity as market makers are 
discouraged from participating with increasingly knowledgeable counterparties.  Boulatov 
and George (2013) also find that dark trading increases the informative of prices as the 
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competition among informed traders intensifies. However, unlike Zhu (2014), they find that 
segregation of informed and uninformed investors improves liquidity. 
Studies that distinguish between and measure the contributions of institutional versus retail 
order flow on market conditions help gain empirical insight into the effects of such investor 
isolation programs.  Institutional investors are arguably more rational and well-informed than 
retail investors Aggarwal and Rao (1990).   Easley et al. (1996) contend that retail order 
isolation can improve price discovery on exchanges.  They find that the informational content 
of NYSE trades far exceeds those of the regional Cincinnati Stock Exchange.  As a result, 
retail order isolation is at least partially motivated by a desire to reduce information 
asymmetries amongst investors by improving the quality of signals conveyed by stock prices.  
Easley et al. (1996) attribute this to the NYSE’s ability to internalise and absorb retail order 
flow, thus fragmenting the market to isolate informed and uninformed order pools.  Chordia 
and Subrahmanyam (1995) also find that orders diverted from the NYSE through payment for 
order flow activities are less informed. The implication is that payment for order flow is often 
used to cream-skim the most profitable orders from exchanges. E. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) 
later corroborate these findings when they find that institutional trading, which is generally 
considered to be informed, plays a vital role in price discovery.  Using NYSE listed stocks 
from 1983 to 2004, they find that institutional investment is positively related to the 
informational efficiency of prices.  Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) also find a strong 
positive relationship between institutional trading volume and daily stock returns. 
Institutional investors are recognised as being more informed due to their superior ability to 
gather private information.  However, recent studies argue that retail investors are becoming 
more informed. Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) and  Kelley and Tetlock (2013) propose that 
retail trades are beginning to contain more information regarding future returns Kaniel et al. 
(2008) find a positive correlation between short term returns and retail investor trading 
volume.  Kelley and Tetlock (2013) also find a positive relationship between future stock 
returns and the imbalance of limit and market orders for retail investors.  The imbalance is 
indicative of the informational content of retail market orders.  This may raise doubt into 
information asymmetry reduction being a supporting motivational factor in the emergence of 
instances of retail order fragmentation.  However, the majority of the research discussed in 
this section supports the notion. 
In summary, isolating retail investor orders from institutional orders extends upon the existing 
services offered by equity exchanges.  The desire to protect uninformed investors from 
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predatory traders motivates innovation, leading to fragmentation based on perceived levels of 
investor expertise.  An increased concentration of informed trading activity leads to more 
informative transaction prices.  This, in turn, reduces levels of information asymmetry, though 
is not necessarily the primary goal of such innovations (see Figure 2-8). 
2.3.2 Foreign Investors (International Cross Listing) 
When firms cross-list their shares on foreign stock exchanges, they fragment the market into 
distinct liquidity pools based on geographic location.  However, this also has the effect of 
creating a more complete market. New subsets of investors can now apply their expertise 
regarding a particular stock, thereby contributing to market efficiency. 
Cross-listing shares in overseas markets is not a new occurrence.  Since the 1980s, firms have 
chosen to have their shares represented on markets outside of their respective countries.  The 
United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) are amongst the most popular choices.  
This choice is internally driven as firms make the conscious decision to cross-list rather than 
being compelled to do so to adhere to regulatory requirements or investor demands.   Duel-
listing on exchanges such as the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), NASDAQ, and the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the U.S. and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the 
U.K. are proven to be the most beneficial choices (Dodd & Louca, 2012; Ghadhab & Hellara, 
2016; Roosenboom & Van Dijk, 2009; Sarkissian & Schill, 2009).  Roosenboom and Van 
Dijk (2009) show that firms who cross-list in either of the two aforementioned markets 
experience improvements in market valuation.  Ghadhab and Hellara (2016) find that U.S. 
cross-listing leads to greater contributions to price discovery when compared to other foreign 
exchanges, including the LSE.   
Some firms, however, choose to cross-list more regionally.  (Dodd, 2013) shows that 
investors are more inclined to participate in share trading with stocks originating from 
countries with which they are familiar.  Familiarity increases among stocks who exist within a 
similar vicinity as this has positive effects on the flow of information (Portes & Rey, 2005; 
Sarkissian & Schill, 2009).   
International cross-listing is an extension to traditional services offered by exchanges.  This 
form of financial innovation provides investors with the opportunity to access shares of 
international firms within the same trading environment they traditionally use. As such, 
international cross-listing extends the services offered by the exchange by allowing for the 
easier facilitation of international diversification. International cross-listing also contributes to 
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market completeness for cross-listing firms as it deepens the pool of potential investors.  
Without access to foreign shares, investors suffer from participating in markets in which they 
cannot span all states of nature.  International cross-listing facilities the movement of funds 
across an increasing number of states of time and space and allows investors to better manage 
risk factors through diversification. 
Given the current global nature of the financial landscape, firms are choosing to cross-list 
across exchanges in multiple countries (Ghadhab & Hellara, 2016; Ghadhab & M’rad, 2018).  
Doing so allows firms to market themselves within an even larger pool of potential investors.  
The presence of a wider investor pool fuels growth through greater access to funding resulting 
from improved capital costs (Pagano, Röell, & Zechner, 2002).  Therefore, the desire to adapt 
to increasing globalisation in financial markets motivates the phenomenon of international 
cross-listing.  
In addition to these traditional forms of cross-listing, Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) 
in Europe have increased international access to shares by allowing for cross-border trading.  
Academics, however, are unable to determine the exact benefits of such actions with research 
into the topic leading to equivocal results.  Research has deciphered various motivations 
behind the decision to cross-list.   
Consolidation of Investors 
Sarkissian and Schill (2009) and Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010) determined that companies 
cross-list to consolidate the geographically fragmented investor base.  By doing so, they 
bypass the barriers to entry for foreign investments and make their shares more readily 
available to a wider array of potential investors.  Companies that do not cross-list are largely 
dependent upon the investors in their original listing country.  As a result, single-listed 
companies are unable to benefit from the diversification requirements and risk-sharing of 
foreign investors.  They are also unable to leverage the expertise of informed traders residing 
outside its sovereign borders and the superior information they may be able to produce 
(Amira & Muzere, 2011; Bailey, Karolyi, & Salva, 2006; Lee & Valero, 2010).  These studies 
suggest that market completing, globalisation and risk management are influential in the 
decision to cross-list internationally. 
The concept of an investor base fragmented by international borders is one of the most widely 
studied motivations for the cross-listing of shares.  Errunza and Losq (1985) and Alexander, 
Eun, and Janakiramanan (1987) are among the first studies to model internationally 
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fragmented (also referred to as ‘segmented’) markets.  They find that domestic investors 
require a lower return on locally listed stocks than they do on securities listed on international 
exchanges. Errunza and Losq (1985) find that when barriers to entry are not uniform across 
investor groups, the group which faces greater obstacles when investing incorporates a 
premium into their pricing model.  This premium reduces upon the subsequent cross-listing of 
the stock. Alexander et al. (1987)  find that companies expand upon their investor base and 
fulfil the investments needs of a more diverse audience when allowed easier access to foreign 
shares.  By expanding the investor base through cross-listing companies also allow for greater 
risk-sharing among investors which in turn lowers their overall required returns, when 
compared to singly listed firms.  Specifically, foreign investors are less exposed to risks 
associated with exchange rates, inflation, and interest rates as well as greater financial 
oversight.  Alexander et al. (1987)  verify these results empirically and find that non-Canadian 
stocks which cross-list internationally experienced a decline in required returns compared to 
when they were singly listed.  The result is an increase in the overall share price.   
Before 1990, stock markets were found to be greatly fragmented (segmented) across 
sovereign borders as they did not have access to an internationally diverse array of investors.  
Empirical studies find that non-US firms experience an increase in share prices upon cross-
listing in the U.S. market.  Errunza and Losq (1985) and Alexander et al. (1987) show that by 
listing shares in a foreign market, companies can consolidate their investor base and decrease 
the level of segmentation in the market (Foerster & Karolyi, 1999; Serra, 1999), leading to an 
increase in share prices.   
However, not all researchers agree that the consolidation of the foreign investor market leads 
to positive returns.  Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find that firms from both developed and 
developing countries experience similar effects from international cross-listing.  This outcome 
is not intuitive as firms originating from developed markets should have a more 
internationally consolidated investor base than their developing counterparts. As a result, 
firms originating from developed markets should not experience the same level of benefits 
from international cross-listing. In support of Errunza and Losq (1985), Stulz (1999) argues 
that reducing barriers to entry which significantly limit the investor base should result in a 
significant decrease in a firm’s cost of capital.  But the gains recorded in the previous studies 
are low in comparison to the reduction in the cost of capital (Karolyi, 2006).  Stulz (1999) 
also argues that decreases in barriers to international investment since the 1990s have resulted 
in the consolidation of foreign investors and the expansion of the investor pool for firms in 
45 
 
developed economies.  As a result of the increased globalisation of investor pools, cross-
listing events should decrease due to their reduced benefits.  However, events of cross-listing 
increased during this period as reported by Karolyi (2006).  Therefore, there must exist 
alternative motivations behind a firm’s decision to cross-list. 
Improvements to Price Discovery 
Expanding the investor pool by consolidating geographically fragmented investors can 
improve the price discovery process.  Permanently compounding high-quality information 
into the stock price in a timely fashion benefits both the firm and its investors.  Price 
efficiency is important as theoretical modelling shows that stock prices guide managers into 
making decisions surrounding potential investments (Dow & Gorton, 1997; Subrahmanyam 
& Titman, 1999).  
International cross-listing, particularly in the U.S., can result in improvements to the price 
discovery process and improves the accuracy of pricing information.   These improvements to 
price discovery provide further evidence that reducing information asymmetry is a supporting 
factor in the decision to cross-list as doing.   In a study of AMEX and NYSE listed shares, 
Noronha, Sarin, and Saudagaran (1996) find that informed trading increases following 
international cross-listing, leading to more efficient and informative prices.  However, the 
primary market is still believed to provide the majority of price disseminating information.  
Foreign exchanges contribute to price discovery as they can often trade shares at prices that 
differ from those in the primary local exchange.  Kaul and Mehrotra (2007) show that 
Canadian shares cross-listed on U.S. exchanges often trade at noticeably different prices once 
transactions costs have been accounted for.  The U.S. exchanges can be attractive to Canadian 
investors as they allow them to both save money when transacting as well as open the door to 
potential arbitrage profits.   These results are supported by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010).   
Price discovery largely occurs in the primary domestic exchange (Su & Chong, 2007); 
however, not all studies agree that this is a constant relationship.  Using data on U.S.-listed 
Canadian stocks,  Eun and Sabherwal (2003) find that U.S. trading contributes on average 
38.1% of the price forming information. The extent of the contribution is proportionally 
related to U.S. trading volume and inversely related to bid-ask spreads.  Pascual, Pascual-
Fuster, and Climent (2006) support the notion that contribution to price discovery is related to 
trading activity.  In their study of U.S. cross-listed Spanish stocks, Pascual et al. (2006)  find 
that the Spanish Stock Exchange contributes the vast majority of information due to the high 
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proportional volume of trading activity, compared to the NYSE.  Frijns, Gilbert, and Tourani-
Rad (2010) study Australian stock cross-listed in New Zealand, and vice versa, from 2002 to 
2007.  Using the Hasbouck (1995) information share (IS) as well as the Grammig, Melvin, 
and Schlag (2005) conditional information share, they too find that primary domestic 
exchange leads in terms of price discovery.  However, over time the larger Australian market 
begins to play a more prominent role in the process for firms of either origin.  The 
contribution of Australian markets is positively related to the growth in the firm and 
negatively related to its trading costs, as measured by the bid-ask spread.  A subsequent study 
by Frijns, Gilbert, and Tourani-Rad (2015) returns the focus to Canadian firms cross-listed on 
major U.S. exchanges such as the AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE.  Utilising the Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995) component share (CS) Frijns et al. (2015) find support for their 2010 study.  
They conclude that price discovery is positively related to trading activity and negatively to 
bid-ask spread transaction costs.   
Chen, Choi, and Hong (2013) also study U.S. traded Canadian firms.  They find that while the 
U.S. contributes to the price discovery process, it is the local Canadian market, the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX), which leads in terms of information share.  Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008)find that the informativeness of stock prices, as measured by stock return variation, 
improves for firms of developing markets who cross-list in the U.S..  Improved analyst 
coverage resulting in the discovery and dissemination of new private information drive these 
improvements as opposed to changes in liquidity, ownership, or adherence to greater 
accounting standards leads.  For this reason, firms from developed economies who cross-list 
in the U.S. experience negative effects with regards to price informativeness.    
Foerster and Karolyi (1999)  argue that domestic market improvements to bid-ask spreads for 
U.S. cross-listed Canadian shares stem from increased competition among U.S. market 
makers.  Moulton and Wei (2009) find the same improvements to transaction costs resulting 
from international cross-listing; however, they attribute the results to competition associated 
with the increased availability of substitute investments.  Conversely, Noronha et al. (1996) 
find that spreads do not improve as increased trading by informed investors has adverse 
effects on the cost of liquidity provision by specialists. As a result, there is not sufficient 





Commitment to Higher Reporting Standards  
Companies may choose to cross-list, both internationally and domestically, to signal to 
investors their intention to adhere to a greater financial reporting standard.  This commitment 
to greater reporting standards leads to improvements in information asymmetry among 
investors as more information is made publicly available.  It also implies a reduction in 
agency costs as it reduces shareholders’ reliance on external monitoring to maintain financial 
transparency. Theoretical models show that firms prefer to cross-list on exchanges that 
impose the strictest disclosure requirements.  By committing to the most rigorous standard 
firms improve liquidity and achieve the greatest reductions to their costs of capital (Amira & 
Muzere, 2011; Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 2006; Huddart, Hughes, & Brunnermeier, 1999) 
leading to an increase in firm valuation (Bailey et al., 2006; Eaton, Nofsinger, & Weaver, 
2007; Roosenboom & Van Dijk, 2009).   Liquidity improves as adherence to greater standards 
allows firms to appeal to a wider range of investors (Fanto & Karmel, 1997).  Baker, 
Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) use data on foreign firms listed on the NYSE and LSE.  They 
confirm that firms who convey their willingness to adopt stricter financial reporting standards 
through listing on said exchanges improve their ability to attract new investors.  Increased 
media coverage, as well as greater interest by financial analysts, are partially responsible for 
the increase in potential investors.      
One of the driving forces behind the improvements to liquidity, cost of capital, and firm 
valuation is the willingness for smaller investors to trade in firms they feel protect their 
interests (Stulz, 1999).  Greater adherence to accounting and reporting standards provides 
smaller and less knowledgeable investors with the confidence to invest in firms while 
simultaneously lowering the costs associated with firm monitoring and risk compensation.  In 
return, this allows firms to raise additional investment capital at a more favourable price.  By 
improving capital acquisition costs, the firm can invest in a wider array of potential projects, 
thus contributing to future growth.  Pagano, Randl, Röell, and Zechner (2001) find empirical 
support for improvements to investor protection surrounding international cross-listing.  
Along with Reese Jr and Weisbach (2002), Pagano et al. (2001) find that firms who choose to 
cross-list in the U.S. tend to have weaker investor protection policies in their primary listing 
country.  
There is some contradictory evidence regarding the motivating factors for international cross-
listing. Saudagaran and Biddle (1995), Pagano et al. (2001) and Fernandes and Giannetti 
(2014) find that firms do not tend to cross-list on exchanges that impose more strict 
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accounting requirements.  Using data from nine stock exchanges across eight countries from 
1981 through 1986, Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) conclude that increased costs associated 
with foreign listing make firms less likely to cross-list on exchanges with greater disclosure 
requirements and accounting standards.  Pagano et al. (2001) find similar results using data 
from 1986 to 1997 for European firms cross-listed in the U.S., along with Fernandes and 
Giannetti (2014) who use data from 1980 to 2006 for foreign firms of 24 countries listed on 
U.S. exchanges such as the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. 
In summary, market completeness, supported by globalisation, contributes to events of 
international cross-listing.  Single-listed companies are unable to benefit from the 
diversification requirements and risk-sharing of foreign investors.  They are also unable to 
leverage the expertise of informed traders residing outside its sovereign borders and the 
superior information they may be able to produce (Amira & Muzere, 2011; Bailey et al., 
2006; Lee & Valero, 2010).  This commitment to greater reporting standards leads to 
improvements in information asymmetry among investors as more information is made 
publicly available.  It also implies a reduction in agency costs as it reduces shareholders’ 
reliance on external monitoring to maintain financial transparency (see Figure 2-8). 
2.3.3 High-Frequency Traders 
The ability of computer programs to source liquidity as well as identify liquidity gaps across 
numerous exchanges simultaneously has also aided in the consolidation6 of equity markets.  
Recent technological advancements have resulted in the creation of a new investor class that 
can process information, execute trades, and submit and cancel order book quotes at high 
speeds.  Algorithmic traders (AT) and their more controversial subgroup, high-frequency 
traders (HFT), have recently entered markets and now regularly interact with the more 
traditional, slower group of investors.  Orders submitted by this new investor class are 
submitted automatically by advanced computing algorithms, rather than through traditional 
means.  AT and HFT orders distinguish themselves from traditional trades by their fast 
reaction times, short holding periods, and frequent trade and order book activity resulting in 
significant increases in trading volume and order book adjustment, respectively.  Firms that 
employ HFT strategies are therefore able to reduce search costs.  They can process the states 
of several markets, both domestic and international, at speeds that far exceed those which can 
be achieved exclusively through human intervention.   This innovation extends upon existing 
trading strategies by providing firms with an alternative method with which to access 
                                                 
6 The reverse of market fragmentation. 
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liquidity.  Firms can adopt these new techniques and change the process by which they 
transact or continue to use traditional means to buy and sell shares.   
Previously, markets were fragmented in that they would only allow for participation by local 
investors.  Today, however, liquidity can be sourced by local and well as international 
investors, with or without the aid of tools to improve latency.  This section reviews research 
into whether the fragmentation of investors into various subclasses benefits markets.  It also 
discusses whether decisions should be made to isolate such investor groups from traditional 
investors, that is, to fragment the market, to improve market conditions.  In recent years 
exchanges have discussed and even implemented policies that exclude certain high-frequency 
trading (HFT) activities under the guise of investor protection 7 .  This results in the 
fragmenting of the market into trading pools that differ based on their level of non-human 
intervention.  For example, 1 April 2012 saw the Investment Regulatory Organisation of 
Canada introduce a limit on the number of electronic messages submitted by market 
participants resulting in a decrease in message traffic of roughly 76%.  Exchanges and 
regulators argue such actions are warranted when certain investor classes negatively impact 
markets through increased adverse selection and systematic risk as well as the saturating 
markets with predatory and non-viable liquidity (Biais & Foucault, 2014). 
The inclusion, or consolidation, of algorithmic and high-frequency traders into the investor 
pool is said to come with several benefits and risks.  According to the policies outlined in the 
second iteration of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II), some of the 
key benefits of software-assisted trading includes greater order execution, increased liquidity 
through greater investor consolidation, narrower bid-ask spreads and decreases in short-term 
volatility leading to more efficient pricing.  Therefore, in addition to benefiting from the 
improved search capabilities, HFTs are motivated by their ability to reduce transaction costs.   
However, MIFID II policymakers outline that consequences arising from the inclusion of 
such an investor class include the submission of duplicate or predatory orders, increased order 
book noise, and overreaction to information.8  Predatory actions such as quote stuffing, where 
thousands of quotes are generated and submitted every second to increase market latency, are 
found to harm liquidity (M. Ye, Yao, & Gai, 2013).   The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) also acknowledges that HFTs are a potential source of ‘phantom 
                                                 
7  Aquis exchanges has banned predatory HFTs in order to protect investor liquidity (Source: 
https://www.aquis.eu/trade-aquis-ban-predatory-hfts/) 
8 The Flash Crash is one of the most famous overreactions resulting from HFT.  It  occurred on the Dow Jones 
Index in May of 2010. 
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liquidity’.  Phantom Liquidity consists of orders submitted order books that subsequently 
disappears when they are most needed by long-term investors.  
Theory of HFT 
While those who employ HFT strategies often benefit from their decision, theoretical 
modelling implies that increased HFT activity has adverse effects on market conditions. 
Evidence suggesting that HFT strategies are motivated by the desire to improve pricing 
information and reducing information asymmetries is mixed, at best (Cartea & Penalva, 
2012).  Their own self-interest instead motivates them.  Investor welfare deteriorates through 
greater information inefficiency and volatility.   High frequency trading models show that 
profits resulting from engaging in such practices largely come at the expense of traditional 
investors who are slower in their responses to changes in market conditions.  
HFTs are not known to be sources of new information (Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, & 
Vega, 2014).  Instead, they facilitate the process of incorporating new information from 
sophisticated investors through the observations order flow, volume, and price signals (Biais 
& Foucault, 2014; Foucault, Hombert, & Roşu, 2016).  By taking advantage of their speed, 
HFTs can piggyback on the costly information gathering of other investors for profit.  Such 
actions negatively impact the informativeness of prices as HFT free-riding dis-incentivise 
investors from acquiring information that can contribute to price discovery (Grossman & 
Stiglitz, 1980).  Foucault et al. (2016) conclude that increased HFT activity leads to an 
emphasis on short-lived and imminent information.  As a result, the prominence of trades 
involving long-term information decreases leading to an impairment in the price discovery 
process.  In this situation, market-makers experience greater adverse selection risk leading to 
a reduction in liquidity.  Emphasis on reaction speed can also create more noise leading to a 
deterioration in the efficiency of prices.  Jarrow and Protter (2012) also find that HFT can 
create temporary deviations from fundamental values leading to less efficient prices. 
In their model, which includes HFTs operating alongside liquidity traders and market makers, 
Cartea and Penalva (2012) find that HFT activity adversely affects liquidity traders.   While 
trading volume increases within the market, liquidity traders suffer from exposure to greater 
volatility and price impacts.  Market makers are less affected as any losses to market shares 
from HFT competition are compensated for by greater profits.   
Biais and Foucault (2014) find that slower investors experience severe adverse selection when 
competing with faster investors who can more quickly process and react to information.  This 
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can potentially discourage retail investors and smaller firms from participating in markets as 
trading costs increase and high price impacts due to market illiquidity become more frequent.  
It can also encourage investment by larger firms into technologies to improve reaction speeds 
to maintain competitiveness rather than information gathering, which contributes to price 
efficiency.  The fragmentation, that is, exclusion or isolation, of HFT investors can, however, 
negatively impact other market participants.  HFTs increase the likelihood of trade execution 
due to their innate ability to quickly source and provide liquidity across different exchanges, 
thereby consolidating liquidity across several trading venues. 
Menkveld and Jovanovic (2016) find a similar adverse selection cost in their model.  They 
find that HFTs can introduce adverse selection into the market when such risks are inherently 
low or non-existent.  A fragmented market in which HFTs were excluded from such 
exchanges, allowing for buyers and sellers to interact in the limit order book, would be more 
beneficial to investors.  However, if adverse selection risks were already present, HFTs who 
benefit from avoiding such risks could impart some of the benefits to investors, thereby 
improving market liquidity and lower transaction costs. 
Empirical HFT Research 
Empirical results generally concur with the existing models regarding greater adverse 
selection risk resulting from increases in HFT activity. Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan 
(2014), Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2017), and Carrion (2013) and  all use a similar 
NASDAQ data-set which explicitly identifies HFTs and find that their participation results in 
increased adverse selection costs for other market participants.  This dataset contains 
information on trades in 120 stocks by 26 firms that identify themselves as HFTs from 2008 
to 2009.  They conclude that the liquidity benefits are not purely one-sided in that they both 
supply and consume liquidity.  Brogaard et al. (2014) also find that HFTs convey information 
through the use of market orders.  They buy market orders prior to positive changes in market 
prices resulting in permanent price effects that exceed those of traditional, non-electronic 
investors.  Chaboud et al. (2014) contradict these findings using foreign exchanges market 
data and claim that human trades are more influential on prices and convey more information 
than those originating from algorithms. 
However, the previous empirical studies suffer in that the scope of their dataset, and the 
overall impact of HFT, is severely limited.  By only using markets where HFT activities are 
explicitly identifiable, they do not gain clear insight into the market-wide impacts of HFT.  
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Equity markets have grown increasingly fragmented and HFTs often participate 
simultaneously in multiple exchanges. When studies cannot explicitly identify HFT activities, 
they instead choose to investigate the changes in market conditions surrounding key changes 
to market structure.  They must also resort to using proxies for the levels of algorithmic of 
high-frequency trading. While this allows researchers to study more geographically diverse 
data, it comes at a cost.  Certain proxies may not accurately measure exclusively high-
frequency activity and include noise from low-speed activities.  
Several studies investigate changes to the market such as technological enhancements used to 
improve market latency.   Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) study the impact of the 
inclusion of automated quote dissemination (Auto-quote) on the NYSE which improved the 
efficacy of algorithmic trading.  Using data on 1,082 listed stocks from December 2002 to 
July 2003, Hendershott et al. (2011) find the effects automated quote dissemination to be 
beneficial.  They use the number of electronic messages, which they normalise by trading 
volume, as a proxy for algorithmic trading.  Particularly for large stocks, algorithmic trading 
(AT) results in narrower quoted and effective spreads and decreases adverse selection costs, 
fuelling improvements in liquidity.  It also shifts the dynamic of price discovery and sees 
order books quotes increasingly becoming the source of permanent price forming information 
when compared to transaction prices.  Effects on smaller sized firms are not found to be 
statistically significant. 
In contrast, McInish and Upson (2013) show that slow traders suffer from adverse prices 
when interacting with HFTs who benefit from lower latency.  Fast traders intentionally avoid 
certain orders leaving slower traders to fulfil them at less favourable prices.  The results in 
McInish and Upson (2013) support earlier assertions that HFTs are motivated by self-interest 
and are not necessarily interested in improving market conditions. 
Hendershott and Riordan (2013) study data on 30 DAX stocks trading on the Deutsche Boerse 
in January 2008.  They find that ATs play a greater role in monitoring liquidity and 
identifying occurrences of mispricing compared traditional investors.  When it is inexpensive 
to do so, that is, when bid-ask spreads are narrow, ATs consume liquidity. Conversely, they 
choose to supply liquidity when transaction costs increase, and bid-ask spreads are wide.  
Submitting more efficient quotes and demanding liquidity to move prices when it is 
favourable to do so implies that ATs contribute to price efficiency leading to more stable 
market conditions.  A subsequent study by Brogaard et al. (2014) confirms that HFTs play an 
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imperative role in the price discovery process.  However, this is merely a by-product of HFT 
strategies rather than their intention. 
Using data from 42 equity markets across 39 countries from 2001 to 2011, Boehmer, Fong, 
and Wu (2015) find that AT generally improves liquidity and leads to narrower bid-ask 
spreads.  Like in Hendershott et al. (2011), they find that benefits are substantial for firms 
with a higher market capitalisation.  However, unlike Hendershott et al. (2011), Boehmer, 
Fong, and Wu (2015) find support for the negative liquidity implications of AT on smaller 
firms.  E. Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2013) propose that AT also leads to improvements in the 
efficiency in which price forming information in compounded into the price. Using 
autocorrelation of stock returns as a measure of price inefficiency they find a negative 
relationship when they, similar to Hendershott et al. (2011), use the normalised number of 
messages as a proxy for AT.  Unfortunately, any improvements come at the cost of increased 
volatility.  
Joel Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) use NASDAQ order-level data from 2007 to 2008.   They 
identify HFT activity by the cancellation and immediate (within one second) resubmission of 
limit orders. Activities occurring at such speeds are unlikely to originate from traditional 
investor classes.  Using the level of cancel-and-replace activity as an instrumental variable, 
Joel Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) conclude that increases in HFT activity improve market 
quality.  They observe that increases in the level of cancel-and-replace activities correspond 
with a reduction of spreads and short-term volatility as well as an increase displayed depth.  
However, Joel Hasbrouck (2018) finds that high frequency quoting can lead to increases in 
the short-term volatility of spreads that exceed those implied by long-term fundamentals. 
Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) use member-level data for 30 stocks based on the NASDAQ-
OMX Stockholm exchange from 2011 to 2012.  They classify firms into HFT, non-HFT, and 
hybrid groups to construct an accurate HFT dataset. They find support for HFTs and argue 
that HFTs do indeed reduce short-term volatility, as documented in MiFID II.   Hagströmer 
and Nordén (2013) also identify opportunistic HFTs by their low message-to-trade ratios and 
higher investor holdings.  Market-making HFTs exhibit reverse characteristics (high message-
to-trade ratios and low inventory levels) and contribute to the majority of trading volume. 
High-frequency methods which allow for the continuous updating of order books through 
frequent order submissions and cancellations can negatively impact liquidity.    Markets 
experience widening spreads (Han, Khapko, & Kyle, 2014)and a decline in depth which is 
54 
 
particularly detrimental to traditional investors Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2014).  Upson 
and Van Ness (2017) also show that depth is adversely affected by AT at the national best bid 
and offer price.  Hasbrouck (2018) also finds that high frequency quoting can lead to 
increases in the short-term volatility of spreads that exceed those implied by long-term 
fundamentals.  
Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2016) identify increased HFT activity by periods of 
abnormally frequent quote submission.  They use periods during which quoting activity 
exceeds 20 standard deviations above standard levels for a particular stock over one to ten-
minute periods.  They find that these events are common and can occur hundreds of times per 
day across a wide array of stocks.  During these times, they find that markets quality suffers in 
that bid-ask spreads widen and price volatility increases. 
In summary, the innovation of HFT is an extension to existing trading methods. Reductions in 
transaction and search costs motivate HFT.  HFTs can process the states of several markets, 
both domestic and international, at speeds that far exceed those which can be achieved 
exclusively through human intervention.  This innovation extends upon existing trading 
strategies by providing firms with an alternative method with which to access liquidity.  The 
desire to capitalise on recent technological advancements also motivates innovation in HFT 
(see Figure 2-8). 
2.4 Substitutionary Fragmentation 
Substitutionary fragmentation occurs upon the introduction of an alternative asset alongside 
existing financial assets.  These events fragment the market as they divert investment to new 
products and limit the amount of trading in any given asset.  Alternative assets can take the 
form of derivative products as well as variants of existing offerings.   Options markets are 
used as a means of studying the fragmentation of investors upon the introduction of substitute 
investment products.  This section explores what motivates investors to enter such markets 
and the extent to which such innovations affect conditions in traditional equity exchanges.  
Next, this section explores substitute cryptocurrencies and the motivating factors behind their 
development.  Finally, it addresses the impact that these alternatives to Bitcoin have on the 
overall cryptocurrency market.  The driving factors behind substitutionary fragmentation are 




Figure 2-9: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Substitutionary Fragmentation) 
The taxonomy in Figure 2-9  depicts the factors that motivate the fragmentation of investors 
across financial assets through the introduction of substitute financial assets.  Substitutionary 
fragmentation normally leads to the formation of new products and services. Equity 
substitutes, such as equity-based derivatives, fragment investors by introducing new asset 
classes.  Equity substitutes promote market completeness as they allow investors to engage 
new strategies that mitigate risk. A secondary motivator is improved transaction costs. 
Increased informed investor activity also reduces levels of information asymmetry, but this is 
more a consequence of derivative (option) trading rather than the motivation behind such 
innovations. In contrast, technological advancements in computing and decentralised 
networking are the primary motivators leading to the development of modern-day 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin as currency substitutes. The subsequent development of 
altcoins represents a modification or extension upon existing features offered by Bitcoin.  A 
desire to mitigate risk associated with traditional fiat currencies and monetary policies also 
motivate the development and adoption of new cryptocurrencies.   This implies that 
globalisation and risk management plays a significant role in the growing popularity of 




Options markets are the primary example of substitutionary fragmentation in equity.  The 
creation of equity options offers investors an alternative to traditional forms of equity 
investment, though they are also used in conjunction with share purchases.  Derivatives, 
including options, futures, and swaps, provide investors with several benefits.  For one, they 
allow investors to engage in strategies that may otherwise not be available with traditional 
asset classes such as equity shares.  Therefore, options promote market completeness.  
Options can help reduce the cost of portfolio diversification.  They also allow investors to 
leverage their investment funds better to take on positions that would otherwise be too 
expensive. The cost of short-selling proves restrictive, as in some cases, participants are 
required to provide collateral.  For example, in the United States (U.S.), Regulation T as 
outlined by the Federal Reserve Board requires an initial margin of 150% of the value of the 
short sale.  This means that even after investors locate a counterparty willing to lend them 
their shares they are still responsible for contributing 50% of the value of the share sale 
towards the initial margin in addition to providing the lender with compensation. Finally, 
options also allow investors to mitigate risk associated with an investment in equity shares.   
The relationship between options and their ability to contribute to the development of 
complete markets is a key motivating factor behind the development of these and other 
derivative products. The relationship between options and short-sale constraints is used to 
study innovations that lead to substitutionary fragmentation.  Short-sale constraints take the 
form of both costs and risk associated with short-selling as well as legal restrictions imposed 
on investors.  Damodaran and Lim (1992) and Figlewski and Webb (1993) find that short-
selling activity increases upon the introduction of options. Their research shows that if retail 
investors are subject to greater short-selling constraints compared to options market makers, 
then short-selling activity in the market increases.  Increased short-selling activity occurs as 
retail investors look towards options markets to employ strategies that mimic short-sales.  
These actions fragment the market as traditional equity investors are forced to migrate to 
derivative markets to employ their desired investment strategies.  By synthesising short equity 
positions, options help complete the market for retail investors who wish to engage in bearish 
investment strategies.  However, this increases the overall number of short positions as 
market makers, who face lesser short-selling constraints, use short-selling as a means of 
hedging positions taken by options traders.   
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Negative abnormal returns are also found to convey the notion that options help complete 
markets by reducing short-sale constraints.  Miller (1997) claims that impediments to short-
selling discourage bearish investors from participating in the market.  As a result, investors 
with a more positive outlook on future expectations play a greater role in formulating prices.  
Therefore, by allowing investors to circumvent short-sale restrictions, greater use of options is 
associated with negative abnormal returns as prices adjust to account for the views of more 
pessimistic investors.  Sorescu (2000) and  Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) find empirical 
evidence to support Miller’s (1977) findings when studying listed options from 1980 to 1995.  
Faff and Hillier (2005) find contradictory results using data on U.K. options.  However, Faff 
and Hillier (2005) focus exclusively on returns corresponding to the options first trading day.  
Therefore, an influx of informed trading arguably drives the results.  This occurs as investors 
use options to leverage their positions better, thereby taking advantage of the improvements to 
transaction costs that options provide. Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) also find that 
the level of price discovery associated with options is higher for out-of-the-money options.  
The increased informativeness of out-of-the-money options provides further support that 
options traders value leverage as a means of reducing costs.  Increased informed investor 
activity reduces levels of information asymmetry and provides support for the efficient market 
hypothesis.  However, this is a consequence of options trading rather than the motivation 
behind such innovation and the resulting increase in its popularity. 
Improvements to market efficiency are not considered a leading motivational factor behind 
this form of substitutionary fragmentation, though they play a supporting role.  Fedenia and 
Grammatikos (1992) find that bid-ask spreads reduce upon the introduction of options to the 
market.  Lower bid-ask spreads improve market conditions by reducing transaction costs. 
Options are also found to contribute to maintaining efficient price levels in equity markets 
(Chakravarty et al., 2004; Patel, Putniņš, Michayluk, & Foley, 2018).  Chakravarty et al. 
(2004) study 60 U.S. firms from 1988 to 1992 using a variation of Hasbrouck’s (1995) 
information share (IS).  Their goal is to measure the level to which options contain permanent 
price adjusting information regarding stock prices.  They find that options markets contribute 
roughly 17% to the price discovery process.  Patel et al. (2018) find similar results in their 
study of U.S. stocks and exchange trades funds (ETFs).  Using another variation of the IS 
measure, the information leadership share, they find that options markets contribute roughly 
33.2% of all price adjusting information.   
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Finally, risk mitigation is a potential motivational factor behind the innovation of options, 
which is a form of substitutionary fragmentation.  Options trading is synonymous with 
hedging and often employed by institutional investors as a means of protecting their 
investments.  C. W. Smith and Stulz (1985) support the concept that firms see risk aversion as 
a motivating factor behind their hedging practices.  Fehrs and Mendenhall (1994)  investigate 
the level of institutional investment in stocks with traded options compared to those without 
traded options.  They find that stocks with options have a greater proportion of institutional 
investment in their shares.  Schizer (2000) shows that tax incentives associated with employee 
stock option plans do not motivate in institutional investors participate in options trading.  
This is due to the existence of noticeable tax disadvantages to hedging restricted stocks.   
In summary, the creation of equity substitutes, that is, equity-based derivatives, fragments 
investors by introducing new asset classes.  Equity substitutes promote market completeness 
as they allow investors to engage in strategies that may otherwise not be available through 
traditional means.  Allow investors to mitigate risk associated with an investment in equity 
shares also promotes innovation leading to the introduction of substitutes products.  Equity 
substitutes lead to improvements in transaction costs. Increased informed investor activity 
reduces levels of information asymmetry and provides support for the efficient market 
hypothesis.  However, any reduction in information asymmetry is a consequence of options 
trading rather than the motivation behind such innovations (see Figure 2-9). 
2.4.2 Substitute Cryptocurrencies 
Since its launch in 2009, Bitcoin is considered the oldest and most popular of the modern-day 
cryptocurrencies.  Its formation stems from a 2008 paper by an anonymous person or group 
working under the name Satoshi Nakamoto which outlines the structure of the currency.  
Today, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are viewed as a medium of exchange and also as an 
alternative investment for speculative investors (Baur & Dimpfl, 2019; Yermack, 2015).  
With average quoted and effective spreads below those available in equity markets, 
cryptocurrencies are supportive of retail investor trading activity (Dyhrberg et al., 2018).  
Bitcoin’s key innovation includes being the first completely decentralised and distributed 
currency.  It operates without the need for either a third-party to manage its value, supply, 
facilitate and clear transactions, or maintain a record of client accounts.  Therefore, Bitcoin 
represents an entirely new innovation in the world of financial assets.  Other forms of virtual 
currencies have existed in the past.  However, recent technological advancements in 
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computing and decentralised networking proved to be catalysts in the development of 
modern-day cryptocurrencies.  Without improvements to computing speeds and device 
connectivity, cryptocurrencies would only exist in theory, especially at the scale in which they 
currently operate. 
Political Discontent 
Political discontent and mistrust of the role government and large financial institutions play in 
monetary policy are among the most wildly studied aspects surrounding the growth of 
cryptocurrencies. A 2014 survey finds that nearly 60% of Bitcoin users identified as having 
libertarian values (Lustig & Nardi, 2015).  Libertarians promote, among other things, the 
importance of individual freedom, privacy, and disbelief in the ability for authoritative powers 
to effectively manage economic policy. These views are not only shared among the users of 
cryptocurrency but are common with the founders as well.  Nakamoto (2019) states that a 
fundamental problem with traditional currencies is the level of trust that society must place in 
traditional financial institutions such as banks, noting that they have breached this trust 
numerous times.  The desire to mitigate risk associated with traditional fiat currencies and 
monetary policies, due to their distrust of traditional financial institutions, motivate Bitcoin 
developers and its users.  By not being subject to such policies, Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies have succeeded in developing a globalised currency platform that spans 
sovereign borders. 
Altcoins 
However, Bitcoin is not the only modern cryptocurrency.  The cryptocurrency market soon 
fragmented and presented investors with a plethora of alternative currencies, otherwise 
referred to as altcoins.  This is due to the source code for Bitcoin is readily available online9, 
thus acting as a catalyst for growth by lowering barriers to entry for new currency founders.  
Beginning in 2011, developers adopted this readily available resource and introduced new 
currencies into the market that either slightly or widely vary from the original offering.  Some 
have opted to copy the original code and make only slight variations to distinguish themselves 
from Bitcoin. As a result, many cryptocurrencies differ very little from each other (Kogias et 
al., 2016), and the market views new cryptocurrencies as direct substitutes from a technical 
standpoint.  However, other cryptocurrencies have brought forth and incorporated significant 
advancements.  Therefore, subsequent entries into the cryptocurrency market are view as 
                                                 
9 A current version of the Bitcoin source code can be found on GitHub. (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin) 
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either modification or extensions to existing offerings.  The degree of innovation is dependent 
on the level of differentiation between the new cryptocurrencies and existing ones. 
Litecoin and Peercoin are among two early Bitcoin competitors.  Categorised as alternatives 
that improve upon the shortcomings of Bitcoin, they offer improved transaction times and 
improved or non-predefined coin limits. Litecoin and Peercoin also reduce the reliance on 
specialised mining hardware, which poses a threat to the ultimate goal of a network 
decentralisation.  Specialised hardware empowers only the most technologically advanced 
miners as it encourages miners to work together by merging into larger pools.  Litecoin and 
Peercoin are two examples are instances of modifications to the original product.  Dowd and 
Hutchinson (2015) argue that the potential for miners to collude and amass a minimum 51% 
market share may eventually lead to the collapse of Bitcoin.   The subsequent introduction of 
services such as CoinCreator.net further facilitated the diversity in cryptocurrencies by 
allowing individuals with no programming experience to create new currencies.   
According to Tarasiewicz and Newman (2015), there were ten competitors to Bitcoin in 
circulation by the end of 2011.  The oldest and most widely known of these altcoins in 
Litecoin.  Litecoin was established in 2011 and improved upon Bitcoin by upgrading the 
confirmation speed of transactions by 75%.  The number of Bitcoin alternatives increased to 
215 by the end of 2013, with only a small minority of 5 cryptocurrencies operating without 
the use of the publicly available Bitcoin source code.  Today, there are 2,136 cryptocurrencies 
on offer to investors, according to CoinMarketCap.com.  Of these 2,136 cryptocurrencies, 
only 12 have a market capitalisation of at least $1 billion.  Ease of implementation, as well as 
the level of profitability new cryptocurrencies present to their founders, represent key 
motivational factors behind the increase in the number of cryptocurrencies (Gandal & 
Halaburda, 2016).  Bitcoin, however, remains the dominant cryptocurrency with a market 
capitalisation of approximately 50% as of March 2019 (Figure 2-10)10.  Velde (2013) argues 
that due to its first-mover advantage, Bitcoin has solidified itself as having a ‘quasi-
monopoly’.  However, Bitcoin's dominance is under threat from the ever-competitive 
landscape resulting from the introduction of new altcoins.   
 
                                                 




Figure 2-10: Market Capitalisation of Cryptocurrencies 
Source: Coinmarketcap.com (March 2019) 
The current number of active cryptocurrencies does not, however, fully represent the level of 
activity in the market regarding new entrants.  While many new cryptocurrencies have entered 
the market since the introduction of Bitcoin, many have not managed to survive.  Lánský 
(2016) finds that of the 1278 cryptocurrencies identified in their study, more than half (688) 
no longer exist.  Of those 688 now-defunct currencies, 399 ceased operations within their first 
24 weeks.  If a currency manages to survive for 124 weeks, the probability of failure reduces 
significantly, with only three cryptocurrencies failing beyond this point.   These figures 
convey the competitiveness of the cryptocurrency market.  
Lánský (2016) finds that competition from more innovative currencies is a driving factor 
leading towards significant currency devaluation of at least 10%.  A consequence of this is the 
potential failure of a cryptocurrency.  Lánský (2016) also identifies the 2013-2014 pricing 
bubble and failure of national cryptocurrencies as leading factors in significant currency 
devaluation.  Regarding the regulation of the creation of new private currencies, Williamson 
(2002) presents a matching model that allows for the circulation of private money.  They find 
that, despite problems associated with coordination and private information, private 
currencies are superior to fiat ones in that they allow for the intermediation of investment.  As 
a result, Williamson (2002) argues that restrictions on the issue of private currencies are not in 
the best interest of the market.   
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Therefore, Bitcoin, altcoins, and other private currencies represent permanent innovation.  
The degree to which they differ from each other determines the degree of innovation they 
propose.  Truly novel offerings, particular first-movers such as Bitcoin, are new innovations.  
Others build upon existing offerings through extension or modification.   Cryptocurrencies 
take advantage of technological shocks to distinguish themselves from other asset classes and 
each other to gain market share. 
Modelling Competition 
The study of competition amongst private currencies has a long history.  Hayek (1990) laid 
the foundation for modern works on the denationalisation of currencies and their ability to 
compete.  Hayek (1990) argues that governments hold a monopoly on currencies at the 
detriment to society as individuals must continue using the currencies available despite any 
flaws they present.  Hayek (1990) argues that an economy in which financial agencies can 
independently issue new currencies has a positive effect on all available currencies, including 
the previously monopolistic national currency.   These positive effects occur as the failure to 
conform to the best standard available leads to the failure of any substandard currencies. Proof 
of Hayek’s (1990) theory is evident today as only a handful of cryptocurrencies maintain 
significant market shares. Other, more inferior, currencies fail due to their non-competitive 
offerings.   
Hayek (1990) argues that there exists an equilibrium price level among competing private 
currencies.  However, most subsequent studies argue that such an equilibrium does not exist.  
Calvo (1978) and White (1999) propose that this is due to a time-consistency problem where 
issuers of a private currency believe that they will eventually limit the issuance but fail 
actually to do so.   Taub (1985) provides proof supporting the lack of equilibrium using an 
overlapping-generations model.   
Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches (2017) present the first modern theoretical study into 
competition among privately issued currencies.  Their model uses the standard (Lagos & 
Wright, 2005) approach while adding a feature whereby entrepreneurs create on currencies to 
maximise profits better.  The study differentiates itself from previous works by not allowing 
currencies to be redeemed for other assets. In contrast to previous studies, Fernández-
Villaverde and Sanches (2017) find that there exists an equilibrium where the prices of 
competing currencies stabilise.  They also find that, like government-issued currencies, 
private currencies are susceptible to devaluation due to inflationary effects.  Inflationary 
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effects have the power to reduce the value of each currency to zero over time (Obstfeld & 
Rogoff, 1983).  Lagos and Wright (2005) show that in a world with only private currencies, it 
is not possible to achieve an optimal money supply in the way that is possible with the supply 
of goods and services.  They also find support for the notion that a single private currency can 
dominate all others and become the lone source of currency in the market, thereby reducing 
the level of substitutionary fragmentation.  Competition plays a vital role in determining 
whether the development of new currencies represents a permanent change to the investment 
landscape. Failure to compete leads some cryptocurrencies to only exist in a temporal sense.  
Price Dynamics 
Other research into competing cryptocurrencies focuses on pricing dynamics and attempts to 
identify the mechanisms behind changes in the value of various cryptocurrencies.  Gandal and 
Halaburda (2016) study the change in prices for seven cryptocurrencies from May 2013 to 
July 2014 on the Btce exchange, which at the time represented a 30% of cryptocurrency 
exchange activity (Gandal & Halaburda, 2016).They focus on Bitcoin (BTC) and Litecoin 
(LTC) which at the time of the study, represent market shares of 90% and 5%, respectively.   
The remaining five currencies, each of which represent less than 1% of the total market share 
of cryptocurrencies as of January 13 2014, are Namecoin (NMC), Feathercoin (FTC), 
Novacoin (NVC) and Terracoin (TRC).  The study aims to explain price variations as either 
being caused by a ‘reinforcement effect’ or ‘substitution effect’.  The reinforcement effect 
argues that the popularity of a currency drives its future growth as investors gravitate towards 
a single currency believing that it will eventually dominate all others in the market.  The 
substitution effect attributes price changes to investors migrating to new currencies.  Investors 
migrate to currencies that either innovate upon existing offerings or are viewed as being 
overvalued or too volatile. Gandal and Halaburda (2016) find that neither effect is dominant 
in the early stages of the study.  However, starting in October 2013, the authors find that the 
substitution effect reveals itself as a key explanatory factor in the synchronous changes in 
pricing among the cryptocurrencies included in the study.  However, Gandal and Halaburda 
(2016)  acknowledge that some of the increases in the substitutional effect are due to the 
rising popularity of the cryptocurrency market.  The reinforcement plays a more significant 
role in price changes in the final period of the study.  During this time, the price of Bitcoin 
increased while the remaining cryptocurrencies experienced devaluation.  Such price patterns 
are indicative of migration of investment towards the dominant currency.   
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Corbet, Lucey, Peat, and Vigne (2018) further investigate the informational linkages between 
cryptocurrencies and measurements of investable assets.  The key measures they employ are 
market indices, gold prices, and the USD exchange rate. Using a variance decomposition 
introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), Corbet et al. (2018) measure the direction and 
intensity of informational spillovers across assets.  They do not find a strong relationship 
between cryptocurrency prices and those of other asset markets.  However, they do find that 
Bitcoin prices have a significant effect on both Litecoin and Ripple prices with spillovers of 
42.3% and 28.37%, respectively.  Conversely, spillover from Litecoin and Ripple onto 
Bitcoin prices is minimal, at 5.47% and 7.11%, respectively.  These results position Bitcoin as 
a clear leader in cryptocurrency pricing. 
In summary, Bitcoin represents an entirely new innovation in the world of financial assets. 
The subsequent development of altcoins represents a modification or extension upon existing 
features offered by Bitcoin.  This is because most altcoins rely on publicly available Bitcoin 
source code for their foundation.   Recent technological advancements in computing and 
decentralised networking act as the motivating factor leading to the development of modern-
day cryptocurrencies. A desire to mitigate risk associated with traditional fiat currencies and 
monetary policies also motivate the development and adoption of new cryptocurrencies.   This 
implies that globalisation and risk management plays a significant role in the growing 
popularity of cryptocurrencies (see Figure 2-9). 
2.5 Financial Fragmentation 
Financial fragmentation is defined as the lack of perfect market integration.  Under such 
conditions, the law of one price no longer holds and markets move towards a state of 
disequilibrium.  Instances of financial fragmentation are most common in debt markets.  For 
example, they occur when yield spreads on bonds from various countries differ once all 
relevant risk factors are accounted for (Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova, & Monnet, 2004).  
Unlike previously discussed forms of fragmentation, financial fragmentation is not internally 
motivated by the goals of market participants (see Figure 2-11).  Financial fragmentation does 
not result from the explicit actions of individuals or firms who aim to change how investors 
transact in financial markets through the modification of processes and products.  Rather, 
external shocks lead to financial fragmentation.  Financial fragmentation is a consequence 
these external shocks, rather than the cause.  Therefore, since financial fragmentation does not 
fall under the traditional ‘process’ and ‘product’ categories of innovation, ‘pricing’ is 




Figure 2-11: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Financial Fragmentation) 
 
Existing studies agree that levels of heterogeneity in bond yields are not sufficient as a sole 
indicator of market fragmentation (Zaghini, 2016).  Heterogeneity in bond yields is not 
sufficient because spreads are affected by the issuer’s credit rating as well as the various 
features of a bond, including its liquidity and duration.  Therefore, the first step in 
determining the extent of financial fragmentation is controlling for the potential risk factors 
that influence the premium.  After accounting for all risk factors, any deviations are attributed 
to country-specific and signify the presence of cross-border financial fragmentation (Zaghini, 
2016).   This section focusses on instances of financial fragmentation in Europe.  Europe has 
experienced multiple changes in levels of financial fragmentation over the past two decades, 
as is used as a backdrop for the majority of research in the field (Baele et al., 2004; de Sola 
Perea & Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2014).   
Since integration efforts began in the 1990s, the Eurozone has experienced significant market 
integration and has benefited through increased trade and capital flows across its member 
states (Baele et al., 2004).  These effects were exacerbated in 1999 upon the introduction of 
the Euro currency as it eliminated any exposure to Euro-wide exchange rate risk for its 
members.  The formation of the Eurozone and adoption of the Euro currency represents two 
significant economic shocks that motivated changes in the levels of financial fragmentation in 
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Europe. From the introduction of the Euro currency until 2007, the Eurozone experienced 
rapid financial integration evident in terms of both the volume and prices of fixed income (de 
Sola Perea & Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2014).   
However, integration of Eurozone credit markets began to subside in 2007 upon the beginning 
of the subprime crisis.  Most notably, it was after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 
that European financial markets began to experience great duress, which revealed itself in the 
form of a freeze within the interbank market, increased reliance on ECB liquidity facilities, 
and greater deviation in sovereign debt yields.  Bank lending rates also began to differ across 
national borders, and retail investors began to favour domestic securities over foreign 
securities.  Battistini et al. (2014) refer to the return to domestic securities by investors as a 
fragmentation event of European credit markets.  As a result, globalisation and market 
completeness suffered due to investors’ desires to isolate themselves into domestic investment 
pools.  
The fragmenting events continued into 2010, where government intervention in currency 
stabilisation led to the inability of capital to be accessed by smaller capital markets.  Later, in 
2011, larger countries such as Spain and Italy experienced what Blommestein and Hubig 
(2012), and De Santis (2018) refer to as contagion effects.  The result was a widening of 
sovereign bond spreads across countries that could not be justified by economic 
fundamentals.  These effects later spread into the corporate bond market. During this time, 
companies experienced previously unprecedented risk premiums associated with their 
securities.  However, these changes were not permanent and represented a temporal event.  
The widening of bond spreads and deviation from equilibrium price levels has raised concerns 
about the efficacy of monetary policy in an integrated economic environment (ECB, 2013). 
The interbank market was the first market to be affected by the subprime crisis and as a result, 
was the first market to be investigated during this time from an empirical standpoint.  Angel, 
Harris, and Spatt (2011) argue that the aggregate risk aversion of investors following the 
default of Lehman Brothers, not the riskiness of the financial institution, contributed most 
towards widening spreads in interbank lending rates.   By estimating the country-specific 
effects Garcia-de-Andoain, Hoffmann, and Manganelli (2014) show that many banks faced 
higher funding costs purely due to their nationality.  Since the deviations could not be 
justified, Garcia-de-Andoain et al. (2014) identify these events as instances of financial 
fragmentation.   
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Subsequent studies of financial fragmentation focus on the second stage of the global 
financial crisis and its effect on the government bond market. Research by Georgoutsos and 
Migiakis (2013) and Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli (2014) find that fragmentation results 
from country-specific factors.  However, De Santis (2018) argues that deviations are due to 
contagion effects.  The primary unit of measure of financial fragmentation employed in these 
studies involves comparing credit default swap spreads and sovereign bond yield spreads with 
the German Bunds.  
The duress in the Eurozone market was not contained within banks and financial institutions 
but spread into the corporate bond market as well.  Bedendo and Colla (2015) investigate 
credit default swap data for 118 non-financial firms and find that a 10% increase in sovereign 
risk factors corresponds to a 0.5%-0.8% increase in corporate risk.  Similarly, Pianeselli and 
Zaghini (2014) find that instances in which a single-level downgrade in sovereign ratings 
results in the widening of the corporate bond spread by ten basis points.    
Horny, Manganelli, and Mojon (2016) and Zaghini (2016) also study the existence of 
financial fragmentation in Eurozone corporate bonds.  Horny et al. (2016)  investigate the 
pricing of various non-financial corporate bonds originating in Spain, Italy, Germany, and 
France from 2005 to 2014. Their model employs dummy variables in a simplified approach to 
measuring cross-border financial fragmentation.  They find that German bond spreads are 
largely integrated with those of French bonds, but differ significantly at times from Italian and 
Spanish bond spreads, peaking in 2011 and 2012 respectively.  Zaghini (2016) looks at over 
2400 Euro-based corporate bonds and isolates for the country-specific effects.  They find that 
financial fragmentation peaks during the sovereign debt crisis.  Following this, the financial 
market began to integrate in 2013 and reverted to pre-crisis level in 2014.  This reversion 
effect highlights the temporal nature of financial fragmentation. 
2.6 Discussion 
Figure 2-12 contains the final taxonomy of market fragmentation proposed in this chapter.  It 
connects the various forms of market fragmentation with their corresponding motivational 
factors.  It also maps the degree of innovation associated with each innovation that leads 
towards a fragmenting event.  Classifying the various types of fragmentation has led to some 




Figure 2-12: Taxonomy of Market Fragmentation (Final) 
 
Firstly, expanding upon the general classifications presented by Avlonitis et al. (2001) and 
Tufano (1989) resulted in the three Ps of financial fragmentation: process, product, and 
pricing.  Previous taxonomies focus exclusively on internally motivated financial innovations 
and as a result, only include developments to processes and products.  While this does cover 
the majority of definitions of market fragmentation referenced in the literature, it fails to 
capture the phenomenon of financial fragmentation.  Financial fragmentation is an externally 
driven event whereby economic shocks result in situations where markets lack perfect 
integration.   Such innovations do not expand upon processes or product offerings and 
therefore necessitate the creation of an additional category type.   
Next, the proposed taxonomy distinguishes between permanent and temporal degrees of 
fragmentation.  Internally motivated innovations (for example, additions and modifications) 
lead to permanent changes in financial offerings, whether process-based or product-based.  
Temporal innovations are externally driven and result in the market reverting to previously 
integrated states once the effects of economic shocks have worn off. For this reason, the 
taxonomy classifies temporal innovations by a state of disequilibrium, which markets 
naturally attempt to correct.   
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Regarding the various motivational factors, the traditional factors presented by Tufano (1989) 
only encompass process and product innovation types.  This is understandable as those are the 
only two innovation types included in the author’s taxonomy.  Therefore, a seventh 
motivational factor, economic shocks, is introduced to classify externally driven sources of 
market fragmentation.   
Changes in regulatory policy are a catalyst in driving fragmentation in equity markets, both lit 
and dark.  They are critical in establishing investor confidence in new exchanges and support 
subsequent innovations in equity markets.  The desire to reduce transaction, search, and 
market costs motivate innovation, leading to competitive market fragmentation.  Transaction 
cost reduction plays a particularly significant role in the competitiveness of new exchanges 
and liquidity pools.  This is because exchanges use cost savings as a primary marketing tool 
for attracting liquidity in order to help facilitate the timely execution of transactions.  
Historically, this has been one of the leading factors influencing fragmentation in quote driven 
markets.  It also continues to be a highly influential factor in more modern forms of 
competitive market fragmentation, particularly amongst dark pools and cryptocurrency 
exchanges.   
Reductions in information asymmetry are influential in process-oriented innovations; 
however, they are not the driving force.  The desire to complete incomplete markets and well 
as take advantage of changes in taxes and regulation also only play a supportive role in 
motivating fragmentation-based process innovations.   
Globalisation, risk management, and technological shocks are considered modern 
motivational factors.  They are associated with more recent innovations in market 
fragmentation such as dark pools, cryptocurrency exchanges and substitutes, and high-
frequency trading.  They are also the only two factors that play a role in motivating all three 
types of process and product innovations: competitive market fragmentation, fragmentation 
based on customer types, and substitutionary fragmentation.    
The degree of fragmentation is different across the various types of fragmentation.  
Competitive market fragmentation events largely represent a modification to existing services.  
These events are also the most plentiful; therefore, it is understandable that they represent the 
degree of innovation that is the least costly to implement.  Fragmentation based on customer 
types exclusively focuses on extending upon existing services.  These events largely occur 
within traditional exchanges and allow investors to participate in such submarkets in addition 
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to using traditional mediums of exchange.  Innovations that represent completely new 
financial products are the most expensive to implement and consequently, they are also the 
least plentiful.    
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter addresses RQ1 and discusses the various forms of fragmentation and how they 
relate to financial innovation. The result of the study is a unique taxonomy of the innovations 
that lead to fragmentation in financial markets.  This framework identifies how the existing 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, interprets the impact of such events on their 
respective financial markets. The taxonomy highlights that not all innovations, including the 
motivating factor that lead to them, are created equal.  Some markets, such as those for 
substitutes to traditional equity investments, are more innovative as they are more focussed on 
the creation of new investable products.  Comparatively, traditional equity markets, or those 
that operate in an exchange structure, are less innovative and focus on small modifications to 
traditional services that aim to serve a particular subset of the market with particular trade 
preferences such as speed and anonymity. 
The final model adapts the taxonomies presented by Avlonitis et al. (2001) and Tufano 
(1989), expanding upon the process and product classifications of financial innovation.  The 
addition of a third classification, pricing, is proposed resulting in the development of the three 
Ps of financial innovation: process, product, and pricing.  These classifications are used to 
identify and categorise the various forms of fragmentation referenced in the literature and 
results in the creation of four fragmentation classes: competitive market fragmentation, 
fragmentation based on customer type, substitutionary fragmentation, and financial 
fragmentation.  Instances of innovation in all fragmentation classes, except for financial 
fragmentation, are classified as internally motivated and result in permanent changes to 
financial markets.  Financial fragmentation is the only temporal event and pertains to markets 
reaching a state of disequilibrium, which they correct for naturally over time. 
The review identified a series of fragmenting events within each fragmentation class.  The 
extant research on each fragmentation subclass reviewed to identify the motivational factors 
that influence their development.  This chapter explores the implications of the various 
fragmentation events on market conditions, including liquidity and price discovery.  A desire 
to reduce transaction costs for investors motivates most innovations leading to market 
fragmentation.  More modern motivational factors exert greater influence over recent 
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fragmenting innovations.  Technological shocks and globalisation are most responsible for 
fragmenting events involving dark pools, cryptocurrencies, and high-frequency trading.   
The degree of innovation is associated with the type of fragmentation. Competitive market 
fragmentation events involve modification of existing services, while fragmentation based on 
customer types involve the extension of existing services. In contrast, substitutionary 
fragmentation results in innovations of new financial products that differ from existing 
financial products. 
Reductions in information asymmetry play a supporting role in motivating many events that 
fragment marks.  It is also a by-product of many fragmenting events such as lit and dark 
market fragmentation as well as the introduction of high-frequency trading and equity 
substitutes.  As a result, market fragmentation coincides with changes to the price discovery 
process as more or less permanent price-adjusting information is made public in a timely 
fashion. This effects investor decision making as public price and quote signals become more 
or less reliable.  Events that negatively impact the accuracy of publicly available information 
jeopardise markets as they discourage investor participation or encourage greater risk 
aversion. 
Drawing on this taxonomy, the empirical studies reported in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis 
explore the impact of key fragmenting events on the price discovery process. Specifically, the 
following chapters focus on the extent to which transaction prices and order book quotes fully 
reflect all relevant information.  Chapter 3 reports an empirical study that focusses on 
competitive fragmentation within and across lit and dark order books and measures the impact 
on the informativeness of transaction prices and mid-quotes.  Chapter 3 measures levels of 
price discovery (information asymmetry) and tests the extent to which efficient market 
hypothesis applies in explaining these changes.  Chapter 4 reports an empirical study that tests 
the applicability of equity-based efficient market theories to competitive fragmentation in 
cryptocurrency markets.  The objective of these two empirical studies is to assess the efficacy 




Chapter 3: Fragmentation and Price Discovery in Equity Markets 
3.1 Introduction 
Access to liquidity has evolved for equity investors since the turn of the century.  Historically, 
a single quote-driven exchange would advertise prices and quantities of shares available for 
sale and purchase.  Investors would submit limit orders to the exchange knowing the current 
state of the order book.  In contrast, today’s market participants access liquidity across 
multiple exchanges.  Motivated by a desire to reduce transaction and search costs, new equity 
exchanges formed, resulting in events of competitive fragmentation in equity markets.  The 
desire to fill gaps in exchange services and cater to the needs of a heterogeneous investor base 
and support market completeness also played motivating roles (see Figure 2-12).     
Improvements to market completeness are resulted from exchanges allowing investors access 
to both traditional and un-advertised liquidity herein referred to as ‘lit’ and ‘dark’, 
respectively, also resulted in instances of competitive market fragmentation.  Dark liquidity 
differs from lit liquidity as it offers no pre-trade transparency.  Dedicated dark liquidity 
providers are known as ‘dark pools’ and are the primary source of dark liquidity.  This chapter 
investigates the impact that fragmentation within and across lit and dark exchanges has on the 
price discovery process.  When information regarding the fundamental value of an asset 
leaves the primary exchange, it has a detrimental effect on investors’ ability to formulate 
accurate prices and impedes market efficiency (L. Ye, 2016; M. Ye, 2012; Zhu, 2014).  
Therefore, this chapter uses rational expectations theory and the efficient market hypothesis as 
frameworks to study the extent to which competitive market fragmentation coincides with the 
dispersal or concentration of valuable price-adjusting information. 
The introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) prompted events 
of competitive market fragmentation in the European equity market by eliminating barriers to 
entry for new exchanges.   Three policies contained within MiFID are responsible for the 
majority of the changes in the microstructure of the market.  The first policy retracts the 
‘concentration’ and ‘default’ rules which discourage fair competition amongst exchanges by, 
under many circumstances, requiring the routing of orders to the primary exchange.  The 
second policy sets minimum transparency standards for exchanges regarding the publication 
of pre- and post-trade information. The third policy introduces the best-execution rule and 
guarantees investors that their trades will not execute at a price that is less favourable than the 
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one available on the primary exchange.11 By providing protections for investors who trade 
outside of the primary exchange, MiFID encourages the formation of new exchanges called 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs).   MTFs offer investors an alternative source of both 
traditional lit and dark liquidity for European equities.12  
While the term ‘dark’ liquidity is considered a recent development, the overall concept behind 
this type of liquidity is not.  Dark liquidity exists on traditional exchanges through 
upstairs/over-the-counter (OTC) markets, in addition to dedicated providers (dark pools).  
OTC markets do not report information regarding the existence of a trade or the availability of 
liquidity until after the completion of a successful transaction.  The lack of pre-trade 
transparency means that unsuccessful transactions do not reveal the availability of liquidity 
unless the order is later routed to a traditional lit exchange. Exchanges also offer investors 
access to hidden order types to allow for reduced pre-trade transparency within a lit order 
book (see Section 2.2.3).  Other historical forms of dark liquidity include the following: floor 
broker orders, specialist capital on floor-based exchanges, working orders handled by agency 
brokers or broker-dealers, dealer capital, stand-alone crossing networks, and broker or 
exchange/ECN operated crossing networks (Buti et al., 2011).13  
The key difference between dark pools and other means of off-exchange trade execution is 
that dark pools operate under complete pre-trade transparency.   Only dark pools preclude the 
need for broker or dealer involvement, thus preventing any information leakage.  Since 
dealers in the OTC market contact other dealers in order to source liquidity, complete pre-
trade opacity cannot be guaranteed.   Another difference between dark pools and the OTC 
market is the trading cost, which is theoretically lower in dark pools (Lefebvre, 2010).  See 
Appendix 1 for a more detailed discussion about the characteristics of dark pools. 
In the paper ‘Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?’ Zhu (2014) acknowledges that although 
OTC liquidity is not usually classified as dark, it is still a source of non-displayed liquidity.  
Given the similarity between traditional OTC orders and orders submitted to dark pools, this 
study reports analysis both including and excluding off-order book transactions.  
                                                 
11  Exchanges may also opt to use the best price available across the consolidated European market. See 
Appendix A1.4 for more information about order matching and execution. 
12 MTFs are not limited geographically and can trade in European assets regardless of their country of origin. 
13 The first exchange that was successful at automating the process was created by Instinet which had been 
running, with limited success, an ECN since 1969. 
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3.2 Existing Literature  
There exists extensive research, both theoretical and empirical, surrounding the efficient 
market hypothesis and rational expectations theory relating to price discovery, liquidity and 
asymmetric information.  The seminal works around which the majority of research revolves 
are Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) who focus on non-fragmented markets.  
Kyle (1985) studies the liquidity characteristics of markets as well as the informational role 
that prices, particularly those that stem from informed competitive traders, play in said 
markets.  The author concludes that the level of uninformed noise trading is proportional to 
the depth of the market and has an inverse relationship with the level of private information 
that has yet to be compounded into prices.  Glosten and Milgrom (1985) deduce that increased 
participation from informed competitive traders is proportional to bid-ask spreads due to 
adverse selection. The transfer of wealth from uninformed to informed investors plays a 
critical role in maintaining price efficiency and is, therefore, crucial to the process of price 
discovery.  This transfer of wealth is compensation to informed investors in return for 
gathering price revealing information and conveying it to the market and thus contributing to 
price discovery. 
The papers mentioned above play a foundational role in future studies and are the cornerstone 
for theory examining the relationship between competitive market fragmentation and price 
discovery.  This chapter measures three forms of competitive market fragmentation and 
examines their impact on the price discovery process.  The three forms of competitive market 
fragmentation are as follows: i) intra-market fragmentation within the lit market, ii) inter-
market fragmentation between lit and dark markets, and iii) intra-market fragmentation within 
the dark market (see Figure 3-1). Intra-market fragmentation within the lit market (i) occurs 
when new exchanges operating displayed order books are introduced into the market.  
 




This section reviews existing literature of each of the aforementioned forms of fragmentation 
with market quality metrics such as liquidity and price discovery and outlines the 
contributions to the body of research.  Section 3.2.1 focuses on the exclusively on 
fragmentation between lit exchanges (i) while Section 3.2.2 discusses fragmenting events 
involving dark exchanges, (ii) and (iii). 
3.2.1 Intra-market Lit Fragmentation  
Intra-market lit fragmentation refers to increased levels of competition amongst exchanges 
with displayed order books (see (i) in Figure 3-2).  This form of competitive market 
fragmentation occurs when new lit exchanges open and offer investors additional choices for 
where they can submit orders.  Findings regarding the benefits of fragmentation within lit 
order books are mixed; however recent studies find that fragmentation is beneficial to the 
price discovery process (R. H. Battalio, 1997; B. Boehmer & Boehmer, 2003; Colliard & 
Foucault, 2012; Foucault & Menkveld, 2008).  Studies also acknowledge that benefits 
observed across the consolidated global order book come at the expense of the local exchange 
(Degryse et al., 2015; Gresse, 2017).14  
 
Figure 3-2: Three forms of Competitive Market Fragmentation (Lit) 
Traditional studies view exchanges as natural monopolies where participants benefit from 
economies of scale.  Transaction costs in a monopolistic environment are reduced through the 
superior matching of buyers and sellers (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991; Mendelson, 1987; 
Pagano, 1989).  Critics of market fragmentation in traditional lit exchanges argue that adverse 
selection risk increases and price discovery deteriorates as investor access to exchanges with 
pre-trade transparency increases.  Mendelson (1987) states that participants face more 
                                                 
14 The local exchange refers to the dominant sovereign exchange (primary exchange) while the the global order 
book is comprised of orders across all exchanges trading in a particular stock.   
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difficulty finding a counterparty to their trade in a fragmented clearinghouse market compared 
to a consolidated clearinghouse market.  Trade execution speeds decrease, leading to 
increased price variance and lower returns on trades, when finding a counterparty becomes 
more difficult.  Greater participation by a wide array of investors improves both the 
probability and speed of execution.  As a result, investors favour and tend to concentrate on 
the most liquid market, resulting in a positive feedback loop (Pagano, 1989). 
Pagano (1989) adds that if two similar exchanges exist with unequal trading costs, some 
investors will concentrate on one exchange while others migrate to the alternative exchange.  
Migrating investors are typically large traders who are forced to independently find a trading 
partner in order to avoid adverse price changes.  This concept stems from a theory by Keynes, 
which states that a key characteristic of a functioning market is its ability to avoid adverse 
price changes when facilitating a transaction.  Since trading volume is positively related to the 
absorptive capacity of a market, any events which draw speculators away from an exchange 
will adversely affect liquidity (Pagano, 1989). 
While the previously discussed theories are true the individual exchanges, Mendelson (1987) 
argues that the overall quality of price signals improves in the consolidated global market.  
Investors who can access the order books of multiple exchanges simultaneously will 
experience a reduction in the weighted average price variance.  This occurs as the price 
diversification effect dominates the ‘thinness’ effect15 in each exchange.   
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) extend the work of Kyle (1985) by incorporating multiple 
exchanges into their model.  They find that adverse selection risk increases along with an 
increase in the number of exchanges listing a particular asset.   The increase in adverse 
selection risk hinders a market’s ability to formulate accurate prices (Chowdhry & Nanda, 
1991; Madhavan, 1995). When there exists a greater proportion of large liquidity traders who 
can simultaneously access multiple exchanges, exchanges experience an increase in volume 
but also a decrease in the informativeness of prices.  Prices become less informative as market 
makers, who compete by offering investors more favourable transaction costs than their 
competitors, release price information to the market in order to deter informed trading. 
Smaller liquidity traders tend to concentrate on exchanges that offer lower transaction costs. 
Consequently, the actions of smaller liquidity traders attract large liquidity traders and 
                                                 
15 ‘Thinness’ implies a lack of depth, that is, few shares being advertised in the order book at the best price level. 
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informed traders, thereby concentrating the market around a single dominant venue 
(Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991).  
Madhavan (1995) argues that differences in trade disclosure rules are largely responsible for 
the fragmentation of markets and that markets with similar requirements across exchanges 
tend to consolidate.  Fragmented markets allow dealers to be less competitive.  Fragmented 
markets also help informed traders conceal their trades from certain participants of the overall 
consolidated market.  Less competition among dealers and more dispersed informed trading 
can contribute to price volatility (Madhavan, 1995).  Easley et al. (1996) and Bessembinder 
and Kaufman (1997) also conclude that increased fragmentation, caused by the listing shares 
on multiple exchanges, deteriorates the price discovery process of the primary exchange.  This 
occurs as the most profitable uninformed trades are picked off by informed traders, often 
referred to in the literature as ‘cream-skimming’. 
One drawback of the studies mentioned up to this point is their use of specialist markets.  In 
specialist markets, market makers or dealers take on the responsibility of providing quotes 
and matching purchase and sale requests.  In contrast, electronic limit order books allow 
market participants to trade with each other directly without the need for an intermediary.  
Hasbrouck (1995) develops a widely used measure of price discovery, the information share 
(IS).  Hasbrouck (1995) concludes that, for those shares whose primary listing is on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the primary exchange is responsible for over 90% of price 
discovery when compared to regional satellite exchanges on which the asset is cross-listed.  
Barclay et al. (2008) later find that consolidating orders aids in producing efficient prices and 
is particularly important when the demand for liquidity is high.  
Empirically, critics of market fragmentation in displayed order books show that price 
efficiency is inversely related to the level of fragmentation in the market.  Bennett and Wei 
(2006) study 39 stocks that transfer their primary listing from a fragmented market 
(NASDAQ) to a consolidated market (NYSE) between 2002 and 2003.  They find that the 
transition to a consolidated market improves price efficiency and liquidity provisions.  They 
also observe improvements to price efficiency through reduced volatility and a contraction of 
quoted, effective and realised spreads.  Gajewski and Gresse (2007) confirm the 
improvements to price efficiency.  They find that consolidated order books offer lower trading 




Foucault and Menkveld (2008) examine the launch of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) 
operated EuroSets into the Dutch stock market alongside the existing EuroNext exchange and 
present mixed results.  The authors investigate whether liquidity improves upon the 
introduction of a new market and conclude that the consolidated global limit order book 
deepens following the introduction of EuroSets.  However, higher trade-through rates in the 
newly formed market highlight the need for policies protecting the price priority of limit 
orders in order to preserve the quality of transactions (Foucault & Menkveld, 2008). 
In contrast, Riordan, Storkenmaier, and Wagener (2011) find that price protection policies are 
not necessary to protect all investors.  They study the events surrounding the introduction of 
three new Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) operating lit order books: Chi-X, BATS and 
Turquoise. They find that a lack of price protection policies did not prevent investors from 
executing orders at the best price level.  Riordan et al. (2011) argue that given the importance 
of price competition, investors prioritise the need to stay informed by autonomously 
monitoring multiple markets.  However, Riordan et al. (2011) concede that some investor 
protection policies are necessary.  Not all market participants, particularly retail investors, can 
afford to employ the monitoring techniques needed to avoid the increase in trade-through 
rates.   
Advocates of market fragmentation argue that it has positive market effects and increases 
investor welfare.  Monopolistic trading environments often result in non-competitive 
behaviour.  Increased competition improves trading costs in the form of tighter primary 
market bid-ask spreads as liquidity suppliers improve their prices (R. H. Battalio, 1997; B. 
Boehmer & Boehmer, 2003; Colliard & Foucault, 2012; Foucault & Menkveld, 2008).  R. H. 
Battalio (1997) study the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) after the introduction of a third-
market broker deal and the results support trading cost benefits of fragmentation.  B. Boehmer 
and Boehmer (2003) study the NYSE following the listing of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) 
on the competing American Stock Exchange (ASE) and also support the positive benefits of 
fragmentation. 
O'Hara and Ye (2011) are among the first studies to directly compare the effects of 
fragmentation on liquidity.  Using data on 265 stocks over six months in 2008, they find that 
higher levels of fragmentation are inversely related to both transaction costs and the speed of 
execution.  While the authors acknowledge that more fragmented assets experience greater 
short-term volatility, this comes with the benefit of improved market efficiency.  Using data 
for 100 FTSE stocks from 2008 to 2011,  Boneva, Linton, and Vogt (2016) find that volatility 
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is lower in a fragmented lit order book.  Volatility also remains more constant over the study 
period when compared to the effects of dark order book fragmentation. One drawback to the 
study by O'Hara and Ye (2011) is that the data does not allow for the comparison between 
global consolidated and local primary order books.  However, O'Hara and Ye (2011) argue 
that the positive effects are because the overall market acts as a single source of liquidity with 
multiple entry points.  This concept is explored in future studies by Degryse et al. (2015) and 
Gresse (2017). 
Degryse et al. (2015) study a sample of 52 large and midcap constituents of the Amsterdam 
Exchange (AEX) Index from 2006 to 2009.  They conclude that fragmentation in the 
displayed (or lit) order book is beneficial, with regards to liquidity, to the consolidated global 
order book but detrimental to the primary exchange.  Gresse (2017) extends the work of 
Degryse et al. (2015) by sampling data from more active European markets.  Gresse (2017) 
gathers data on large and midcap U.K. and Euronext stocks and finds that results vary 
depending on the size of the firm.  Following the introduction of MiFID, spread and depth 
measures either improve across both consolidated and local markets or are unaffected. High-
value stocks and those with less electronic trading experience the greatest benefits. However, 
lit fragmentation is detrimental to the depth of low-value stocks while algorithmic trading is 
largely to blame for any decreases to depth for high-value stocks. 
Some authors acknowledge that fragmentation is beneficial to the market only up to a certain 
point. Degryse et al. (2015) find that visible fragmentation follows an inverted U-Shape 
showing with the marginal benefit of fragmentation decreasing over time.   They determine 
that the ideal level of fragmentation of 32% as measured by one minus the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. They find that fragmentation improves liquidity about the midpoint but has 
a lesser effect deeper in the visible order book.   
In summary, the results surrounding the benefits of fragmentation within lit order books are 
mixed. Recent studies find that fragmentation is beneficial to the price discovery process (R. 
H. Battalio, 1997; B. Boehmer & Boehmer, 2003; Colliard & Foucault, 2012; Foucault & 
Menkveld, 2008).  However, benefits observed across the consolidated global order book 
come at the expense of degradation to the local exchange and retail investors (Degryse et al., 
2015; Gresse, 2017). 
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3.2.2 Inter-market Fragmentation and Intra-market Dark Fragmentation  
This section explores existing research in the price discovery implications of inter-market 
fragmentation and intra-market dark fragmentation (see ii and iii in Figure 3-3).  Existing 
studies, both theoretical and empirical, differ significantly regarding the price discovery and 
liquidity effects of reduced order-book transparency, including the migration of orders from 
lit to dark markets.  The migration of orders from lit to dark markets, and vice versa, is herein 
referred to as inter-market fragmentation. Except for Majtyka, Henker, and Henker (2015), 
there are no studies of intra-market dark fragmentation.  Also, unlike the work in this chapter, 
Majtyka et al. (2015) focus on the effects of intra-market dark fragmentation on liquidity as 
opposed to price discovery. 
 
Figure 3-3: Three forms of Competitive Market Fragmentation (Dark) 
Post-Trade Transparency 
Early research surrounding the transparency of equity markets focusses on post-trade 
transparency, that is, the disclosure of transactions. Madhavan (1995) shows that, under the 
condition of voluntary trade disclosure, markets can remain fragmented and only consolidate 
when trade disclosure is made mandatory. Since traders are heterogeneous in their trading 
requirements, markets will fragment in order to meet their demands (L. E. Harris, 1993).  
Supporting the needs of heterogeneous investors drives the market towards a state of 
completeness. Madhavan (1995) finds that large traders front-run their trades in a 
consolidated market resulting in greater execution costs for smaller investors.  As a result, all 
investors benefit from dynamic trading in a fragmented environment where trade disclosure is 
not required.  Dealers also benefit from fragmentation as they face less competition than in a 
consolidated market.  The resulting fragmentation leads to greater price volatility and less 
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efficient prices (Madhavan, 1995). 16  Intraday bid-ask spreads also widen as, unlike in a 
transparent consolidated market, dealers face greater uncertainty over time due to the lack of 
trade disclosure. Small traders, however, prefer to have access to more information before 
trading and thus benefit from a consolidated market with greater transparency (Madhavan, 
1995).  Experimental findings reported by Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999, 2000) also find that 
greater market transparency, most notably trade disclosure, improves market liquidity and 
reduces price volatility resulting in improvements to price efficiency.   
Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanathan (1999) propose that the benefits of post-transparency 
come at a cost.  Greater transparency reduces adverse selection through the sharing of 
quantity risk by limiting the winning dealer’s ability to manipulate the beliefs of other dealers.  
The downside of this is a reduction in public welfare through greater exposure to price 
revision risk where prices become more sensitive to the information revealed during trade 
negotiations. 
Pre-trade Transparency & Price Discovery 
The focus now shifts to research surrounding pre-trade transparency. In auction and dealer 
markets, pre-trade transparency allows market makers to learn information more quickly.  
This improved access to information allows market makers to price assets more efficiently 
and lower trading costs for uninformed traders (Pagano & Röell, 1996).  Unlike previous 
studies (Admanti & Pfleiderer, 1991; Madhavan, 1995) Pagano and Röell (1996) do not 
require the identities of traders to be known by market makers, thus aligning their resulting 
more closely with real world scenarios.  Baruch (2005) supports improvements to price 
discovery and liquidity, including bid-ask spreads and argues that a transparent market allows 
participants to more easily compete with liquidity providers.  Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) 
provide empirical support for Baruch (2005). They study the introduction of NYSE’s 
OpenBook, where pre-trade transparency increases for off-floor traders who are provided with 
limit-order book information.  Eom et al. (2007) find similar results surrounding the 
publication of additional levels of the order book on the Korea Exchange. 
In contrast, Boulatov and George’s (2013) model suggests price discovery improves when 
liquidity providing orders are concealed.  The improvement occurs as informed traders 
compete more aggressively to provide liquidity.  Foley and Putniņš (2016) provide further 
                                                 
16 Madhavan (1996) requires the market to be sufficiently large for the results to hold true and the findings are 
reversed for smaller markets.   
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evidence on the role of dark trading. Consistent with the theoretical model of Boulatov and 
George (2013) they find that two-sided dark trading improves market quality by encouraging 
competition between liquidity suppliers.  Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) support this 
contradiction with their investigation into the Toronto Stock Exchange’s decision to reveal the 
first five levels of the order book to the public.  The authors attribute the drop-in liquidity to 
limited order traders who are now less inclined to provide ‘free trading’ options to other 
traders.  
Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999) conduct an experimental study to investigate the effects of 
both pre- and post-trade transparency on price discovery and liquidity.  They find that post-
trade transparency increases price efficiency at the cost of wider bid-ask spreads.  Post-trade 
transparency requirements de-incentive market makers from competing for liquidity.  
However, pre-trade transparency has no significant effect on markets (Bloomfield & O'Hara, 
1999; Bloomfield et al., 2005). 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) shift their focus to modelling the interaction between 
dealer networks and a particular subset of dark pools, passive crossing networks.  Their 
research aligns with the work presented in this chapter as it investigates the effects that both 
transparency and inter-market fragmentation have on market performance.  Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000) find two opposing effects of the introduction and growth of a crossing 
network.  On the positive side, a crossing network’s liquidity improves as trading volumes 
increase, which in turn attracts additional liquidity until the crossing network reaches a 
‘critical mass’. On the negative side, the absence of price priority leads to a ‘crowding’ effect 
whereby trades compete for execution on the same side of the market.  Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000) find that investors who use the dealer market as a last resort compel dealers 
to widen bid-ask spreads.  Prices also become more efficient so long as the information is 
short-lived.17  Traders who only use crossing networks, however, provide a counterbalancing 
effect.  They contribute to reducing adverse selection by attracting new liquidity and 
providing an alternative to the dealer market for informed investors.  This results in narrower 
bid-ask spreads and less efficient pricing. 
In an extension of the classical rational expectation model by Kyle (1985),  M. Ye (2012) 
studies the market outcome when informed traders have the option of sending their trades to 
either a displayed limit order book, that is, to a traditional lit exchange, or a crossing network, 
                                                 




which is a particular type of dark pool. Informed traders value the ability to hide their trades. 
Therefore, the routing of informed orders to a crossing network reduces price discovery, with 
the impact being higher for stocks with higher fundamental value uncertainty.  M. Ye (2012) 
also concludes that the use of a crossing network harms price discovery if informed traders 
can trade in the crossing network.  The model implies that inter-market fragmentation 
between crossing networks and traditional lit exchanges increases until informed investors are 
indifferent between non-execution probability in the crossing networks and price impact in 
the traditional exchange (M. Ye, 2012). 
Zhu (2014) develops a similar model but, unlike M. Ye (2012) who assumes exogenous 
choices of trading venues by liquidity traders, assumes endogenous venue choices by liquidity 
traders.  This assumption of endogenous venue selection is critical to the resulting findings.  
The study improves on other models that exogenously fix the strategies of informed traders 
(Hendershott & Mendelson, 2000) or fail to consider the role asymmetric information plays 
regarding to the value of the asset (Buti et al., 2017; Degryse et al., 2009).  Zhu’s (2014) 
model results in informed investors clustering on the heavy side of the market, thereby facing 
low execution probability in the dark pool, relative to uninformed traders. This occurs because 
informed orders are positively correlated with the value of the asset, and therefore each other.   
As a result, traditional exchanges become more attractive to informed investors, improving 
the price discovery process by concentrating price-relevant information on the exchange.  
However, greater price discovery comes at the cost of greater adverse selection risk and wider 
bid-ask spreads.  Dark pools also become more attractive to uninformed investors as liquidity 
orders are less likely to correlate with each other.  Therefore, uninformed investors are able to 
maintain a higher probability of execution compared to informed investors.   
L. Ye (2016) extends upon Zhu (2014) to include noisy information.  Under a noisy 
information structure, L. Ye (2016) finds that the majority of informed traders opt to trade in 
the dark pool, thereby impairing price discovery.  However, in the circumstances with 
minimum noise where the level of information risk is low, the results coincide with those of 
Zhu (2014); the majority of informed traders transact in the exchange and the price discovery 
process is improved.  Unlike M. Ye (2012), L. Ye (2016) also allows uninformed traders to 
choose between exchanges.  Removing this choice aligns the results with that of M. Ye 
(2012). 
Empirical research studying the impact of dark liquidity transactions on price discovery is 
limited.   Hendershott and Jones (2005) use empirical data from the Island electronic 
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communication network (ECN) and find a negative impact surrounding the exchange’s 2002 
elimination of pre-trade transparency.  The reduction in pre-trade transparency results in an 
increase in transaction costs and adverse selection within the exchange.  It also negatively 
impacts the exchange’s market share and contribution to price discovery.  Competing 
exchanges, however, benefit from the change through a reduction in trading costs. 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) conduct the most direct empirical analysis of dark 
trading and its impact on price discovery.  The authors use Australian data from the ASX All 
Ordinaries index from 1 February 2008 to 30 October 2011 from the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) and Chi-X exchanges.  Their results are in line with Zhu (2014) and indicate 
that increased inter-market fragmentation impedes price discovery as orders bypass pre-trade 
transparency requirements.   Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) also find that prices become 
less efficient as order flow migrates from lit to dark trading venues when the proportion of 
non-block dark trading exceeds 10%.  The incentive to engage in costly information 
acquisition decreases as prices become less efficient, which causes a further reduction in the 
informational efficiency of prices.  High levels of dark trading also increase adverse selection 
and widen of bid-ask spreads in the primary lit market as uninformed trading in the lit market 
reduces disproportionally. Hatheway et al. (2017) find support for these findings using a data 
set consisting of 59 NYSE and 57 NASDAQ stocks over three months beginning January 3rd 
2011.  
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) also find that dark trading increases the role order book 
quotes play in determining prices compared to trade prices.  Increased informational content 
in order book quotes implies that liquidity providers in the lit market are becoming 
increasingly more informed.  When the dark liquidity market share is below 10%, however, 
they find that inter-market fragmentation across lit and dark order books improves price 
discovery within the primary exchange.  The changes in outcome surrounding the 10% dark 
market share threshold imply that price discovery is an increasing concave function 
(Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015).   
Pre-trade Transparency & Liquidity 
The following studies focus on the liquidity and performance impacts of increased dark 
trading.  Some of the later studies (Brandes & Domowitz, 2011; Buti et al., 2011; 
Nimalendran & Ray, 2014) use their results to infer the effect on price discovery. This is 
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important as the impact of dark trading on price discovery is not necessarily the same as the 
impact of dark trading on liquidity (Zhu, 2014). 
Degryse et al. (2009) construct a model containing a dealer market and crossing network.  
They study the impact of various levels of transparency surrounding historical order flow on 
investor behaviour and welfare.  Degryse et al. (2009) find that the ability to predict order 
flow varies with the level of transparency.  However, they do not find that overall market 
returns benefit from adding a crossing network or increasing transparency in the dealer 
market.  The lack of improved market return results varies depending on the asset’s relative 
spread. 
Gresse (2006)  uses data from July 2000 to June 2001 for the London Stock Exchange’s 
SEAQ (dealer market) as well as the POSIT crossing network. The author finds that bid-ask 
spreads are inversely correlated with dealer volume on the crossing network for dealers.  The 
effect is reversed, though less pronounced, for institutional investors.  Overall, liquidity 
improves in the lit exchange as any cream-skimming effects resulting from uninformed 
trading by institutional investors are more than offset by the risk-sharing benefits experiences 
by dealers. A subsequent study, Gresse (2017), finds dark liquidity has either a positive effect 
on liquidity or no effect at all.  However, Gajewski and Gresse (2007) find that dark trading 
by dealers in a hybrid market may be detrimental to liquidity when compared with lit 
fragmentation.  Degryse et al. (2015) support Gajewski and Gresse (2007) and concur that 
negative effects associated with increased dark liquidity use are consistent with ‘cream-
skimming’.  This occurs as dark pools attract predominately uninformed orders resulting in 
increased adverse selection on the lit exchange. 
Unlike the previous study by Degryse et al. (2009), Buti et al. (2017) model the interaction 
between a crossing network and limit order book.  They find that introducing a crossing 
network increases overall trading activity.  However, increased trading activity comes at the 
expense of wider (narrower) bid-ask spreads when the order book is deep (shallow), lower 
depth, and a decrease in overall returns.  Some investors benefit from the crossing network as 
those that are able to utilise it for trading experience greater gains.18 A previous empirical 
study by Buti et al. (2011) uses 2009 data from 11 U.S. dark pools and measures the effects 
dark pools have on price liquidity and price efficiency.  Time-series results show a positive 
relationship between dark pool market shares and total trading volume, depth and bid-ask 
                                                 




spreads.  The results also show a negative relationship dark pool market shares and volatility, 
returns and order imbalance.  Cross-sectional results show an inverse relationship between 
dark pool market shares and bid-ask spreads, price impact, and volatility..19  Boneva et al. 
(2016) also find a negative relationship between dark liquidity market share and volatility.  
Price efficiency results, however, are unclear.  
Nimalendran and Ray (2014) use proprietary crossing network transaction data from 1 June 
2008 to 31 December 2009 to examine information linkages between dark and lit exchanges.  
Using transaction-level crossing data from an actual crossing network, they gain insight into 
the exact nature of dark pool trades.  However, drawing data from a single source limits its 
generalizability.  Nimalendran and Ray (2014) find that dark trading positively correlates with 
bid-ask spreads and price impacts in the lit exchange.  They also conclude that, in addition to 
lit exchanges, crossing networks provide a venue for informed traders to trade strategically. 
As a result, Nimalendran and Ray (2014) propose that dark pools contribute to the price 
discovery process.  The extent to which the price discovery process is supported, however, 
depends on the nature of the trade.  Trades in less liquid stocks against members of the 
crossing networks transmit significant information to the lit exchange.  However, trades in 
liquid stocks, trades by the crossing network’s brokerage desk, and large blocks in negotiated 
crosses transmit less information.  
Brandes and Domowitz (2011) support the findings of M. Ye (2012) and  Nimalendran and 
Ray (2014).  They study dark pool trading in Europe and find that increased dark trading is 
beneficial to price discovery.   Using 2009 data from U.S. trade reporting facilities, O'Hara 
and Ye (2011) find that increased inter-market fragmentation through the use of dark liquidity 
leads to more efficient prices which more closely resemble a random walk. They also find a 
negative relationship between dark pool market shares and bid-ask spreads.20   
Over-The-Counter Trades 
The level of pre-trade transparency is slightly greater for over-the-counter (OTC) transactions 
compared to dark pool transactions.  While they do not publish their information to the lit 
limit order book, OTC trades require broker-dealers to negotiate terms among parties 
whenever they choose not to trade against then own account.  Seppi (1990) discusses how 
                                                 
19 Ray (2010) uses POSIT, Liquidnet, and Pipeline data from June 2005 to June 2005 and finds that a cross-
sectional study results in a concave relationship between dark pool market share and overall market quality. 
20Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015), Degryse et al. (2015), and Hatheway et al. (2017) observe that bid-ask 
spreads widen as dark pool market shares increase while O'Hara and Ye (2011) and Ready (2014) find evidence 
of the opposite effect. 
87 
 
uninformed traders benefit from the lack of anonymity in the OTC market when trading large 
blocks while informed traders prefer to use traditional lit exchanges.  Madhavan and Cheng 
(1997) and Booth et al. (2002) support Seppi (1990), empirically concurring with the 
conclusion that uninformed liquidity based trades favour the OTC market. 
The OTC market is viewed as a source of unexpressed trading interest and as a result contains 
untapped liquidity (Grossman, 1992).  Through the negotiation process, large block trades in 
the OTC market can be revealed as liquidity-driven,  encouraging trade by reducing adverse 
selection risk (Bessembinder & Venkataraman, 2004; Madhavan & Cheng, 1997).  When 
allowed to execute off-exchange, whether in the OTC market or a dark pool, liquidity 
motivated block trades do not cause temporary deviations from the expected price.  Therefore, 
liquidity-based OTC trades do not adversely impact the price discovery process.  
In summary, early research surrounding post-trade transparency in equity markets shows that 
markets can remain fragmented and only consolidate when trade disclosure is made 
mandatory (Madhavan, 1995). Fragmentation caused by differing levels of post-trade 
transparency leads to greater price volatility and less efficient prices (Madhavan, 1995).21  
Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999, 2000) also find that greater post-trade transparency improves 
market liquidity and reduces price volatility, which increases price efficiency.  Greater 
transparency reduces adverse selection but results in greater exposure to price revision risk 
(Naik et al. (1999) 
Baruch (2005) supports improvements to price discovery and liquidity, including bid-ask 
spreads and argues that a transparent market allows participants to more easily compete with 
liquidity providers.  Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005), Baruch (2005), and Eom et al. (2007) 
find that price discovery improves on the lit exchange with greater pre-trade transparency. 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) find that investors who use the dealer market as a last 
resort compel dealers to widen bid-ask spreads.   
M. Ye (2012) also concludes that the use of a crossing network harms price discovery if 
informed traders can trade in the crossing network.  Zhu (2014) improves on other models 
that exogenously fix the strategies of informed traders (Hendershott & Mendelson, 2000) or 
fail to consider the role asymmetric information plays regarding to the value of the asset (Buti 
et al., 2017; Degryse et al., 2009).  Zhu’s (2014) model results in informed investors 
                                                 
21 Madhavan (1996) requires the market to be sufficiently large for the results to hold true and the findings are 
reversed for smaller markets.   
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clustering on the heavy side of the market, thereby facing low execution probability in the 
dark pool, relative to uninformed traders. L. Ye (2016) extends upon Zhu (2014) and finds 
that the majority of informed traders opt to trade in the dark pool, thereby impairing price 
discovery.   
The OTC market is viewed as a source of unexpressed trading interest and as a result contains 
untapped liquidity (Grossman, 1992).  Through the negotiation process, large block trades in 
the OTC market can be revealed as liquidity-driven,  encouraging trade by reducing adverse 
selection risk (Bessembinder & Venkataraman, 2004; Madhavan & Cheng, 1997).   
3.3 Problem, Contribution and Hypotheses 
Market participants access liquidity across multiple exchanges.  Given the research reviewed 
in Section 3.2, it is clear that market fragmentation impacts investors’ ability to formulate 
accurate prices (M. Ye, 2012; Zhu, 2014; L. Ye, 2016).   This chapter identifies three forms of 
competitive market fragmentation: i) intra-market fragmentation within the lit market, ii) 
inter-market fragmentation between lit and dark markets, and iii) intra-market fragmentation 
within the dark market (see Figure 3-1).  Using rational expectations theory and the efficient 
market hypothesis, this study examines RQ2 and the extent to which competitive market 
fragmentation dilutes price-adjusting information within lit exchanges. In doing so, the study 
contributes to the existing literature on intra-market fragmentation.  It tests whether the 
structure of the ‘lit’ exchange impacts the informativeness of its trades and quotes when 
presenting investors with more than two markets in which they can participate. 
The study also contributes to price discovery research with a focus on dark liquidity in several 
ways. First, it explores the effects inter-market fragmentation of lit and dark orders has on 
price discovery.   It is the first study to empirically test the effects of intra-market 
fragmentation within the dark market in a similar fashion to which existing studies focus on 
intra-market fragmentation within lit exchanges. This study differentiates itself from previous 
works by taking into consideration that structure of the dark liquidity market itself rather than 
simply its market share 
The study also focusses on both the local order book of the primary market as well as the 
global consolidated order book.  Distinguishing between global and local order books allows 
for testing of how fragmentation impacts both retail investors and more sophisticated 
institutional investors.   Retail investors often default to using the primary exchange (Degryse 
et al. (2015) and are subject to its conditions.  Institutional investors have greater accessibility 
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to multiple exchanges through the use of smart order routing technology (SORT) and can 
transact against the consolidated global order book. 
The remainder of this section outlines the testable hypotheses contained within this study.  
Section 3.3.1 focuses on hypotheses relating to the informational content and trade prices and 
mid-quotes in lit and dark exchanges.  Section 3.3.2 relates to the impact on price discovery 
3.3.1 Informational Content  
Zhu (2014) proposes that informed investors cluster on the heavy side of the market.  
Informed trades cluster together because they correlate positively with the value of the asset, 
and therefore, each other.  As a result, informed investors face a lower probability of 
execution in dark pools, relative to uninformed investors.    Dark pools attract less liquidity 
than traditional lit exchanges and therefore, can support less informed trading (Zhu, 2014; L. 
Ye, 2016).   
Since lit exchanges offer faster execution speeds, they are more attractive to informed 
investors (Zhu, 2014).    As dark pools proportionally attract more uninformed investors than 
informed investors, informed investor activity becomes more concentrated on lit exchanges.  
Higher concentrations of informed to uninformed activity result in improved price discovery 
on lit exchanges.   
H3-1: Lit exchange trade prices contain more information than dark pool trade prices. 
Improvements in price discovery on lit exchanges come at the cost of greater adverse 
selection risk and wider bid-ask spreads.  Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Boulatov and George 
(2013) show informed investors to be sources of liquidity.   Informed investors prefer to 
supply liquidity when adverse selection risk is high due to the informational advantage they 
possess. Informed investors favour supplying liquidity in highly fragmented markets in order 
to pick-off only the most profitable trades (Bessembinder & Kaufman, 1997; Easley et al., 
1996).   
H3-2A: Lit exchange mid-quotes contain more information than lit exchange trade prices. 
H3-2B: The informational content of lit exchange mid-quotes is positively related to market 
fragmentation. 
While the primary exchange is the source of the majority of permanent price adjusting 
information, some informed trading naturally migrates to competing lit exchanges, otherwise 
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known as satellite exchanges (Hasbrouck, 1995).  Also, informed investors use satellite 
exchanges to supply liquidity (Madhavan, 1995) and effectively ‘cream-skim’ the most 
profitable uninformed trades across multiple trading venues.  
H3-3A: Lit exchange trade prices in the consolidated global market contain more information 
than lit exchange trade prices in local primary exchange. 
H3-3B: Lit exchange mid-quotes in the consolidated global market contain more information 
than lit exchange mid-quotes in local primary exchange. 
3.3.2 Intra-Market Lit Fragmentation 
Intra-market lit fragmentation occurs when new exchanges operating pre-trade transparent 
order books are introduced into the market. Greater levels of intra-market lit fragmentation 
increase the informativeness of lit trade prices compared to dark trade prices.  An increase in 
the number of trading venues with pre-trade transparency allows informed investors to 
conceal their intentions more easily by spreading trades across multiple exchanges 
(Madhavan, 1995).  By using multiple lit exchanges, informed investors minimise their 
exposure to non-execution risk.  Non-execution risk is high for informed investors in dark 
pools as they tend to cluster on the heavy side of the order book (Zhu, 2014).  
Also, investors who can access liquidity across multiple exchanges simultaneously through 
the use of smart order routing technology (SORT) can offset the ‘thinness’ of the exchanges 
with price diversification benefits (Mendelson, 1987).  Therefore, an increase in the level in 
which global exchange prices contribute to price discovery compared to trade prices 
originating in dark pools is expected when lit markets fragment.   
However, local exchange trade prices become less informative compared to the dark exchange 
trade prices.  As increased competitive decreases the absorptive capacity of the primary local 
exchange, investors look towards satellite exchanges in order to avoid adverse price changes 
(Pagano, 1989).  
H3-4A: The informativeness of local exchange trade prices is negatively related to the level 
of intra-market lit fragmentation.  
H3-4B: The informativeness of consolidated global exchange trade prices is positively related 
to the level of intra-market lit fragmentation. 
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3.3.3 Inter-Market Fragmentation 
Both limit and market orders contain price forming information (Kaniel & Liu, 2006). 
Therefore, any liquidity that dark pools draw away from traditional lit exchanges will increase 
the informativeness of dark trade prices.  This reduces the extent to which lit exchange prices 
contribute price forming information when compared to dark orders.  However, informed 
investors face a lower probability of execution in dark pools, relative to uninformed investors 
(Zhu, 2014).    Therefore, dark pools attract a higher proportion of uninformed investors than 
informed investors, thereby concentrating the level of informed investment on lit exchanges.  
Global trade prices lose less information than local trade prices as informed investors continue 
to use satellite exchanges to transact.  Informed investors migrate to satellite markets as they 
provide greater execution speeds than dark pools (Zhu, 2014, L. Ye, 2016).  Informed 
investors are also able to conceal private information better when using a fragmented network 
of lit exchanges versus the primary exchange.   
H3-5A: There is a negative relationship between inter-market fragmentation 22  and the 
informativeness of lit exchange trade prices compared to dark exchange trade prices.  
H3-5B: Inter-market fragmentation results in a greater concentration of informed investors, 
compared uninformed investors, in lit exchanges. 
H3-5C: The informativeness of local trade prices is more sensitive to changes in inter-market 
fragmentation compared to global trade prices. 
3.3.4 Intra-Market Dark Fragmentation 
Informed investors continue to favour lit exchanges as fragmentation in the dark market 
distributes liquidity across competing dark liquidity providers and increases the non-execution 
risk for informed investors in any given dark pool (Zhu, 2014, L. Ye, 2016).  Therefore, new 
dark pools must attract uninformed liquidity in order to sustain activity within the pool.  This, 
in turn, concentrates informed investors on quoting exchanges which leads to increased 
adverse selection risk in the said exchanges.   However, any liquidity that dark pools draw 
away from traditional lit exchanges will increase the informativeness of dark trade prices and 
decrease the informativeness of lit trade prices.   
H3-6A: There is a negative relationship between intra-market dark fragmentation and the 
informativeness of lit exchange trade prices compared to dark exchange trade prices.  
                                                 
22 Inter-market fragmentation refers to the migration of liquidity from lit exchanges to dark exchanges.  See 3.2.2 
for more information on inter-market fragmentation. 
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H3-6B: Intra-market dark fragmentation results in a greater concentration of informed 
investors, compared uninformed investors, in lit exchanges. 
H3-6C: The informativeness of local trade prices is more sensitive to changes in inter-market 
fragmentation compared to global trade prices. 
3.4 Data 
As a result of the introduction of MiFID, Europe’s stocks have fragmented across both lit and 
dark liquidity venues, while maintaining significant daily trading volumes across multiple 
venues, making them suitable for this study. This study focusses on a sample of large-cap 
European stocks and limits the sample to the constituents of the primary index.  Millisecond 
time-stamped transaction-level data is collected from the Thomson Reuters Tick History 
Database via SIRCA.  The study excludes companies that are not continuously part of the 
index throughout the entire observation period.   
The study focusses on the top 20 listed firms in the following seven European countries, 
based on their membership in the major local stock index, with the final sample containing 
140 stocks.  The seven countries are as follows: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  Transaction data is gathered for each stock and consists of 
transactions from the dark and lit liquidity providers indicated in Table 3-1. 
The study period is 1 November 2008 to October 31 2016.  This time frame is ideal as it 
consists of three very distinct periods of fragmentation within European equity markets: i) 
Intro to MiFID (November 1 2008 to October 31 2011) ii) Post-Intro to MiFID – (November 1 
2011 to October 31 2013) iii) MiFID Maturity– (November 1 2013 to October 31 2016). 
The study improves upon previous research (Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015; Gresse, 2017; 
Hatheway et al., 2017) by allowing for a greater geographic distribution within the sample 
across a longer timeframe.  MiFID has aided in removing geographical barriers within the 
European trading market thus creating the need for a study that spans multiple countries and 
views the pan-European market as a virtual market with multiple entry points (O’Hara and 




Table 3-1: Exchange List 
 
Note. This table contains a list of the stock exchanges used in the study.  Primary exchanges are the 
national quoting exchanges where stocks are originally listed.   Other exchanges are quoting MTFs 
and represent satellite exchanges.  Dark exchanges refer to dark pools. 
3.4.1 Transaction Data 
In order to calculate the various dependent and independent variables, this study sources 
transaction level data for each stock, across all relevant trading venues, found in Table 3-1.  
For equity data it should be noted, however, that transaction data cannot be collected for each 
dark liquidity provider as some venues submit their orders to the consolidated tape and fail to 
provide information regarding the exchange from which the transaction originated.   The 
following information is required for each transaction: 
1. Stock Traded (RIC) – An identifier that indicates which stock is traded 
2. Date – The date of the transaction 
3. Time – The time of the transaction (accurate to the nearest millisecond) 
4. Exchange - The exchange from which the transaction originates 
5. Price – The price per unit 
6. Quantity –The number of units in the transaction 
Lit Dark
Primary Blink
Frankfurt Stock Exchange BlockMatch
Euronext (Amsterdam, Brussels, BATS Dark
    Lisbon, Paris) CHI-X Dark
Madrid Stock Exchange RWB















7. Qualifier – An identifier that supplies some additional information about the 
transaction (for example, ‘K’ for dark pool trades) 
3.4.2 Quote Data 
The following information is collected for each order book: 
1. Asset - An identifier that indicates the stock to which the quote pertains 
2. Date – The date of the current order book snapshot 
3. Time – The time of the current order book snapshot 
4. Exchange – The exchange that advertises the quotes 
5. Bid Price – The price at which investors can sell the stock 
6. Bid Quantity – The number of units available at the current bid price 
7. Bid Number of Investors – the number of investors at the current bid price 
8. Ask Price – The price at which investors can purchase the stock 
9. Ask Quantity – The number of units available at the current ask price 
10. Ask Number of Investors – The number of investors at the current ask price 
3.5 Methodology 
This section introduces the methods used to conduct the study.  Independent and dependant 
variables are calculated using a combination of SAS, Excel and custom C++ code.  SPSS is 
used to perform the final regression analysis.  The following subsections provide further detail 
regarding the variables and regression analyses used to test the hypothesis outlined in section 
3.3.  Section 3.5.1 introduces the methods used to calculate price discovery, the dependant 
variable. Section 3.5.2 discusses independent variables. Section 3.5.3 discusses the regression 
models used to test the hypotheses.  Section 3.5.4 tests the regression assumptions to ensure 
the validity of the regression results. 
3.5.1 Measuring Price Discovery  
In line with previous research, including those focussing on the implications of the increased 
use of dark liquidity (Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015), we measure price discovery using 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share (IS) and  Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component 
share (CS). These two measures are considered to be the quintessential measures of price 
discovery between two price series.  They both rely on distinguishing between two 
components of changing prices: the permanent components, which imply changes in the 
fundamental value of the asset, and temporary components, which represent the noise 
contained within price variations.  The IS metric focuses on the decomposition of the variance 
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of efficient price changes resulting from both price series while the CS metric is a 
convergence model which isolates for the linear combination of weights that cause the two 
price series to converge at the fundamental value.  In a 2002 study, Baillie et al. document 
that IS and CS are not substitutes, but complementary measures that focus on different aspects 
of price discovery.  They deduce that the IS metric is simply a variance-weighted version of 
CS.  However, while IS is considered to be more effective in determining which price series 
contributes more towards price discovery, it is also more heavily influenced by the level of 
noise contained within the data (Putniņš, 2013).  As a result, we use both measures in our 
study in order to generate a more robust conclusion.  (Baillie, Booth, Tse, & Zabotina, 2002; 
Gonzalo & Granger, 1995; Joel Hasbrouck, 1995) 
To calculate both IS and CS the study first estimates the following vector error correction 
model (VECM) for each stock-day using 1 second time intervals, t, and a lag input of 60: 
∆𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼1�𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡−1� +  ∑ 𝛾𝛾1∆𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖60𝑖𝑖=1 +  ∑ 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗60𝑗𝑗=1 +  𝜀𝜀1,𝑡𝑡    (1) 






+  𝜀𝜀2,𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2 are two price series at each 1-second time interval, 𝛼𝛼 is the error correction 
vector, and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the zero-mean vector of serially uncorrelated innovations, with covariance 
matrix Ω.  
In line with previous studies (Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015) the study calculates two 
versions of the VECM above to utilise within the IS and CS calculations.  In the first set of 
measures 𝑝𝑝1 is a series of the last available lit trade prices at each 1-second time interval and 
𝑝𝑝2 is a series of the last available dark trade prices at each 1-second time interval across all 
dark pools. This results in the measures ISLvD and CSLvD which allows the study to determine 
the extent to which lit market transactions contribute to price discovery when compared to 
dark pool transactions.  In the second set of measures, 𝑝𝑝1 is a series of the last available lit 
trade prices at each 1-second time interval, and 𝑝𝑝2 is a series of lit mid-quotes at each 1-
second time interval.  The resulting measures, ISLvM and CSLvM, allow the study to investigate 
the contribution that trade prices resulting from exchanges with displayed order books make 
towards price discovery when compared to the best quotes from said exchanges. 
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Hasbrouck’s (1995) IS defines the information share of a market as the proportion of variance 
of a common factor that are attributed to innovations in the market.  It is calculated as 
follows: 





               (2) 
where 𝜓𝜓 is the common row vector such that 𝜓𝜓𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the amount of the price change that is 
permanently adjusted into the price as a result of the release of new information, 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is a zero-
mean vector of serially uncorrelated innovations with covariance matrix Ω, and 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗2  is the 
variance of price series j. 
The study continues with Hasbrouck’s (1995) method, as outlined by Baillie et al. (2002) and 
turn the more generalized version of Equation (1) into a vector moving average: 
∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =  Ψ(𝐿𝐿)𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡        (3) 
and then integrate: 
   𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  Ψ(1)∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1 + Ψ∗(𝐿𝐿)𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 ,     (4) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = (𝑝𝑝1,𝑡𝑡 ,𝑝𝑝2,𝑡𝑡)′, Ψ(𝐿𝐿) and Ψ∗(𝐿𝐿) are matrix polynomials in the lag operator (L), and 
Ψ(1) is the sum of the moving average coefficients and is referred to as the impact matrix. 
Finally, Hasbrouck (1995) states that if the rows of the long-run impact matrix, Ψ(1)𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, are 
identical then the long-run impact should be the same for all prices.  Therefore, if the study 
defines 𝜓𝜓 = (𝜓𝜓1,𝜓𝜓2) as the common row vector in  Ψ(1) and transform Equation 4 into: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  ιψ(∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1 ) + Ψ∗(𝐿𝐿)𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡       (5) 
where ι is a column vector of 1s. 
Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share decomposes the permanent price change into 
a combination of two prices.  The study uses Equation 4 from above and defines the 
permanent price change (common factor), 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, to be: 
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 =  Γ𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡        (6) 
where  Γ is the common factor coefficient vector. 
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The study follows the approach of Degryse et al. (2015) and Gresse (2017) and distinguishes 
between global and local order books. 23   The Thomson Reuters Tick History database 
provides information on transactions as well as the best bid and ask quotes and is accurate up 
to the nearest millisecond.  Raw transactional and order book data is processed using custom 
C++ code in order to match prices as indicated by lit transactions, dark transactions, and order 
book midquotes.  SAS is used to process the transaction and quote data in order generate the 
price discovery measures outlined in this section. 
3.5.2 Independent Variables 
This following section lists the series of independent variables used in the study.  It begins by 
outlining the  key regressors relating to fragmentation which are used to test the hypotheses.  
Finally, this section is concluded with a description of the  control variables.  Similar to the 
price discovery variables previously mentioned, the independent variables in this section are 
calculated from Thomson Reuters Tick History data using custom C++ code with some 
additions being performed in Excel. 
3.5.2.1 Fragmentation Measures 
This section discusses the methods used to test the impact of fragmentation on the price 
discovery process.  The study separates equity exchanges into two distinct pools depending on 
their levels of pre-trade transparency: lit exchanges are those that offer pre-trade transparency 
by publicly displaying their order books while dark exchanges offer no pre-trade 
transparency.  Fragmentation is ultimately a measure of competition and the study is 
interested in the ways in which these markets face competition, both amongst themselves and 
with each other.   
The study begins by measuring the level of competition among lit exchanges resulting from 
the migration of trades from one lit exchange to another.  Lit fragmentation results from the 
proliferation of MTFs due to the policy changes that MiFID introduced.  The study refers to 
this as intra-market lit fragmentation.  Following previous research (Buti et al., 2017; Degryse 
et al., 2015; Gresse, 2017) the study employs the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to 
measure the extent to which trading activity concentrates around a single trading venue.  As a 
result, the measure of lit fragmentation for stock i at time t (LFi,t) is as follows:  
                                                 
23 For global trade prices in lit exchanges we sort transactions chronologically and reference 
the resulting consolidated trade reports.  We follow a similar approach for dark pool price 
series data and do not foresee any problems given that dark pool prices are pegged to the 
midpoint of either the primary exchange for a given stock or the global consolidated market. 
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                             𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =   1 −  ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑣𝑣2𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣=1           (7) 
where i represents a particular company,  
t is the observation day,  
v represents a particular visible liquidity venue,  
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣2  is the squared market share of lit trading venue v, measured by the 
number of stocks traded in venue v when compared to the lit market as a 
whole.  
The study uses 1-HHI to allow the measure to more intuitively measure fragmentation. An 
increase in LF corresponds to increased fragmentation in the market for any particular stock.   
The next measure focuses on the competition between quoting and non-quoting exchanges. 
Due to the increasing popularity of dark pools the equity market is no longer consolidated 
around exchanges that offer pre-trade transparency.  The study refers to the migration of 
transactional volume from lit to dark exchanges as inter-market fragmentation.  In line with 
previous studies (Buti et al., 2017; Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, 2015; Degryse et al., 2015; 
Gresse, 2017) we measure the level of competition/fragmentation between quoting and non-
quoting exchanges as the market share of dark trades (DMS).   
DMSi,t = DVi,t /Voli,t       (8) 
where i represents a particular company,  
t is the observation day,  
DV i,t is the daily transaction volume, in Euro, of the dark order book market,  
Vol i,t is the total daily volume for the firm, in Euro.  
This variable is used to compliment the dark volume measure as it informs us whether the 
increased volume in the dark market is a result of increased total volume24 or trade migrations 
from the lit to the dark market.25 
Finally, the measure of the level of fragmentation, that is, the degree of competition, in the 
dark pool market employed in this study is similar to the one for lit fragmentation (LF).  
However, this time the focuses exclusively on the market share of trading venues that do not 
offer pre-trade transparency.  This is referred to as intra-market dark fragmentation as it 
measures the extent to which dark pools compete with each other.   
                                                 
24 The increase in dark volume could be a direct result of an increase in total trading activity for the day. 
25  As an increase in dark volume coupled with an increase in the proportion of dark trading implies that 
subsequent effects are as a result of trades favouring execution in the dark market over the lit market. 
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𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 −  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  1 −  ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑣𝑣2𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣=1      (9) 
where i represents a particular company,  
t is the observation day,  
v represents a particular dark liquidity venue,  
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣2 is the squared market share of dark trading venue v, measured by the 
number of stocks traded in venue v when compared to the dark market as a 
whole. 
Previous dark pool price discovery studies focus exclusively on the market share of dark 
pools.  That is the extent to which they compete with traditional quoting exchanges.  
However, in this study, competition is measured within the dark market itself, just as we have 
done with the lit market.  Only one previous study (Majtyka et al., 2015) measures the level of 
intra-market dark fragmentation; however, the authors focus on liquidity measures as opposed 
to price discovery when analysing its impact.  
3.5.2.2 Control Variables 
The regressions control for the following factors: volatility, bid-ask spread, market 
capitalisation and total daily volume. The following details the construction of the control 
variables used for the study: 
1. Volatility (σ)i,t - The volatility of an asset is measured by its standard deviation of 
returns over the course of a trading day, calculated as follows: 
 
i. 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 =  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1,𝑠𝑠 
)        (10) 
where i represents a particular asset, 
  t is the observation day,  
s is the second/time of day t, 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠is the logarithmic return between 1-second snapshots, 
        𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 is the current midpoint of the best bid-ask spread, 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑠𝑠 is the midpoint of the best bid-ask spread from the previous 
second. 
 
ii. 𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡���� =  
∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1
𝑆𝑆




where i represents a particular asset, 
  t is the observation day,  
s is the second/time of day t, 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠is the logarithmic return between 1-second snapshots, 
𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡���� is the average return over the course of the trading day, 
𝐼𝐼 is the number of seconds over the course of the trading day. 
 
iii. 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �




 26       (12) 
where  i represents a particular asset, 
  t is the observation day,  
s is the second/time of day t, 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠is the logarithmic return between 1-second snapshots, 
𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡���� is the average return over the course of the trading day, 
𝐼𝐼 is the number of seconds over the course of the trading day. 
 
2. Bid-Ask Spread (BASp)i,t – Average quoted spread for exchange i over the course of 
a trading day, t.  It is calculated as follows:   
i. 𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 =  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵−𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵
      (13)
    
where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the second/time of day t. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 is the best available ask price, 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 is the best available bid price. 
The bid-ask spread is calculated throughout each second of the day and averaged over 




                                                 
26 S-1 is used as this is a sample measure because it is not possible to have all possible outcomes. 
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3. Market Capitalisation (MC)i,t - Market capitalisation is the size of the company and 
is calculated as follows: 
 
i. MCi,t = Pri,t * NumShi,t        (14) 
where NumShi,t is the total number of shares outstanding.27 
4. Total Volume (Vol)i,t – Total volume is the total trading volume of stock i over the 
course of a single trading day, t, measured in Euro(€). 28  It is calculated as follows: 
i. 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟=1                   (15) 
where i represents a particular company, 
  t is the observation day, 
r is the current transaction, 
N is the total number of transactions over the course of trading day t, 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the number of shares in transaction r, 
 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the price at which transaction r took place. 
3.5.3 Panel Regression 
The data is analysed using panel regression performed in SPSS.  This type of regression is 
appropriate as the data consists of multiple entities (stocks) that are observed over more than 
two points in time.  A time series analysis would not be appropriate here as the data consists 
of multiple entities (stocks).  Also, a cross sectional regression would not be appropriate as 
the data consists of observations over multiple time periods.   
The base for the regression formula is: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +    𝑏𝑏2𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏3𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑏𝑏7𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡           
                         (16) 
                                                 
27 To determine how many shares a company has outstanding at any given point in time we used the figures as 
presented in quarterly reports. 
28 For control variables 2-4 we use the LN() of the original value.  Logarithms convert changes in variables into 




where LF, DMS, and DF refer to the aforementioned measures of fragmentation and the 
remainder refer to control variables for volatility ( 𝜎𝜎 ), bid-ask spread (BASp), market 
capitalization (MC), and total volume (Vol).      
The regression model is extended to include the entity and time fixed effects.  The extended 
model is as follows:  
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +   𝑏𝑏2𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏3𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑏𝑏7𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 .            
            (17) 
3.5.3.1 Entity Fixed Effects 
It is important that the model controls for omitted variables in the panel data when the omitted 
variables vary across entities but do not change over time.  These include factors such as the 
industry in which the company operates as well as its organisational structure.  To account for 
this effect in the model a set of binary dummy variables, 𝐷𝐷2, 𝐷𝐷3.. 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 , are added where  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is a 
fixed effect binary dummy variable for stock i that does not change over time.  This results in 
the following regression model: 
   𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +    𝑏𝑏2𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏3𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑏𝑏7𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏8𝐷𝐷2 + 𝑏𝑏9𝐷𝐷3 + ⋯+ 𝑏𝑏7+𝑛𝑛−1𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛+ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡       
            (18) 
where 𝐷𝐷2, 𝐷𝐷3.. 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛  are the fixed effect binary dummy variables for stock i which are set to 1 
when the data pertains to stock i, and 0 otherwise.  The resulting model consists of n 
intercepts, 1 for each observed entity (stock). The following specification is used in the 
regression: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +    𝑏𝑏2𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏3𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑏𝑏7𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏8𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡          
            (19) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is the unobserved variable which varies from stock to stock but remains fixed over 
time.  This can be simplified to: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝑏𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +    𝑏𝑏2𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏3𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑏𝑏7𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏8𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                       (20) 
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where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 =  𝑏𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑏8𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖. 
The former model, contained in Equation 18 , define the change in the y-intercept with respect 
to the intercept of the first stock in the study29, stock 1, while the latter models, contained in 
Equations 19 and 20, reorganise the inputs and define a unique intercept for each stock. 
3.5.3.2 Time Fixed Effects 
Just as entity fixed effects control for variables that are constant over time but differ across 
entities, time fixed effects control for variables that are constant across entities but change 
over time.  This is particularly important over the observed period as effects resulting from 
events such as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) are difficult to measure but must be 
accounted for. To account for this effect, we add to the model a set of binary dummy 
variables, 𝐼𝐼2, 𝐼𝐼3.. 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 , where  𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 is a quarterly fixed effect binary dummy variable for time t 
that remains constant across entities but changes over time.  This results in the following 
regression model: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑏𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑏1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +    𝑏𝑏2𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏3𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏5𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏7𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑏𝑏8𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏9𝐷𝐷2 + 𝑏𝑏10𝐷𝐷3 + ⋯+ 𝑏𝑏8+𝑛𝑛−1𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛+ 𝑏𝑏8+𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼2 + 𝑏𝑏8+𝑛𝑛+1𝐼𝐼3 + ⋯+ 𝑏𝑏8+𝑛𝑛+𝑇𝑇−2𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 +
  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                     (21) 
where 𝐼𝐼2, 𝐼𝐼3.. 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 are the fixed effect binary dummy variable for time t which are set to 1 
when the data pertains to period t, and 0 otherwise.   
3.5.4 Regression assumptions 
For the panel regression results to be valid, they must first adhere to the assumptions of linear 
regression.  The true relationship between independent and dependent variables is distorted if 
the assumptions are not met.   As a result, regression coefficients lose their interpretability.   
The remainder of this section tests for the presence of the following: normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity.  Tables and figures in this section report on only a 
subset of the variable and regression combinations examined in this study.  Omitted results do 
not deviate from the reported values and are considered redundant for reporting purposes. 
3.5.4.1 Normality 
Linear regression assumes that residuals of the dependent variables are normally distributed.  
Regression coefficients and significant testing are distorted when residuals are not normally 
                                                 
29 Note that there is no 𝐷𝐷1 but only 𝐷𝐷2.. 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 
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distributed.  This study runs normality tests on both the individual variables as well as the 
resulting model itself. 
Panel A:  ISLvD           Panel B:  CSLvD 
 
Figure 3-4: Distribution of Dependent Variable Residuals 
Note. The figure displays the distribution of dependent variable residuals resulting from regression 
analyses.  The results originate from OLS regressions on variables ISLvD and CSLvD, located in Panels 
A and B, respectively. The regression included stock and time fixed effects and consists of local 
market measures. 
The analysis begins by graphing residuals for each independent variable and inspecting them 
to see whether a normal distribution is present.  Figure 3-4 displays the distribution of 
residuals for the following dependent variables: ISLvD and CSLvD. The results stem from panel 
regressions using local measures of ISLvD and CSLvD with both time and stock fixed effects.  The 
results presented in Panels A and B of Figure 3-4 indicate that the residuals do not extensively 
deviate from the normal distribution, as indicated by the fitted line.  These results support the 
assumption of normality. 
The normal probability plots in Figure 3-5 provide further support for the normality 
assumption.  While slightly bowed, Panels A and B follow along fitted line reasonably well.  





Panel A:  ISLvD               Panel B:  CSLvD 
 
Figure 3-5: Normal Probability Plots 
Note. The figure displays normal probability plots.  The results are collected from performing an OLS 
regression on variables ISLvD and CSLvD located in Panels A and B, respectively. The regression 
included stock and time fixed effects and consists of local market measures. 
3.5.4.2 Linearity 
Next the study examines the linearity of the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables.  Deviations from linearity result in meaningless coefficients as the model attempts 
to explain a non-linear relationship using linear variables.  Tests for linearity entail plotting 
the regression residuals against predicted values.  A non-linear relationship exists if the 
variance of the residuals changes significantly along with changes in the predicted value.   
Panel A:  ISLvD              Panel B:  CSLvD 
 
Figure 3-6: Standardised Residuals versus Predicted Values 
Note. This figure plots the standardised residuals and predicted values.  The results are collected from 
performing an OLS regression on variables ISLvD and CSLvD located in Panels A and B, respectively. 
The regression included stock and time fixed effects and consists of local market measures. 
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Figure 3-6 displays the standardised residual versus predicted value plots for IS and CS 
measures in Panels A and B, respectively.  Both panels convey that a linear relationship exists 
as there is no noticeable pattern of deviation in the plotted values supporting the linearity 
assumption.  
3.5.4.3 Homoscedasticity 
Homoscedasticity occurs when the variance of the residuals remains constant across all 
predicted values.  That is, var(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 |𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  = x), is constant for i = 1…n.  Patterns in the 
standardised residual versus predicted values indicate that the term is heteroskedastic.  Linear 
regression models are unable to generate meaningful coefficients from heteroscedastic data.  
As reported in Section 3.5.4.2, both Panels of Figure 3-6 show that the variance in the residual 
terms is reasonably constant across all predicted value.  Therefore, the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is supported.  
3.5.4.4 Multicollinearity 
Testing for multicollinearity among the independent variables is the final assumption test in 
this study.  High levels of multicollinearity in the data imply that there are some redundant 
variables.  When the correlation coefficient between two variables is high, they will attempt to 
explain the same changes in the dependent variable if used together.  Like in previous 
assumption tests, violations of independence, that is, high levels of multicollinearity, result in 
less meaningful regression coefficients.  
Table 3-2 contains the correlation measures between all independent measures.  This table 
shows that there is some level of multicollinearity between the three fragmentation measures:  
LF, DMS and DF. Correlation coefficients among pairs of fragmentation measures range from 
0.49 to 0.59.  This means that the fragmentation measures are at least moderately correlated.  
Bid-ask spread (BASp) is also moderately negatively correlated with lit fragmentation (LF), 





Table 3-2: Correlations 
 
Note. This table shows the correlation coefficients between the independent variables contained within 
the study.  All measures have been compared in a local context. LF denotes the fragmentation of lit 
exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  DMS measures the market 
share of off-order book transactions.  DF denotes the fragmentation of dark exchanges and is 
represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  The DMSDP and DFDP measures of 
fragmentation consist exclusively of transactions that original from dark pools.  σ is the standard 
deviation of 1-minute mid-quote returns as measured in basis points.  BASp is the average bid-ask 
spread at the best price level and is weighted by the total depth at that price level. MC is the market 
capitalisation and is measured by the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the average daily 
price and is weighted by the total volume transacted at each price.  Vol is the total volume and consists 
of the value of shares transacted in the stock over a given stock day and is measured in Euros (€).  Vol 
includes lit and dark transactions, including those originating from dark pool and over-the-counter 
trades. 
 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) also tests for the presence of multicollinearity among the 
variables in the model.  The test entails regressing one independent variable against the 
others.  The process repeats until all independent variables have been regressed against.  VIF 
values below three indicate that multicollinearity is at a minimum.  VIF values between three 
and five indicate a moderate level of multicollinearity.  VIF values over 5 and 10 indicate 
significant and high multicollinearity, respectively.   
 
  
LF DMSDP DFDP σ BASp MC Vol
LF 1.00
DMSDP 0.49 1.00
DFDP 0.59 0.54 1.00
σ 0.19 0.11 0.24 1.00
BASp -0.40 0.11 -0.03 0.34 1.00
MC -0.02 0.09 0.06 -0.09 -0.64 1.00
Vol 0.13 0.19 0.09 0.03 -0.49 0.51 1.00
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Table 3-3: Variance Inflation Factors 
  Panel A:  LF        Panel B:  DMS 
                      
Note. This table contains information on the variance inflation factors (VIF).  The results are collected 
from performing an OLS regression on the previously dependent variables LF and DMS located in 
Panels A and B, respectively. The regression included stock and time fixed effects and consists of 
local market measures. Note that dummy variable VIF values are excluded from the table. 
Table 3-3 contains the VIF resulting from regressions performs on LF and DMS in Panels A 
and B, respectively.  The results indicate the presence of moderate levels of multicollinearity 
in most variables. This needs to be noted when interpreting the coefficient estimates in the 
followings main results section. 
3.6 Results 
This section presents the results of the analysis on fragmentation and its impact on the 
informativeness of exchange trades versus dark pool trades as well as exchange trades and 
exchange quotes.  The section starts by reviewing key descriptive statistics then moves to 
hypothesis testing and discussion. 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics regarding the key fragmentation measures are reported in Table 3-4.  
The dark pool market appears to be more fragmented than the competing lit market with DFDP 
and LF figures of 0.711 and 0.588, respectively.  Taking into account all off order book 
transactions, dark liquidity is even more fragmented with a DFDP of 0.751 which can be 
attributed to the over-the-counter transactions being reported to both the primary exchange 





LN Volatility 0.175 5.7
LN Spread 0.154 6.49
LN Mcap 0.225 4.45







LN Volatility 0.421 2.374
LN Spread 0.212 4.724
LN Mcap 0.126 7.966





the sample period while all off order book transactions account for 28.31%.  This indicates 
that traditional forms of dark liquidity remain more popular that fully-automated dark pools.  
One reason this may occur is that upstairs brokers may be able to tap into unexpressed 
liquidity of larger institutional traders, thereby expanding the overall amount of liquidity that 
is available to the market (Grossman, 1992).  
 




Note. This table contains the means, standard deviations, and medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) 
and third (Q3) quartiles of various price discovery measures.  LF denotes the fragmentation of lit 
exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  DF denotes the fragmentation 
of dark exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). DFDP consists of 
trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DFA consists of all off-order book transactions.  
DMS measures the market share of off-order book transactions.  DMSDP consists of trades that 
originate exclusively from dark pools while DMSA consists of all off-order book transactions.   
 
Figure 3-7 presents the levels of fragmentation both with and without over-the-counter and 
other non-dark pool transactions, DFA and DPDP, respectively versus the lit market level of 
fragmentation. This data is for the FTSE-100 stocks and shows that the lit market is 
consistently less fragmented than the dark pools.  
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Lit Fragmentation 
    LF 0.588 0.074 0.569 0.604 0.649
Dark Market Share
    DMS DP 0.097 0.046 0.053 0.088 0.119
    DMS A 0.283 0.104 0.153 0.263 0.297
Dark Fragmentation
    DF DP 0.695 0.048 0.631 0.674 0.705





Figure 3-7: Intra-Market Fragmentation (Lit and Dark) 
Note. The figure shows that average daily level of fragmentation per company in both lit (LF) and dark 
(DF) markets as measured by the (1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index).  The figure presents levels of 
fragmentation both with and without over-the-counter and other non-dark pool transactions, DFA and 
DPDP, respectively.  Values close to 0 indicate that the market is highly concentrated while values 
close to 1 indicate that the market is highly fragmented, with 0 indicating perfect consolidations while 
1 indicating perfect fragmentation. The labels in the legend appear vertically in the same order as the 
lines in the graph.   
Some key descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3-5.  The average market capitalization 
for firms in the study is roughly €25.6 billion, however this is largely due to the skewness of 
the data and the presence of several large firms.  The median firm size is approximately €17.9 
billion with 25% of firms being worth no more than €5.7 billion.  Total daily volume per 
stock averages to €67 million per day, though these results are quite volatile.  Average spreads 
over the sample period are also observed to be 109.2 basis points (bps) with a mean of 58.3 
bps. 
The analysis of the migration of price forming information is first focused on exchanges 
offering pre-trade transparency compete with each other for liquidity (intra-market lit 
fragmentation).  Next, the study moves to the effect of competition resulting from the 
migration of liquidity between exchanges offering different levels of pre-trade transparency 
(inter-market fragmentation).  The analysis then shifts to the effect of competition within the 
111 
 
dark pool market (intra-market dark fragmentation).  Finally, we perform several robustness 
tests.  Note that until we reach the robustness test, the study focuses on dark liquidity that 
exclusively comes from dark pools and excludes all other off-order book transactions. 
 




Note. This table contains the means, standard deviations, and medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) 
and third (Q3) quartiles of various price discovery measures.  Values are calculated over a single stock 
day on the primary market of exchange. σ is the standard deviation of 1-minute mid-quote returns as 
measured in basis points.  BASp is the average bid-ask spread at the best price level and is weighted 
by the total depth at that price level.  MC is the market capitalisation and is measured by the number 
of outstanding shares multiplied by the average daily price and is weighted by the total volume 
transacted at each price.  Vol is the total volume consists of the value of shares transacted in the stock 
over a given stock day and is measured in Euros (€).  Vol includes lit and dark transactions, including 
those originating from dark pool and over-the-counter trades. 
 
3.6.2 Price Discovery 
The first hypothesis (H3-1) states that lit exchange trade prices contain more information than 
dark pool trade prices. The results for the test of H3-1 are reported in Table 3-6 which shows 
the price discovery shares for lit market prices compared to dark market prices as measured 
by ISLvD and CSLvD.  Both local and global ISLvD and CSLvD measures are reported in order to 
differentiate between the informativeness of trades transacted on the primary exchange as 
opposed to those of the greater consolidated market. The results are consistent with other 
studies in that they support H3-1 that the majority of information results from trades in the 
visible order market as opposed to the dark market, with ISLvD and CSLvD figures of 81.35% 
and 83.88%, respectively.  In the context of a consolidated global market, the ISLvD and CSLvD 
figures increase to 85.77% and 89.59%, respectively. The higher result for the global market 
supports H3-3b that lit exchange trade prices in the consolidated global market contain more 
Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75
σ (bps) 25.1 19.4 15.4 21.8 31.6
BASp (bps) 109.2 154.8 28.6 58.3 163.5
MC (millions of EUR) 25,586   29,390   5,696     17,904   33,376   
Vol (thousands of EUR) 67,017   74,394   11,494   49,140   93,337   
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information than lit exchange trade prices in local primary exchange.  These results indicate 
that the overall market for a stock consisting of many exchanges provides greater information, 
when compared to dark transactions, than a single primary market.  Global consolidated 
figures encapsulate the entirety of lit market trades and are more likely to include greater 
representation from informed traders as they represent the actions of all those who trade in a 
specific stock rather than a particular subset of investors. 
Table 3-6: Price Discovery Measures 
  
 
Note. This table contains the means, standard deviations, and medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) 
and third (Q3) quartiles of various price discovery measures.  Individual values are calculated over a 
single stock day and cover both the local primary exchanges as well as the global consolidated results. 
ISLvD and CSLvD are the information and component shares, respectively, for lit trade prices as 
compared to dark trade prices.  ISLvM and CSLvM are the information and component shares, 
respectively, for lit market mid-quote as compared to dark trade prices. 
 
The results are also supported by the individual country ISLvD and CSLvD measures. Again the 
finding is that all countries included in the study produce mean ISLvD and CSLvD results of at 
least 68%.  However, countries with lower daily transactional volume such as Austria, 
Belgium, and Portugal present lower bounds near the 50% range, while the remaining markets 
experience more stability in the variability of the lit market price information factors.  This 
change is justified by the fact that smaller transacted stocks tend to have wider relative bid-
ask spreads and as a result encourage transaction in the dark market by informed investors 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Local
ISLvD 0.814 0.068 0.786 0.830 0.851
CSLvD 0.839 0.074 0.800 0.826 0.858
ISLvM 0.417 0.125 0.353 0.386 0.481
CSLvM 0.455 0.136 0.380 0.409 0.508
Global
ISLvD 0.858 0.076 0.840 0.934 0.964
CSLvD 0.896 0.077 0.862 0.902 0.923
ISLvM 0.386 0.118 0.338 0.362 0.462
CSLvM 0.434 0.091 0.351 0.401 0.482
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(Zhu, 2014). Tight upper and lower bounds are to be expected due to the frequency of the 
data.  By using granular second time intervals significant deviation from the mean/median 
result is not expected. 
Hypothesis H3-2A states that lit exchange mid-quotes contain more information than lit 
exchange trade prices. The results in Table 3-6, lines 3 and 4, test the contribution of lit 
market quotes towards the price discovery process when compared to lit transaction prices. 
The results show that local ISLvM and CSLvM measurements average approximately 41.65% 
and 45.46% over the study period, respectively.  These figures show that lit quotes contribute 
more towards price discovery when compared to lit transaction prices.  This is expected as 
studies including Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Boulatov and George (2013) find informed 
investors to be sources of liquidity.  
In relation to global markets, hypothesis H3-3B states that lit exchange mid-quotes in the 
consolidated global market are expected to contain more information than lit exchange mid-
quotes in local primary exchange. The results in lines 7 and 8 of Table 3-6 indicate that the 
informativeness of trade prices compared to mid-quotes decrease when migrating from the 
primary exchange to the consolidated market.  Global ISLvM and CSLvM measures decrease to 
38.56% and 43.39%, respectively, implying that informed investors use satellite markets to 
supply liquidity (Madhavan, 1995) and convey information less through trades, and more 
through their quoting activities.  Informed investors effectively ‘cream-skim’ the most 
profitable uninformed trades across multiple trading venues. 
3.6.3 Regression Results 
This section presents the results of the analysis on fragmentation and its impact on the 
informativeness of exchange trades versus dark pool trades as well as exchange trades and 
exchange quotes.  The discussion examines the effects of the migration of price forming 
information in an environment where exchanges offering pre-trade transparency compete with 
each other for liquidity (intra-market lit fragmentation).  Next, the study considers the effect 
of competition resulting from the migration of liquidity between exchanges offering different 
levels of pre-trade transparency (inter-market fragmentation).  The analysis then focuses on 
the effect of competition within the dark pool market (intra-market dark fragmentation).  
Finally, several robustness tests are presented but note that until the robustness test section the 
study focuses on dark liquidity that exclusively comes from dark pools and avoid all other 
off-order book transactions. 
114 
 
3.6.3.1 Intra-market Lit Fragmentation 
Hypothesis H3-4A states that the informativeness of local exchange trade prices is negatively 
related to the level of intra-market lit fragmentation. Table 3-7 contains the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression results for local ISLvD and CSLvD, the key measures of price 
discovery for lit market transaction prices as compared to dark transaction prices. The results 
align with hypothesis H3-4A that increases in fragmentation among exchanges with pre-trade 
transparency, that is, increases in intra-market lit fragmentation, lead to a decrease in 
informativeness of primary market lit trades versus dark trades. 
Table 3-7: Regression Results: Lit vs. Dark (Local) 






LF -0.082 -0.053 -0.066 -0.048 -0.039 -0.058
(-0.92) (-1.68) * (-2.19) ** (-2.42) ** (-2.04) ** (-2.11) **
DMSDP -0.043 -0.035 -0.038 -0.039 -0.183
(-4.24) *** (-3.63) *** (-3.24) *** (-3.86) *** (-2.87) ***
DMSA -0.041
(-4.73) ***
DFDP -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.010 -0.039
(-2.04) ** (-2.09) ** (-2.16) ** (-5.47) *** (-4.31) ***
DFA -0.013
(-4.27) ***
Ln σ 0.021 0.018 0.032 0.027 0.023 0.057
(1.38) (2.01) ** (2.37) ** (2.25) ** (2.14) ** (3.48) ***
Ln BASp -2.822 -2.346 -3.173 -2.513 -2.623 -1.937
(-10.41) *** (-8.74) *** (-13.25) *** (-9.11) *** (-9.57) *** (2.34) **
Ln MC 0.256 0.324 0.414 0.376 0.392 0.523
(1.07) (1.73) * (2.21) ** (2.03) ** (2.16) ** (1.93) *
Ln Vol 1.836 1.636 1.923 1.785 1.847 3.735
(14.36) *** (12.85) *** (15.68) *** (13.63) *** (14.79) *** (11.23) ***
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.088 0.091 0.097 0.095 0.104




Table 3-7: Regression Results: Lit vs. Dark (Local) - continued 
Panel B: Component Share  
  
 
Note. This table contains the information and component share regressions results for lit transactions 
prices when compared to dark transaction price: ISLvD and CSLvD.  ISLvD and CSLvD results are found in 
Panels A and B, respectively.  Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least square (2SLS) 
results are presented.  All values are measured with respect to the local primary exchange. LF denotes 
the fragmentation of lit exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  DF 
denotes the fragmentation of dark exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). DFDP consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DFA consists of all off-
order book transactions.  DMS measures the market share of off-order book transactions.  DMSDP 
consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DMSA consists of all off-order book 
transactions.  σ is the standard deviation of 1-minute mid-quote returns as measured in basis points.  
BASp is the average bid-ask spread at the best price level and is weighted by the total depth at that 
price level.  MC is the market capitalisation and is measured by the number of outstanding shares 
multiplied by the average daily price and is weighted by the total volume transacted at each price.  Vol 
is the total volume consists of the value of shares transacted in the stock over a given stock day and is 
measured in Euros (€).  Vol includes lit and dark transactions, including those originating from dark 
pool and over-the-counter trades. Volatility, Spread and Market Capitalization are all transformed by 
the natural logarithm. T-statistics can be found in parentheses with ***, **, and * representing 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
LF -0.015 -0.015 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002
(-2.35) ** (-2.34) ** (-3.59) *** (-3.27) *** (-4.47) *** (-5.05) ***
DMSDP -0.064 -0.072 -0.068 -0.065 -0.197
(-3.74) *** (-5.12) *** (-4.24) *** (-3.80) *** (-2.90) ***
DMSA -0.058
(-3.23) ***
DFDP -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.028 -0.043
(-5.28) *** (-4.74) *** (-5.27) *** (-5.39) *** (-5.33) ***
DFA -0.021
(2.17) **
Ln σ 0.075 0.064 0.057 0.056 0.061 0.056
(2.43) ** (4.13) *** (3.27) *** (3.20) *** (3.93) *** (2.15) **
Ln BASp -1.837 -1.573 -1.674 -1.603 -1.598 -1.638
(-14.28) *** (-11.03) *** (-12.28) *** (-11.83) *** (-8.73) *** (-2.44) **
Ln MC 0.574 0.473 0.347 0.419 0.395 0.032
(1.04) (0.94) (1.74) * (1.91) * (1.84) * (1.85) *
Ln Vol 0.949 0.847 0.684 0.668 0.710 1.259
(2.33) ** (2.15) ** (3.92) *** (3.75) *** (4.01) *** (5.17) ***
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.064 0.084 0.083 0.074 0.091





With standard OLS regression coefficients on LF (local fragmentation) ranging from -0.048 to 
-0.082 (-0.007 to -0.015 for CSLvD) it appears that an increase in the fragmentation of the lit 
market coincides with a decrease in the price discovery of transactions that result from the use 
of displayed liquidity on the local primary market.  Note that only 3 of the 4 measures for 
ISLvD are found to be significant.  One might conclude that lit market fragmentation causes 
informed trading to leave the local exchange and migrate to dark pools.   
In contrast, hypothesis H3-4B expects the opposite for the global market and states the 
informativeness of consolidated global exchange trade prices is positively related to the level 
of intra-market lit fragmentation. The results in Table 3-8 show that the lit fragmentation (LF) 
coefficient in the global context, that is, when considering information across all exchanges 
rather than simply the primary exchange, shows decrease in price discovery of lit market 
trades in the consolidated market compared to the primary market.   
Table 3-8: Regression Results: Lit vs. Dark (Global) 
Panel A:  Information Share  
 
  
LF -0.011 -0.003 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005
(-2.36) ** (0.67) (-2.41) ** (-2.15) ** (-2.12) ** (-3.19) ***
DMSDP -0.014 -0.018 -0.024 -0.019 -0.092
(-2.37) ** (-1.99) ** (-4.29) *** (-6.25) *** (-2.33) **
DMSA -0.023
(-3.52) ***
DFDP -0.002 -0.006 -0.008 0.008 -0.014
(-2.48) ** (-1.42) (-2.38) ** (-2.10) ** (-2.98) ***
DFA -0.002
(-5.25) ***
Ln σ -0.007 0.008 0.057 0.013 0.004 0.022
(-1.06) (2.14) ** (5.24) *** (3.53) *** (2.30) ** (6.20) ***
Ln BASp -0.902 -1.090 -0.891 -0.917 -1.432 -2.58
(3.15) *** (-2.49) ** (-4.30) *** (-2.91) *** (-4.29) *** (-2.11) **
Ln MC 0.492 0.529 0.819 0.704 0.828 0.392
(1.69) * (1.91) * (2.47) ** (0.85) (2.16) (1.71) *
Ln Vol 2.947 2.048 1.589 3.014 1.495 2.489
(3.53) *** (2.85) *** (2.53) ** (4.21) *** (4.25) *** (2.08) **
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.051 0.057 0.061 0.057 0.063




Table 3-8: Regression Results: Lit vs. Dark (Global) - continued 
Panel B:  Component Share  
 
Note. This table contains the information and component share regressions results for lit transactions 
prices when compared to dark transaction price: ISLvD and CSLvD.  ISLvD and CSLvD results are found in 
Panels A and B, respectively.  Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least square (2SLS) 
results are presented.  All values are measured with respect to the consolidated global order book. LF 
denotes the fragmentation of lit exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).  DF denotes the fragmentation of dark exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). DFDP consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DFA 
consists of all off-order book transactions.  DMS measures the market share of off-order book 
transactions.  DMSDP consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DMSA 
consists of all off-order book transactions.  σ is the standard deviation of 1-minute mid-quote returns 
as measured in basis points.  BASp is the average bid-ask spread at the best price level and is weighted 
by the total depth at that price level.  MC is the market capitalisation and is measured by the number 
of outstanding shares multiplied by the average daily price and is weighted by the total volume 
transacted at each price.  Vol is the total volume consists of the value of shares transacted in the stock 
over a given stock day and is measured in Euros (€).  Vol includes lit and dark transactions, including 
those originating from dark pool and over-the-counter trades. Volatility, Spread and Market 
Capitalization are all transformed by the natural logarithm. T-statistics can be found in parentheses 
with ***, **, and * representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
LF -0.008 -0.012 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.015
(-2.42) ** (-1.87) * (-2.10) ** (-2.39) ** (-4.94) *** (-3.89) ***
DMSDP -0.043 -0.033 -0.042 -0.058 -0.098
(-2.59) *** (-2.17) ** (-3.53) *** (-3.01) *** (-2.38) **
DMSA -0.069
(-3.23) ***
DFDP 0.014 -0.039 -0.021 -0.015 -0.021
(-2.67) *** (-2.52) ** (-2.98) *** (-2.73) *** (-3.49) ***
DFA -0.021
(-1.99) **
Ln σ 0.059 0.070 0.049 0.039 0.050 0.083
(5.63) *** (3.89) *** (2.51) ** (5.28) *** (8.29) *** (2.84) ***
Ln BASp -0.305 -0.520 -0.202 -0.586 -0.617 -0.948
(-6.29) *** (-3.28) *** (-4.30) *** (-5.23) *** (-3.50) *** (-6.77) ***
Ln MC 0.294 0.328 0.211 0.593 0.847 0.105
(1.81) * (1.44) (2.07) ** (2.47) ** (1.94) * (2.19) **
Ln Vol 1.493 0.927 0.802 1.573 0.721 2.149
(2.41) ** (1.39) (2.78) *** (3.20) *** (2.71) *** (2.89) ***
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.072 0.124 0.114 0.058 0.079





With an ISLvD LF coefficients ranging from -0.003 to -0.012 for ISLvD (-0.005 to -0.012 for 
CSLvD) the results suggest that, while some informed activity does migrate to the dark, more 
informed activity is leaving the primary markets compared to the consolidated market. While 
the negative coefficient does not support hypothesis H3-4B, it does imply that participants in 
the consolidated market have less of a need to leave the lit exchange when lit markets 
fragment.  By doing so informed investors are also able avoid non-execution risks associated 
with dark pools whilst continuing to make it difficult for other investors to infer their 
intentions due to the distributed nature of their trades.  However, the result is still a net loss in 
information resulting from lit trade prices.  
Next, the effects of intra-market lit fragmentation on the informativeness of exchange prices 
compared to quotes is analysed. Increased fragmentation is associated with increased trading 
volume as multiple markets can only be sustained if there is sufficient liquidity to support it 
(Mendelson, 1987).  The formation of new markets can attract a greater proportion of 
liquidity traders who then decrease the informativeness of prices (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991).  
Informed investors favour supplying liquidity in highly fragmented markets in order to pick-
off only the most profitable trades (Bessembinder & Kaufman, 1997; Easley et al., 1996).  As 
a result, the study expects intra-market lit fragmentation to decrease the amount in which 
exchange prices reveal price forming information as compared to quotes.  
Specifically, hypothesis H3-2B states that the informational content of lit exchange mid-
quotes is positively related to market fragmentation.  This is represented in the results by a 
negative coefficient for the informativeness of trade prices compared to mid-quotes.  The 
results in Table 3-9 supports the hypothesis where the coefficients for local ISLvM and CSLvM 
range from -0.018 to -0.022 and -0.025 to -0.028 respectively. This also provides support for 
hypothesis H3-4A. This indicates that the informativeness of exchanges trades as compared to 
quotes does deteriorate with greater intra-market lit fragmentation.  The results are robust 
across the global consolidated market in Table 3-10 with global ISLvM and CSLvM coefficients 
ranging from -0.144 to -0.227 and -0.026 to -0.036, respectively. This result is contradictory 
to the hypothesis H3-4B. The increased informativeness of quotes, that is, the decreased 
informativeness of trade prices compared to mid-quotes, is associated with higher levels of 
adverse selection in the lit market and is consistent with the notion that the most profitable 
uninformed trades ‘skimmed’ by informed liquidity providers (Bessembinder & Kaufman, 
1997; Easley et al., 1996). Table 3-9 and Table 3-10 shows that as volatility and quoted 
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spreads increase, that is, as adverse selection increases, both local and global prices contribute 
less towards price discovery than quotes.  This is further supported through the positive 
correlation coefficient (Table 3-2) between volatility and intra-market lit fragmentation (LF).  
The inverse relationship between LF and quoted spreads, as indicated by a negative 
correlation coefficient of 0.3965, implies that increased fragmentation in the lit market is 
associated with an increase in uninformed trading.  
This, however, contradicts the previous statement and supports the notion that greater intra-
market lit fragmentation reduces the amount of informed trading in the market and as a result, 
should reduce adverse selection risk.  Though the correlation between these two measures is 
weak, it does not noticeably discredit the previous statement regarding the increase in adverse 
selection. 
 
Table 3-9: Regression Results: Price vs. Mid-Quote (Local) 




LF -0.021 -0.019 -0.022 -0.018 -0.020 -0.043
(-4.47) *** (-4.36) *** (-5.22) *** (-4.19) *** (-3.88) *** (-4.95) **
DMSDP -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 -0.024 -0.052
(-6.07) *** (-5.89) *** (-5.27) *** (-4.99) *** (-4.27) ***
DMSA -0.025
(-5.37) ***
DFDP -0.018 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006 -0.035
(-0.24) (-2.90) *** (-2.92) *** (-2.75) *** (-4.29) ***
DFA -0.011
(-3.20) ***
Ln σ -0.102 -0.096 -0.085 -0.083 -0.088 -0.124
(-2.36) ** (-2.28) ** (-2.19) ** (-2.78) *** (-2.98) *** (-3.86) ***
Ln BASp -1.246 -0.837 -1.314 -1.294 -1.285 -0.095
(-1.78) * (-1.37) (-2.35) ** (-2.38) ** (-2.29) ** (-2.31) **
Ln MC 0.152 0.162 0.135 0.134 0.145 0.725
(1.78) * (1.83) * (1.69) * (2.18) ** (1.72) * (0.96)
Ln Vol -0.427 -0.356 -0.523 -0.493 -0.458 -0.395
(-2.46) ** (-2.40) ** (-3.02) *** (-2.86) *** (-2.75) *** (-2.37) **
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.057 0.073 0.079 0.068 0.083




Table 3-9: Regression Results: Price vs. Mid-Quote (Local) - continued 
Panel B:  Component Share  
 
 
Note. This table contains the information and component share regressions results for market 
mid-quotes compared to lit market trades: ISLvM and CSLvM.  ISLvM and CSLvM results are found 
in Panels A and B, respectively. Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least square (2SLS) 
results are presented.  All values are measured with respect to the primary order book. LF denotes the 
fragmentation of lit exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  DF 
denotes the fragmentation of dark exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). DFDP consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DFA consists of all off-
order book transactions.  DMS measures the market share of off-order book transactions.  DMSDP 
consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DMSA consists of all off-order book 
transactions.  σ is the standard deviation of 1-minute mid-quote returns as measured in basis points.  
BASp is the average bid-ask spread at the best price level and is weighted by the total depth at that 
price level.  MC is the market capitalisation and is measured by the number of outstanding shares 
multiplied by the average daily price and is weighted by the total volume transacted at each price.  Vol 
is the total volume consists of the value of shares transacted in the stock over a given stock day and is 
measured in Euros (€).  Vol includes lit and dark transactions, including those originating from dark 
pool and over-the-counter trades. Volatility, Spread and Market Capitalization are all transformed by 
LF -0.028 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.021 -0.194
(-4.23) *** (-2.96) *** (-3.84) *** (-3.83) *** (-3.26) *** (-2.97) **
DMSDP -0.050 -0.038 -0.048 -0.051 -0.937
(-7.23) *** (-6.37) *** (-7.05) *** (-7.34) *** (-6.27) ***
DMSA -0.049
(-5.28) ***
DFDP -0.038 -0.032 -0.028 -0.025 -0.083
(-0.65) (-0.39) (-2.25) ** (-2.18) ** (-3.94) ***
DFA -0.027
(-4.28) ***
Ln σ -0.102 -0.085 0.121 0.092 0.084 0.139
(3.39) *** (-2.82) *** (3.67) *** (3.13) *** (2.78) *** (4.28) ***
Ln BASp -3.275 2.452 -4.285 -3.482 2.903 4.284
(-1.26) (0.94) (-1.48) (-1.38) (1.10) (2.41) **
Ln MC -0.285 -0.278 -0.319 -0.428 -0.285 -0.38234
(-1.73) * (-1.70) * (-1.84) * (-1.91) * (-1.72) * (-1.71) **
Ln Vol -0.104 -0.085 -0.132 -0.126 -0.136 -0.087
(-2.25) ** (-2.05) ** (-2.69) *** (-2.61) *** (-2.81) *** (2.09) **
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.048 0.053 0.063 0.048 0.068




the natural logarithm. T-statistics can be found in parentheses with ***, **, and * representing 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
As exchanges offering pre-trade transparency fragment and we observe increased intra-market 
lit-fragmentation, lit market prices begin to contain more private information than their dark 
market counterparts.  The results are consistent with prior research that finds an increase in 
the number of trading venues with pre-trade transparency allows informed investors to 
conceal their intentions more easily (Madhavan, 1995).   
 
Table 3-10: Regression Results: Price vs. Mid-Quote (Global) 
Panel A:  Information Share  
 
LF -0.227 -0.194 -0.154 -0.144 -0.152 -0.393
(-11.28) *** (-9.94) *** (-8.73) *** (-8.17) *** (-9.47) *** (-9.57) ***
DMSDP -0.057 -0.046 -0.053 -0.049 -0.072
(-9.28) *** (-8.37) *** (-8.93) *** (-8.56) *** (-10.24) ***
DMSA -0.037
(-8.74) ***
DFDP -0.015 -0.015 -0.009 -0.008 -0.017
(-0.94) (-1.12) (-3.63) *** (-3.53) *** (-3.25) ***
DFA -0.013
(-4.24) ***
Ln σ -0.827 -1.239 -0.647 -0.749 -0.569 -0.619
(-2.22) ** (-2.32) ** (-2.05) ** (-2.85) *** (-3.02) *** (-2.96) ***
Ln BASp -0.936 -0.873 -0.463 -0.363 -0.473 -0.519
(-1.83) * (-1.76) * (-2.43) ** (-2.12) ** (-2.49) ** (-4.18) **
Ln MC 2.493 1.624 0.235 0.227 0.343 0.402
(0.84) (0.39) (3.27) *** (3.06) *** (4.28) *** (5.28) ***
Ln Vol -0.352 -0.522 -0.278 -0.325 -0.274 -0.230
(-3.04) *** (-2.47) ** (-2.67) *** (-2.84) *** (-2.61) *** (-2.35) **
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.051 0.057 0.061 0.057 0.063




Table 3-10: Regression Results: Price vs. Mid-Quote (Global) - continued 
Panel B:  Component Share  
 
 
Note. This table contains the information and component share regressions results for market 
mid-quotes compared to lit market trades: ISLvM and CSLvM.  ISLvM and CSLvM results are found 
in Panels A and B, respectively. Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least square (2SLS) 
results are presented.  All values are measured with respect to the consolidated global order book. LF 
denotes the fragmentation of lit exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
DF denotes the fragmentation of dark exchanges and is represented by 1- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). DFDP consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DFA consists of all off-
order book transactions.  DMS measures the market share of off-order book transactions.  DMSDP 
consists of trades that originate exclusively from dark pools while DMSA consists of all off-order book 
transactions.  σ is the standard deviation of 1-minute mid-quote returns as measured in basis points.  
BASp is the average bid-ask spread at the best price level and is weighted by the total depth at that price 
level.  MC is the market capitalisation and is measured by the number of outstanding shares multiplied 
by the average daily price and is weighted by the total volume transacted at each price.  Vol is the total 
volume consists of the value of shares transacted in the stock over a given stock day and is measured in 
Euros (€).  Vol includes lit and dark transactions, including those originating from dark pool and over-
the-counter trades. Volatility, Spread and Market Capitalization are all transformed by the natural 
LF -0.036 -0.031 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.057
(-3.28) *** (-2.94) *** (-2.79) *** (-2.66) *** (-2.84) *** (-4.79) ***
DMSDP -0.027 -0.025 -0.018 -0.016 -0.011 -0.038
(-13.29) *** (-12.25) *** (-10.38) *** (-9.85) *** (-9.93) *** (-15.37) ***
DMSA
DFDP -0.016 -0.014 -0.008 -0.007 -0.026
(-4.02) *** (-3.84) *** (-2.95) *** (-3.28) *** (-6.24) ***
DFA -0.002
(-3.02) ***
Ln σ -0.522 -0.518 -0.483 -0.462 -0.643 -0.552
(-3.47) *** (-3.38) *** (-3.18) *** (-2.94) *** (-5.29) *** (-4.28) ***
Ln BASp -0.937 -1.232 0.047 -0.523 -0.175 0.061
(-1.03) (-1.49) (0.10) (-1.75) * (-0.37) (1.84) *
Ln MC 0.453 1.284 0.839 0.948 1.127 0.583
(0.36) (0.94) (0.68) (0.79) (0.90) (1.71) *
Ln Vol 0.026 0.026 0.020 0.019 0.008 0.025
(3.75) *** (3.68) *** (3.18) *** (3.06) *** (2.95) *** (2.38) **
Fixed Effects None Stock Time Stock + Time Stock + Time Stock + Time
Regression Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2-Stage
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.047 0.054




logarithm. T-statistics can be found in parentheses with ***, **, and * representing significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Those with valuable private information need not resort to placing orders in dark pools where 
greater non-execution probability resulting from informed investors clustering on the heavy 
side of the market exposes them to potential increases in transaction costs (Zhu, 2014) as do 
delayed executions during which adverse price changes may occur.  Also, investors who are 
able to access multiple venues simultaneously through the use of smart order routing 
technology (SORT) can offset the ‘thinness’ of the exchanges with price diversification 
benefits and experience reduced weighted average price variance (Mendelson, 1987).   
Therefore, we expect to see an increase in the level in which global exchange prices contribute 
to price discovery compared to trade prices originating in dark pools.  However, local exchange 
prices, or those originating from a stock’s primary exchange, experience a deterioration in their 
contributions to price discovery as compared to the more inherently fragmented dark pool 
market.  These findings suggest that as the absorptive capacity of the primary exchange 
decreases due to increased competition from other exchanges providing pre-trade transparency, 
investors are forced to look towards alternative markets in order to avoid adverse price changes 
(Pagano, 1989) with dark pools being among the set alternatives. 
3.6.3.2 Inter-market Fragmentation 
Both limit and market orders are observed to contain price forming information (Kaniel & Liu, 
2006). Therefore, any amount of dark pool activity is expected to have an adverse effect on the 
extent to which lit exchange prices contribute price adjusting information when compared to 
dark orders, resulting in a negative regression coefficient.  Hypothesis H3-5A states that there 
is a negative relationship between inter-market fragmentation, that is, the migration of liquidity 
from lit exchanges to dark exchanges, and the informativeness of lit exchange trade prices 
compared to dark exchange trade prices. This hypothesis implies that if dark pools attract 
information that is as informative as the information found in lit exchanges then it is expected 
that the regression coefficient for the market share of dark pools (DMSDP) to be -1.  This 
suggests that a 1% increase in the market share of dark pools results in a 1% decrease in the 
informativeness of lit trades.  A coefficient below (above) -1 would indicate that trades 
migrating to dark pools contain proportionally less (more) information than noise.  Consistent 
with the findings of Zhu (2014) and L. Ye (2016), and given the previous results in Tables 3-7 
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and 3-8 conveying the informativeness of lit versus dark prices, dark pools are expected to 
attract less informed investors on average. 
Revisiting Table 3-7, the coefficients for DMSDP pertaining to ISLvD and CSLvD to range from -
0.035 to -0.043 and -0.064 to -0.072, respectively supporting H3-5A.  These results reinforce 
the notion that dark pool transactions are substantially less informed than those on the primary 
quoting exchange.  This again supports the predictions of Zhu (2014) in that dark pools attract 
predominately uninformed trades as informed investors would be subject to greater instances of 
non-execution due to their tendency to cluster on the same side of the order book.  An alternate 
explanation is that the findings support the results found by L. Ye (2016) whereby investors 
with highly precise information trade in the quoting exchange while those with information of 
moderate precision opt to trade in the dark pool as they can help mitigate informational risk.  
The findings of L. Ye (2016) support those of Zhu (2014) in that dark pools attract investors 
that are less than perfectly informed and, as they gain market share, improve the overall quality 
of information in the quoting exchange.30  It must be noted, however, that one drawback to 
measuring the informativeness of dark pools is that information is conveyed to the market only 
after a successful transaction.  This means that any intentions to trade amongst investors, and 
the subsequent information these signals contain, are removed from market consideration until 
after the fact.  Failed transactions, on the other hand, are never considered and their information 
is concealed from the market entirely. 
Hypothesis H3-5C states that the informativeness of local trade prices is more sensitive to 
changes in inter-market fragmentation compared to global trade prices. Table 3-7 and Table 3-8 
convey a similar, albeit reduced, the impact of inter-market fragmentation. ISLvD and CSLvD 
measures in Table 3-8 display coefficients ranging from -0.014 to -0.024 and -0.033 to -0.058, 
respectively, which is less negative than the local trade market.  Global markets tend to be more 
informative than local ones as they consist of both the primary exchange and several competing 
exchanges.  Consequently, they encapsulate a greater proportion of the available information 
and are less impacted by the migration of trading activity to the dark market compared to the 
local exchange.  
Hypothesis H3-5B states that inter-market fragmentation results in a greater concentration of 
informed investors, compared uninformed investors, in lit exchanges. The higher levels of 
                                                 
30 Unlike Zhu (2012), L. Ye’s (2016) findings are dependent on the level of noisy information in the market.  
While Zhu’s (2012) model predicts that dark pools strictly improve price discovery in the quoting exchange, Ye’s 
(2016) results only come to the same conclusion when noise is at a minimum, that is, when information precision 
is high.  When information precision is low informed investors opt to trade in the dark pool. 
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informed trading are associated with greater adverse selection risk with one indicator of this 
being wider bid-ask spreads (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985).  This is evident in the results through 
the (mostly) positive coefficients between quoted spreads and both ISLvM and ISLvM (Table 3-9 
and 3-10).  Therefore, while increases to the market share of dark pools improve the quality of 
information on the quoting exchanges, it comes at the cost of increased adverse selection risk in 
the quoting exchanges as uninformed investors favour trading in the dark pool.  Table 3-2 
contains further evidence of increased adverse selection risk with dark pool market share 
(DMSDP) displaying a positive correlation to both quoted spreads (0.1055) and volatility 
(0.1096). 
On the topic of volatility, L. Ye (2016) predicts that when volatility is high, the informational 
advantage, that is, the benefit of acquiring private information, is high and adding a dark pool 
enhances price discovery.  However, if volatility is low and below a critical threshold, then 
adding a dark pool impairs price discovery. This largely depends on the noise in the market as 
expressed by the ratio of informed to uninformed investors.   When risk is high, informed 
traders face higher potential profits and therefore, would rather stay in the quoting exchange 
when compared to uninformed liquidity traders.  As a result, adding a dark pool increases the 
signal to noise ratio and improves the informativeness of the lit exchange trades. 
Table 3-7 reports a positive coefficient between volatility and the price discovery of lit 
exchange trades ranging from 0.018-0.032.  Consistent with the findings of L. Ye (2016), as 
risk increases the informativeness of the primary exchange prices also increase due to the 
informational advantage experienced by the informed traders.   
The advantages informed traders experience due to their access to superior information affords 
them the opportunity to safely supply liquidity when adverse selection risks are high (Rindi, 
2008).  We have shown that increased use of dark liquidity is associated with greater adverse 
selection in quoting exchanges due to the propensity for dark pools to attract primarily 
uninformed investors.  Therefore, exchange quotes are expected to take on a greater role in 
conveying price adjusting information compared to exchange trade prices. 
The results support hypothesis H3-2B that trade migration from quoting exchanges to dark 
pools is associated with an increase in the informativeness of exchange quotes compared to 
exchange prices.  Table 3-9 and Table 3-10 show negative coefficients across all regressions 
for DMSDP on ISLvM and CSLvM.  The negative coefficients for both quoted spreads and 
volatility also contribute to the conclusion that increases to adverse selection are associated 
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with exchange quotes taking on a greater role in compounding information as informed 
investors face a comparative advantage in supplying liquidity.  Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 
(2015) also remark that dark trading makes it easier for brokers to internalise trades and they 
prefer to do so with uninformed liquidity due to the lower adverse selection costs. This 
provides further support for the increase in adverse selection across quoting exchanges as the 
actions of the brokers help to concentrate informed activity in said markets. 
3.6.3.3 Intra-Market Dark Fragmentation 
To the best of our knowledge, to date there are no studies have investigated the impact of intra-
market dark fragmentation on price discovery.  Studies such as those by M. Ye (2012), Zhu 
(2014) and L. Ye (2016) focus on the introduction of a single dark pool to the existing market.  
However, a previous empirical study by Majtyka et al. (2015) has shown a strong relationship 
between the market share of dark pools and the level of fragmentation among dark pools.  
Therefore, as with quoting exchanges, the predictions are based on the assumption that the 
market for dark liquidity can only sustain greater levels of fragmentation if there exists 
sufficient liquidity to support multiple exchange pools.   
When dark markets were in their infancy and supported few customers, it is likely that it was 
difficult to find an opposing party to the trade.  However, since the introduction of MiFID dark 
markets have increased in popularity and now consist of 9.74% of total trading volume within 
the sample versus 4.38% during the earlier periods.  This supports the idea that a fragmented 
dark order book today can support customers to the same extent as a consolidated dark order 
book during the introduction of MiFID and that the number of dark pools can fluctuate in order 
to serve a growing client base.   
Under such circumstances, an increase in dark pool fragmentation is expected to have a similar 
effect on price discovery as increases to the market share of dark pools.  Informed investors 
continue to favour lit exchanges as fragmentation in the dark market distributes liquidity across 
competing dark liquidity providers and increases non-execution risk for informed investors in 
any given dark pool.  Therefore, new dark pools must attract uninformed liquidity in order to 
sustain activity within the pool.  This, in turn, concentrates informed investors on quoting 
exchanges which leads to increased adverse selection risk in the said exchanges.  Greater 
adverse selection risk incentivises informed investors into supplying liquidity in order to profit 
from their informational advantage. 
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Support for the hypotheses H3-6A to C surrounding intra-market dark fragmentation can be 
found in Tables 3-7 to 3-10.  As with the market share of dark pools, dark market 
fragmentation (DFDP) is associated with a concentration of informed order flow in quoting 
exchanges with the coefficients for DF across ISLvD and CSLvD measures being much closer to 0 
than they are to -1. This result supports hypothesis H3-6A that there is a negative relationship 
between intra-market dark fragmentation and the informativeness of lit exchange trade prices 
compared to dark exchange trade prices.  
The ISLvM and CSLvM coefficients also continue to be negative which supports the hypothesis 
H3-6B that intra-market dark fragmentation results in a greater concentration of informed 
investors, compared uninformed investors, in lit exchanges. That is, informed investors favour 
supplying liquidity when exposed to greater adverse selection risk associated with trading in 
quoting exchanges.  However, these relationships are not as strong for DFDP as they are with 
DMSDP.  DFDP coefficients are only significant for 5 of the 8 regressions performed on ISLvD 
and CSLvD measures in Table 3-10.  ISLvM and CSLvM measures are slightly more favourable 
with 6 of the 8 regression coefficients being significant. This supports hypothesis H3-6C that 
the informativeness of local trade prices is more sensitive to changes in inter-market 
fragmentation compared to global trade prices. 
3.6.3.4 Robustness Checks 
Variations to both the methods and data are explored to test the robustness of the results. First, 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression is run to account for the effects of endogeneity 
within the three key fragmentation measures and instrumental variables: lit fragmentation (LF), 
dark pool market share (DMS), and dark fragmentation (DF).  Note that the analysis focuses on 
DMS and DF figures that consist exclusively of dark pool activity.  In the first stage the model 
for daily lit order book fragmentation for stock i at time t (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)is as follows:  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑏1𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                   (22) 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the average measure of lit fragmentation across all sampled firms at time t 
and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the number of distinct visible trading venues selling stock i at time t, with the 
remainder being the control variables identified in the original panel regression inequation 17. 
The first stage model for dark pool market share for stock i at time t (𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) is as follows: 
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𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡          (23) 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  is the average dark pool market share across all sampled firms at time t and  
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the number of distinct dark trading venues offering stock i at time t, with the 
remainder being the standard control variables. Finally, the first stage model for dark 
fragmentation for stock i at time t (𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) is as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                   (24) 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  is the average measure of dark pool fragmentation across all sampled firms at 
time t, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the number of distinct dark trading venues offering stock i at time t, and 
the standard control variables. 
In the second stage our key measures of price discovery (ISLvD, CSLvD, ISLvM, and CSLvM) are 
regressed using the standard panel regression model, Equation 17, however this time the values 
of each key regressor are replaced with the those from the first stage regression.  Note that this 
is conducted for both local and global measures of price discovery.   
The final column for each price discovery measure in Tables 3-7 to 3-10 displays the results of 
our 2SLS regression.  The results are consistent with the previous findings and support the 
conclusions that fragmentation of any kind increases adverse selection risk in the standard 
quoting (lit) exchanges by encouraging a disproportional number of informed investors to trade 
on lit exchanges as opposed to dark pools.  This, in turn, increases the informativeness of order 
book quotes as informed investors face a comparative advantage in supply liquidity during such 
periods to the superior nature of their information. 
Second, the standard panel regression is adjusted to incorporate all off-order book activity, 
including standard over-the-counter transactions, into the dark measures to account for other 
transactions that originate without pre-trade transparency.  The results are reported in Tables 3-
7 to 3-10 where DMSA and DFA values are used in place of DMSDP and DFDP, respectively.  
The signs of the regression coefficients imply a similar effect as with the previous result.  This 
implies that over-the-counter transactions consist of a similar mix of informed and uninformed 
trading as dark pools and that dark pools may simply be used as a more automated form of off-
order book transaction.  As a result, dark pools may not have any more of a negative impact on 
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market conditions and price discovery than other liquidity that operates without pre-trade 
transparency. 
Lastly, all three sample periods are tested individually. This additional analysis does not 
produce any key differences in the results, though that DF coefficients lose some significance 
during the earliest sample window.  The implication is that dark pools experienced a slight 
change in the mix of clientele as the competition among dark pools, and the resulting 
fragmentation it caused, was more in its infancy and accounted for less volume when compared 
to later stages. 
3.7 Summary of Results 
The results of the hypothesis testing are summarised in Table 3-11. The study tested six main 
hypotheses, some with multiple subparts. The analysis and results support most of the 
hypothesised relations. However, due to the assumption tests in Section 3.5.4.4, the final 








H3-1:  Lit exchange trade prices contain more information than 
dark pool trade prices. 
3-6 Accept 
H3-2A:  Lit exchange mid-quotes contain more 
information than lit exchange trade prices. 
3-6 Accept 
H3-2B:  The informational content of lit exchange mid-




H3-3A:  Lit exchange trade prices in the consolidated 
global market contain more information than lit exchange 
trade prices in local primary exchange. 
3-6 Accept 
H3-3B:  Lit exchange mid-quotes in the consolidated 
global market contain more information than lit exchange 
mid-quotes in local primary exchange. 
3-6 Accept 
H3-4A:  The informativeness of local exchange trade 
prices is negatively related to the level of intra-market lit 
fragmentation. 
3-7 Accept 
H3-4B:  The informativeness of consolidated global 
exchange trade prices is positively related to the level of 
intra-market lit fragmentation. 
3-8 Reject 
H3-5A:  There is a negative relationship between inter-
market fragmentation and the informativeness of lit 





H3-5B:  Inter-market fragmentation results in a greater 
concentration of informed investors, compared 
uninformed investors, in lit exchanges. 
3-9 
   3-10 
Accept 
H3-5C:  The informativeness of local trade prices is more 
sensitive to changes in inter-market fragmentation 




H3-6A:  There is a negative relationship between intra-
market dark fragmentation and the informativeness of lit 









greater concentration of informed investors, compared 
uninformed investors, in lit exchanges. 
3-10 
H3-6C:  The informativeness of local trade prices is more 
sensitive to changes in inter-market fragmentation 






The findings in this chapter answer RQ2.  The result support theory presented by Zhu (2014) in 
that lit prices contain substantially more information than dark prices.  Mid-quotes on lit 
exchanges are more informative than lit prices.  Regarding fragmentation, the results align with 
the hypothesis and indicate that increases in fragmentation among quoting (lit) exchanges lead 
to a decrease in the informativeness of primary market lit trades versus dark trades.  When 
considering information across all exchanges, rather than simply the primary exchange, the 
results suggest an increase in price discovery of lit market trades. Informative trades appear to 
leave the dark market and instead choose to spread their activity across several lit exchanges, 
taking advantage of smart order routing technology (SORT), in order to continue concealing 
their intentions.  Doing so helps informed investors avoid non-execution risks (Zhu, 2014) 
associated with dark pools by offsetting the ‘thinness’ of fragmented markets (Mendelson, 
1987) while continuing to disguise their intentions from the market (Madhavan, 1995).   
The informativeness of exchanges trades as compared to quotes does, in fact, deteriorate with 
greater intra-market lit fragmentation suggesting that intra-market lit fragmentation is 
associated with higher levels of adverse selection in the lit market.  This is further supported by 
the negative relationship between price discovery and volatility and is consistent with the 
notion that the most profitable uninformed trades are being ‘skimmed’ by informed liquidity 
providers (Bessembinder & Kaufman, 1997; Easley et al., 1996). 
Dark market share coefficients, which measure the inter-market fragmentation between lit and 
dark exchanges, provide additional support that dark transactions are substantially less 
informed that lit transactions. They are consistent with the theoretical implications Zhu (2014) 
and L. Ye (2016).  Informed investors are discouraged from relying on dark pools as they tend 
to experience greater non-execution risk since they cluster on the heavy side of the market.  
Once again, fragmentation is associated with greater adverse selection risk in quoting 
exchanges as informed investors use their informational advantage to supply liquidity (Rindi, 
2008). The effects are greater in local exchanges as global market benefit from a more diverse 
subset of investors. 
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The study reported in this chapter is the first study to investigate the impact of intra-market 
dark fragmentation on price discovery.  The findings show that a fragmented dark order book 
today can support customers to the same extent as a consolidated dark order book during the 
introduction of MiFID and that the number of dark pools can fluctuate in order to serve a 
growing client base.  This results in dark market fragmentation being associated with a 
concentration of informed order flow in quoting exchanges.  As expected, these results are 
consistent with those of inter-market fragmentation and the growing popularity of dark pools.  
As dark pools fragment, the market continues to experience greater adverse selection risk 
associated with the concentration of informed trading on quoting exchanges though these 
results are less significant than those for inter-market fragmentation. 
Overall the empirical results support the taxonomical framework established in Chapter 2, 
Figure 2-12. Transaction costs are the main driver of equity markets fragmentation into lit and 
dark segments. In addition, the results show that dark markets help complete lit markets and are 




Chapter 4: Fragmentation & Price Discovery in Cryptocurrency 
Markets 
4.1 Introduction 
Cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, demonstrate that individuals can exchange financial assets 
amongst each other without the need for a financial middleman to facilitate the transaction. 
This is in large part due to a key technological innovation, the distributed ledger, which allows 
for the non-centralised settling and clearing of transactions.  By maintaining the record of 
ownership across many devices, the technology behind cryptocurrencies negates the need for a 
central trusted entity.  Distributed ledgers also make it easier to set up new cryptocurrency 
exchanges.  Cryptocurrency markets are an example of technology motivated new product 
innovations in fragmented markets (see Figure 2-12). 
In equity markets, new exchanges attract informed trades from the dominant exchange making 
collecting all necessary price adjusting information more difficult.  The result is a deterioration 
in the price discovery process.  Bornholdt and Sneppen (2014) argues that cryptocurrencies are 
prone to similar effects of competition as new exchanges and currencies are introduced into the 
market.  However, with its large levels of volatility, a low number of daily transactions, and 
relatively small trading volume, Bitcoin and other competing cryptocurrencies do not yet share 
the characteristics of sovereign currencies.  As a result, their exchanges can be looked upon as 
having more similarity to equity-based exchanges offering access to pre-trade transparent 
liquidity than those that trade currencies.  Therefore, much of the exchange-based discussion 
for cryptocurrencies draws on our knowledge of equity markets. The cryptocurrency market 
resembles current equity markets in that is consists of a series of exchanges.   This chapter 
investigates the effects of increased competitive market fragmentation in the cryptocurrency 
market and tests whether equity market theories surrounding price discovery, such as those 
based in rational expectations theory and the efficient market hypothesis, are applicable. 
Testing price discovery in cryptocurrency markets becomes more important as cryptocurrencies 
begin to play a larger role in investment portfolios.  Briere, Oosterlinck, and Szafarz (2015) test 
Bitcoin’s contributions to a diversified portfolio.  They find that Bitcoin contributes abnormally 
high returns to the investment portfolio, but also adds to its volatility.  However, given its lower 
correlation with other assets, Bitcoin contributes significantly to portfolio diversification, even 
at levels as low as 3%.   
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Decentralised currencies, particularly cryptocurrencies, have the potential to significantly alter 
the landscape of future financial and retail market operations.   Most notably, they have the 
potential to streamline the processes currently used to transfer funds.  The financial industry is 
currently investigating the viability of cryptocurrencies, and other forms of virtual currencies, 
as investable assets. 31   On the other hand, the retail industry is looking into utilising the 
technology for transactional purposes.  Retailers understand that decentralised currency 
technology is particularly helpful in facilitating cross-border transactions as it has the potential 
to improve both the speed and cost of the transaction.  However, many concerns regarding the 
efficiency and security of such systems have delayed their wide-spread adoption. 
As it stands, most financial market participants have not embraced cryptocurrencies.  Due to 
their limited market share compared to other financial assets, cryptocurrencies currently have a 
negligible influence on the global economy.   However, infrastructural developments 
demonstrate that it is feasible to use distributed ledgers in order to facilitate peer-to-peer 
transactions, thus negating the need for an established intermediary.  Also, the incorporation 
distributed ledgers into general investment practices open the door for the development of new 
investment techniques and strategies, including those that require simultaneous access to 
multiple sovereign marketplaces. 
Investors are beginning to see the potential benefits of cryptocurrencies and are beginning to 
invest heavily in start-ups looking to further the technology.  As of November 2016, $1.4 
billion have been invested in digital currency start-ups.32  R3CEV, for example, is a consortium 
of forty-two of the largest banks whose goal is to develop blockchain technology further.  
Another example is the Open Ledger Project, which involves some of the largest names in the 
computing industry including IBM, Intel, Cisco and the Linux Foundation. The goal of the 
Open Ledger Project is to foster the deployment and adoption of the distributed ledger 
technology by focusing on innovation and security.  As a result, cryptocurrency markets have 
experienced numerous substitutionary and competitive market fragmenting events.  The focal 
point of this study, competitive market fragmentation, can have a significant impact on the 
supply of cryptocurrencies in the market, as well as the stability of the market itself.  The 
empirical study presented in this chapter examines the impact of competitive market 
                                                 
31 4 Reasons Why Bitcoin Represents a New Asset Class - Forbes: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/06/02/4-reasons-why-bitcoin-represents-a-new-asset-
class/#1aff43e55ce5 




fragmentation on the dissemination of key price adjusting information, specifically, the 
introduction of new exchanges for facilitating transactions.   
4.2 Description of Cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies are a transactive asset classified in the family of digital currencies.  However, 
unlike other digital currencies such as electronic-money (e-money), cryptocurrencies are not 
simply a digital representation of a sovereign currency.  Instead, they represent a new form of 
currency that maintains its own value and is not supported by any sovereign entity.  Figure 4-1 




Figure 4-1: Taxonomy of Digital Currencies 
Source: (He et al., 2016) (IMF.org) 
The term money applies to both physical and electronic forms of currency, with notes and coins 
representing the former and bank deposits representing the latter. According to the Committee 
on Payments and Market Infrastructure (CPMI), e-money is a form of digital currency whose 
value is stored electronically on a device such as a computer chip in a card or a computer hard 
drive.  Similar to bank deposits, the value of e-money is represented by that of the sovereign 
currency in which the issuing bank transacts.  As a result, it can be easily exchanged for fiat 
money and used in retail transactions.  Due to their similarities, the CPMI has categorised the 
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above three forms of payment (cash, bank deposits, and e-money) as ‘money’ and regards them 
as the same from a policy and regulatory standpoint (BIS, 2003).33 
Digital currencies, including cryptocurrencies, do not fall under the category of e-money in the 
majority of dominions around the world.  This is because most regulatory bodies require the 
value stored to be denominated in and represented by some sovereign currency. However, the 
majority of digital currencies, and by definition, all cryptocurrencies, maintain their own unit of 
measure and are exchanged for sovereign-based currency based on the current market exchange 
rate. 
4.2.1 Factors influencing the development of cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies operating non-centralised ledgers, known as distributed ledgers, are a 
relatively new concept.  They are still growing in terms of market adoption as well as from an 
operational standpoint.  This section outlines some of the factors that play a major role in both 
helping and hindering the widespread use of cryptocurrencies in the market. It begins with a 
look at the factors that influence the supply of and demand for cryptocurrencies and finishes 
with a look at the role of regulation in the process.  
4.2.1.1 Supply-based factors 
Private non-bank institutions have taken a leading role in developing cryptocurrencies other 
digital currencies.34  Therefore, they are the main source of substitutionary fragmentation in 
cryptocurrency markets.  Banks have only recently begun to fund digital currency start-ups in 
order to maintain a footing in the market.  They are also motivated by a desire to provide 
services to their customers that provide access to the digital currency market; though 
admittedly the motivation behind their involvement can vary. 
Financial motives imply that banks are interested in implementing the technology in order to 
reap the financial rewards.  By issuing the currency, the bank can not only profit its issuance 
but also on the resulting capital gains earned by maintaining a positive position in the currency.  
Finally, maintaining the ledger and facilitating transactions results in newly earned transaction 
fees.  If the motivation is non-financial, firms may develop cryptocurrencies to gain a better 
understanding of their operations.  This served as a ‘warm-up’ for future events where the 
                                                 
33 For a detailed explanation of this perception of “singleness” in relation to central and commercial bank money 
(mainly based on the confidence that banks have the ability to convert their sight liabilities into central bank 
money upon demand), see CPMI, The role of central bank money in payment systems, August 2003.   
34 A non-bank in this report is defined as “any entity involved in the provision of retail payment services whose 
main business is not related to taking deposits from the public and using these deposits to make loans”: CPMI, 
Non-banks in retail payments, September 2014.   
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technology becomes more widespread.  Previous experience makes it easier for the institutions 
to adapt and maintain a competitive strategic position in the market. 
Unlike the equity market, digital currencies are also subject to a second form a fragmentation, 
substitutional fragmentation.  As of January 2017, there are more than 680 cryptocurrencies 
available for purchase through online platforms (exchanges) but only 10 that have market 
capitalisations over $10 million (USD).  Of the 680 available cryptocurrencies, the vast 
majority are nearly identical and only differ in terms of accessibility and user base.  They 
represent events of substitutionary fragmentation offering investors only modified access to 
existing products.  As there is no underlying intrinsic value to a unit of cryptocurrency, $1USD 
of currency A should be no different from $1USD of currency B. Therefore, cryptocurrency 
markets are subject to the influence of competing currencies offering nearly identical services.  
Equity based assets, on the other hand, differ widely in terms of the underlying assets they 
represent, the industry they are in, the services they provide, the payments they entitle the 
holder to, and the regulations to which the underlying company must adhere. 
From both an exchange and currency standpoint, fragmentation can hinder a firm’s ability to 
achieve the critical amount of transactional volume necessary to maintain operations.  Much 
like with dark pools (Majtyka et al., 2015), cryptocurrencies and the exchanges in which they 
trade may need to consolidate in order to develop a more robust user base.   
The ability to scale cryptocurrencies’ technology while maintaining operational efficiency has 
not yet been realised.  As a result, the retail payment systems maintain dominance in the market 
for exchange.   While many cryptocurrency services can maintain efficiency regarding the 
speed of transactions, it is unknown if these speeds will be maintained when the project is 
scaled upward.  Also, the computing power and electrical energy required to complete a small 
number of transactions is not insignificant and can be a potential source of strife as 
cryptocurrencies continue to grow.  However, as technology improves, so does the efficiency of 
the system. 
The levels of anonymity within some digital currency programs can also be present roadblocks 
when developing or expanding the service.  Institutional participants may find it difficult to 
provide these services while still adhering to regulations.  The Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (AML/CTF) requires institutions to report suspicious 
transactions and overseas currency flow which, with the level of anonymity present within the 
distributed ledger, can introduce difficulties in identifying suspicious parties. 
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Finally, developments in security can either encourage or discourage the implementation of 
digital currency schemes.  Operators of distributed ledgers must work towards maintaining the 
accuracy of the ledger.  Discrepancies between versions of the distributed ledger can lead to its 
collapse if not resolved as customers can no longer trust that their money is ‘safe’.  Distributed 
ledgers are also subject to manipulation which, if not identified, can lead to the theft of virtual 
currency units from ‘wallets’.35 
4.2.1.2 Demand-based factors  
If companies want to further the adoption of digital currencies in the market, they must provide 
users with incentives over traditional retail services. In lieu of recent events, security is one of 
the top concerns of users interested in digital currency.  The recent theft of over $78 million 
(USD) in Bitcoin from Bitfinex in Hong Kong has raised concerns over the safety of digital 
currency ‘deposits’.  Users, however, can also lose access to funds if they forget the 
information necessary to access their ‘wallets’.  Unfortunately, the use of ‘wallets’ is also not 
without risk as the party/parties responsible for maintaining the ledger can also be subject to 
attacks and other phenomena that can lead to the loss and corruption of data. 
One way in which digital currencies aim to compete with the traditional retail process is 
through cost.  Some digital currencies offer discounted transaction fees to encourage their use.  
They can afford to do so as they are not subject to the same operational and infrastructure 
expenses as traditional retail systems.  Other programs reward users for participating in the 
clearing process as well as maintaining a copy of the ledger itself.  Rewards vary but are 
typically in the form of new currency units which can be immediately sold or held in order to 
earn additional capital gains. 
Block size limits are also influencing how users approach digital currencies.  With Bitcoin, for 
example, each block size contains 1MB of transactional data.  New blocks form approximately 
every 10 minutes; however, it takes less than that amount of time to create 1MB worth of 
transactions.  Market participants must now compete in order to transact within the 1MB limit 
or face higher prices resulting from the increased demand for the currency. 
Recently, the 1MB block size has divided Bitcoin users and market facilitators.  Market 
facilitators, otherwise known as data-miners, are responsible for maintaining the distributed 
ledger and aid in the clearing process.  Users argue that fees resulting from maintaining the 
                                                 




current block size will hinder the introduction of low-value transactions, a staple of the retail 
industry.  Increasing the block size may, however, give larger data miners a competitive 
advantage over their smaller counterparts and result in the centralisation of clearing services.  
This introduces the potential for collusion amongst market facilitators as a few large data-
miners can potentially conspire to manipulate the distributed ledger (Bonneau, 2015). 
Having a system that is easy to use is also a significant factor in terms of the client-side 
adoption of digital currency schemes.  How easy is the process? Can it be used for various 
purposes throughout the day?  The final questions recognise that versatility is important to the 
adoptions of cryptocurrencies as customers tend to look for the ‘one-stop-shop’ that caters to all 
of their needs.  This is currently one of the key areas that digital currency providers are 
focusing on as it not only improves adoptions rates but encourages customers to continue to use 
the service and incorporate it into their daily lives. 
Users who do not immediately liquidate their holding in digital currencies in favour of a 
sovereign currency face the risk capital losses.  Bitcoin is regarded as an unstable currency 
whose value fluctuates significantly throughout the day.  It is also subject to flash crashes and 
waves of sentiment, both positive and negative (Bornholdt & Sneppen, 2014).   This level of 
volatility can discourage users who want to use digital currencies for transactional purposes 
while simultaneously encouraging speculative investment (Baur & Dimpfl, 2019).  The 
academic and finance communities are still uncertain as to the effect that widespread adoption 
may have on volatility. 
4.2.1.3 Regulation 
Future developments in the regulatory environment surrounding virtual currencies may 
significantly influence the adoption of virtual currencies technologies from both a supply and 
demand standpoint.  As virtual currencies are a fairly new construct, they do not easily fit 
within existing policies and regulations.  Their cross-border nature and lack of a central issuing 
authority pose major barriers in the formulation of realistic and effective policies. 
Of particular interest to any government is the potential for virtual currencies to facilitate illegal 
activities.  In 2014, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) distributed a report stating that 
“convertible virtual currencies that can be exchanged for real money or other virtual 
currencies are potentially vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing”.36 
                                                 
36 Financial Action Task Force, Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks, June 2014.   
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The following are the key areas that regulators are targeting most in order to influence the 
development of new policies He et al. (2016):  
Awareness – Use education and awareness to influence the development and adoption 
of virtual currencies from an institutional and retail standpoint, respectively. 
Targeted Regulation – Limit regulation to a particularly important subset of 
participants, notably those that exchange virtual currencies for sovereign ones. This 
would shed light and concentrate efforts on the stage of the transaction process that is 
most likely to result in or facilitate criminal activity. 
Application of Existing Regulations – Some of the existing regulations and policies may 
be applied to virtual currencies; however, their efficacy and applicability must first be 
assessed. 
Prohibition – Ban any or all of the following: the formation of virtual currency 
exchanges, the use of virtual-currency based transactions, virtual currency exchanges, 
the ability for retailers to accept virtual currencies. 
4.3 Existing Literature  
There is a recent limited but growing cryptocurrency research literature.  Some studies 
investigate the validity of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a replacement for traditional 
fiat currency (Lots & Vasselin, 2013).  Other studies focus on price discovery and volatility 
transmission (Eun & Sabherwal, 2003; Pascual et al., 2006). Others study the price dynamics and 
their relationship to the market structure of Bitcoin markets (Brandvold et al., 2015; Fink & Johann, 
2014).  This study extends this latter body of research and investigates the price dynamics and 
market microstructure.  Like the empirical study reported in Chapter 3, the current chapter’s 
empirical study investigates the relationship between competitive market fragmentation and the 
price discovery process but in this case related to cryptocurrency markets.  The goal is to 
determine again if fragmentation is positively or negatively related to the market’s ability to 
gather and impound into the price of the asset all relevant price adjusting information. 
A key contribution of this study is to test the applicability of equity-based research surrounding 
rational expectations theory and the efficient market hypothesis to a new asset class, 
cryptocurrencies. See Section 3.2.1 for a detailed analysis of competitive market fragmentation 
in pre-trade transparent exchanges.   In summary, the results surrounding the benefits of 
fragmentation within lit order books are mixed. Recent studies find that fragmentation is 
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beneficial to the price discovery process (R. H. Battalio, 1997; B. Boehmer & Boehmer, 2003; 
Colliard & Foucault, 2012; Foucault & Menkveld, 2008).  However, benefits observed across 
the consolidated global order book come at the expense of degradation to the local exchange 
and retail investors (Degryse et al., 2015; Gresse, 2017). The results of the empirical study 
reported in Chapter 3 support these findings of prior research. The issue this chapter addresses 
is whether or not these findings also extend to cryptocurrency markets. The following review of 
literature helps inform testable hypotheses that are tested in this study. 
Substitutionary Fragmentation 
Bornholdt and Sneppen (2014) and  Baur, Dimpfl, and Kuck (2018) show that Bitcoin, as a 
cryptocurrency, contains no characteristics that noticeably differentiate it from other 
cryptocurrencies.  They argue that the perception of its value over other currencies stems from 
a herd mentality where users tend to centralise themselves around established market 
constructs.  As a result, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are susceptible to being replaced 
due to the presence of substitute products. 
Furthermore, as the number of coins in a currency can be constant, or grow at a constant rate, 
the number of competitive currencies introduced into the market is more sporadic.  Cloning, 
adjusting, or introducing substitute cryptocurrencies contains few barriers to entry.  However, 
as more currencies are introduced, they not only compete for market share but memory across 
computers and servers worldwide.  Remember that these currencies operate using a distributed 
ledger and, as a result, require external support to maintain the ledger as well as settle and clear 
transactions.    Non-trading participants, those users that help facilitate the trading process, will, 
therefore, be incentivised to move to the market that is most active or can best compensate 
them for their participation (Bornholdt & Sneppen, 2014).  This results in increased market 
share for new currencies while older, less traded currencies, become forgotten and exit the 
market.  For more information on substitutionary fragmentation in cryptocurrency markets refer 
to the discussion in Section 2.4.2.  
Competitive Fragmentation and Price Discovery 
Several studies focus on pricing dynamics and their relation to the microstructure of Bitcoin 
markets.  Section 2.2.4 discusses these findings in detail; however, the results are also 
summarised below.  Fink and Johann (2014) conduct a study into pricing dynamics and their 
relation to the microstructure of Bitcoin markets.  Using a vector-error-correction-model 
(VECM) in conjunction with Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) Component Share (CS) and 
142 
 
conclude that, before the bankruptcy of Mt. Gox, nearly all exchanges have at least a 10% level 
of influence on the prices of their competitors.  Mt. Gox (USD) noticeably exceeds 10% level 
and is identified price leader.  Being the market leader in transactional volume at the time this 
result conforms to theory by Joel Hasbrouck (1995) who argues that the dominant exchange is 
the source of the majority of price forming information.  Brandvold et al. (2015) also focus on 
price discovery in Bitcoin exchanges.  Using a multivariate version of Hasbrouck’s (1995) 
Information Share (IS), they find partial support for the results presented by Fink and Johann 
(2014).  They find that the dominant exchange, Mt. Gox, is the price leader. 
Vs Fiat Currency 
Some Bitcoin papers focus on the validity of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a 
replacement for traditional fiat currency.  Lots and Vasselin (2013) argues that. given 
sufficiently low transaction costs, digital currencies could ultimately replace traditional fiat 
currencies and lead to their obsolescence.  However, some studies take an opposing standpoint. 
Yermack (2015) notes that Bitcoin is not suitable to be a currency because of the instability of 
its price. 
4.4 Problem, Contribution and Hypotheses 
Many Bitcoin (BTC) exchanges allow for trading across multiple fiat currencies.  However, 
they operate separate order books for each fiat currency in which investors can transact.  
Exchanges also restrict customers to the order books which use their local currency.  This 
results in the fragmentation of BTC investors into pools based on their home currency as 
identified by the country in which they are currently a resident.  This study investigates two fiat 
based, USD and Euro, BTC markets determine if they react similarly to competitive market 
fragmenting events.  This study investigates RQ3 by testing the applicability of equity-based 
research principles, such as rational expectations theory and the efficient market hypothesis, to 
instances of competitive market fragmentation in a relatively new asset class, cryptocurrencies. 
Pagano (1989) argues if two similar exchanges exist with unequal trading costs, some investors 
will concentrate on one exchange while others migrate to the alternative exchange. Chowdhry 
and Nanda (1991) extend the work of Kyle (1985) and find that adverse selection risk increases 
along with an increase in the number of exchanges listing a particular asset.   Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) deduce that increased participation from informed competitive traders is 
proportional to bid-ask spreads due to adverse selection. The increase in adverse selection risk 
results from increased competitive market fragmentation and hinders a market’s ability to 
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formulate accurate prices (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991; Madhavan, 1995). Also, Hasbrouck 
(1995) concludes that, for those shares whose primary listing is on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the primary exchange is responsible for over 90% of price discovery when 
compared to regional satellite exchanges on which the asset is cross-listed. However, any 
informed activities that leave the market take with them some permanent price-adjusting 
information.  This leads to the first two hypotheses for the study: 
H4-1: When multiple exchanges offer the ability to transact in the same cryptocurrency asset, 
price adjusting information is spread across multiple cryptocurrency exchanges and does not 
originate from a single source. 
H4-2: The market share of a cryptocurrency exchange is positively related to the informational 
content of prices on said exchange. 
When there exists a greater proportion of large liquidity traders who can simultaneously access 
multiple exchanges, markets experience an increase in volume but also a decrease in the 
informativeness of prices (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991; Madhavan, 1995).  Greater 
fragmentation affords informed investors the ability to more easily conceal their trades from 
investors wishing to take advantage of their superior information Madhavan (1995).  This 
results in the migration of critical price-adjusting information across exchanges and leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H4-3: Market fragmentation across cryptocurrency exchanges is positively related to the 
informational content of prices on an exchange. 
Local exchanges, those that operate within the same country as a particular order book 
currency, will contain more price discovery than foreign exchange.  Noronha et al. (1996) find 
that informed trading increases following international cross-listing, leading to more efficient 
and informative prices.  However, the primary market is still believed to provide the majority 
of price disseminating information.  Ultimately, price discovery occurs in the primary domestic 
exchange (Su & Chong, 2007) which leads to the final hypothesis for the study: 
H4-4: Cryptocurrency exchanges transacting in USD (Euro) contribute more information to 
USD (Euro) cryptocurrency transactions than Euro (USD) cryptocurrency transactions. 
4.5 Data 
This chapter utilises tick level transaction data and order book data obtained from 
CoinMarketCap.  It also references data from BitcoinCharts.com for supporting information 
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regarding market totals.  Bitcoin (BTC) data is chosen as it is the largest and most liquid 
cryptocurrency with regards to market capitalisation and trading volume, respectively.  BTC is 
also the oldest and most recognisable cryptocurrency whose name is used as an eponym for all 
cryptocurrencies.37  
BTC data is collected from January 1st, 2017 to March 31st, 2019.  The data is not only recent at 
the time of the writing of this thesis, it also corresponds to a highly liquid period of the BTC 
market.  This allows for the use of more granular data in constructing the necessary variables 
due to the frequency of transactions.   
BTC data is collected for the following six exchanges: Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Coinbase, Exmo, 
Gemini and Kraken.  These exchanges are among the most liquid BTC exchanges with regards 
to trading volume. Both USD and Euro data is used as they represent the two most active BTC 
markets when we consider the fragmentation of investors by their respective fiat currency.  
Bitstamp, Exmo, and Kraken operate both USD and Euro order books while Bitfinex, 
Coinabase and Gemini only allow for USD trading.  During the study period, these markets 
represent 81% and 74% of total BTC trading volume in USD and Euro, respectively (see Table 
4-1). 
4.5.1 Transaction Data 
Millisecond time-stamped data is used to calculate the various dependent and independent 
variables used in the analysis.  The following information is required for each transaction: 
1. Currency – An identifier that indicates the currency in which the trade occurs 
2. Date – The date of the transaction 
3. Time – The time of the transaction (accurate to the nearest millisecond) 
4. Exchange - The venue from which the transaction originates 
5. Price – The price per unit 
6. Quantity –The number of units in the transaction 
4.5.2 Quote Data 
The following information is collected on a 1-minute basis for each order book in order to 
calculate bid-ask spreads: 
                                                 
37 People refer to cryptocurrencies as Bitcoin akin to the way in which they use Kleenex when referring to facial 
tissue, or Q-tips when referring to cotton swabs. 
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1. Currency - An identifier that indicates the currency in which the trade occurs to 
which the quote pertains 
2. Date – The date of the current order book snapshot 
3. Time – The time of the current order book snapshot 
4. Exchange – The exchange that advertises the quotes 
5. Bid Price – The price at which investors can sell the asset 
6. Ask Price – The price at which investors can purchase the asset 
4.6 Methodology 
This section introduces the methods used to conduct the study. Independent and dependant 
variables are calculated using a combination of SAS, Excel and custom C++ code.  SPSS is 
used to perform the final regression analysis.  The following subsections provide further detail 
regarding the variables and regression analyses used to test the hypothesis outlined in section 
4.4.  Section 4.6.1 introduces the methods used to calculate price discovery, the dependent 
variable. Section 4.6.2 discusses independent variables. Section 4.6.3 discusses the regression 
models used to test the hypotheses.  Section 4.6.4 tests the regression assumptions to ensure the 
validity of the regression results. 
4.6.1 Measuring Price Discovery 
This section outlines the key measure of price discovery used in this chapter.  We use SAS to 
calculate the dependant variables on raw transaction price and order book data that was first 
processed using custom C++ code.  The measure is calculated for each exchange in the study 
for each trading day.  Exchange prices, and subsequent returns, are calculated on 5-minute 
intervals.  This follows the findings of Anderson (2000) who suggests that this time frame is 
short enough to account for the granularity of the data but long enough to avoid capturing a 
meaningful number of observations and minimise noise.  The construction of the price 
discovery metric follows the approach modelled by de Jong (2001) and applied to the 
cryptocurrency market by Brandvold et al. (2015).  This multivariate time-series model is 
designed to measure the degree to which an exchange contributes permanent price adjusting 
information to a market comprised of several exchanges.   
Similar to the information share (Hasbrouck, 1995) and component share (Gonzalo and 
Granger, 1995) price discovery measures discussed in Section 4.5.1, de Jong (2001) assume 
that prices are comprised of the efficient price and an idiosyncratic noise component.  This 
allows a single, unobserved, efficient price to be the basis for the prices found on each 
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exchange with deviations from that price being a result of exchange specific factors.  
Separating idiosyncratic factors from the efficient price was first introduced by Hasbrouck 
(1995). 
Exchanges and markets are defined in order to measure price discovery.  An exchange consists 
of a single order book where investors can buy and sell BTC.  A market refers to all other 
exchanges (order books).  Price discovery is therefore calculated for n exchanges across m 
markets where n=m. 
Section 4.5 states that order books operate separately for each fiat currency and that customers 
rarely have access to order books for fiat currencies outside of their local currency.  Therefore, 
price discovery measures are calculated separately for USD and Euro markets.  This not only 
helps differentiate between subsets of investors but also eliminates the risks associated with 
exchange rates and cross-currency transactions.  As a result, there are n=6 USD exchanges and 
n=4 Euro exchanges. 
Let 𝑃𝑃 be a vector of prices where 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒  is a vector of exchange prices and 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚  is a vector of 
market prices.  Also, let 𝑈𝑈 be a vector of idiosyncratic components with 𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒 and 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚 referring to 
the idiosyncratic components for the exchange and the market, respectively.  Element i of 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 
and 𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒 refer to exchange i while element j of  𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 and 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚 refer to market j. Finally, denote 𝑃𝑃∗ 
as the efficient price.   
If 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒, 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒 and 𝑝𝑝∗ = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃∗ the n-vector of exchange prices is 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒          
 (25) 
and the m-vector of market prices is 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚        
 (26) 
If 𝑝𝑝∗ is a random walk it is assumed that you cannot predict the efficient price (Hasbrouck, 
1995).  Since prices across all exchanges and markets are centred around the same efficient 
price, 𝑝𝑝∗, by design the prices are cointegrated.   
Changes in the efficient price from period t-1 to period t are defined as 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 =  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ −  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1∗             (27) 
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The model assumes that unconditional serial covariances are stable across  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ,𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚.  This 
allows for the following definitions where ψ, 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 and Ω are (n x 1) matrices: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡2] =  𝜎𝜎2          (28a) 
𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ] =  𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖        (28b) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚� =  𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗       (28c) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1𝑒𝑒 � =  𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0      (28d) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1𝑚𝑚 � =  𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 , 𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0      (28e) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒 � =  0, 𝑘𝑘 > 0      (28f) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 � =  0, 𝑘𝑘 > 0      (25g) 
𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 ] =  𝛺𝛺𝑒𝑒        (28h) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚� =  𝛺𝛺, 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗       (28i) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒 � =  0, 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0      (28j) 
𝐸𝐸�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 � =  0, 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0       (28k) 
de Jong et al. (2001) define 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 as the price adjusting component that leads to changes in the 
efficient price, 𝑝𝑝∗.  Since 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 is the return corresponding to changes in 𝑝𝑝∗, and 𝑝𝑝∗ is a random 
walk, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 is serially uncorrelated.   
𝑝𝑝 is the only variable that can be observed.  Therefore, it is critical in helping calculate the 
measure of price discovery.  Let 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 =   𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 =  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1  (29) 
and let the vectors of prices for exchanges and markets be 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 =  𝜄𝜄𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−1𝑒𝑒       (30a) 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 =  𝜄𝜄𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚      (30b) 
ι is a vector of ones of size n.  Using the definitions listed in Equations (27a) to  (27k) the 
serial covariances of 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 are 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡′] =  𝜎𝜎2𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄′ + 𝜄𝜄𝜓𝜓′ + 𝜓𝜓𝜄𝜄′ + 2𝛺𝛺     (31a) 
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𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1′ ] =  −𝜓𝜓𝜄𝜄′ − 𝛺𝛺 + 𝛾𝛾𝜄𝜄′     (31b) 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−2′ ] =  −𝛾𝛾𝜄𝜄′      (31c) 
The covariance between exchanges and their markets are key to the final results and are defined 
as the covariance between and element and its counterpart in vectors 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒 and 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚, respectively.  
Given this information and Equations (31a) to (31sc)  
𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] =  𝜎𝜎2 + 2𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖     (32a) 
𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1] =  −𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗      (32b) 
𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2] =  −𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗        (32c) 
The first-order autocorrelation for exchanges is defined as 





        (33) 
The covariance between the new price adjusting information and the idiosyncratic component 
is 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 as defined in (25b) and (25c).  The larger the value of 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 the stronger the signal of price 
adjusting information originating from that exchange. 
Finally, the information share attributable to a single exchange is defined as 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 =  
(𝜎𝜎2+𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖)𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎2
=  𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 �1 + 
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎2
�           (34) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is the activity share of an exchange and is defined by the proportion of transactions 
taking place in the exchange relative to the entire market.  The sum of all 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 equals 1.  By 
imposing the rule that 𝜋𝜋′𝜓𝜓 = 0 the sum of all information shares across all exchanges sum to 1. 
4.6.2 Independent Variables 
This following section lists the series of independent variables used in the study, some of which 
are key regressors relating to fragmentation and are used to test the hypotheses while the 
remainder are control variables.  A combination of custom C++ code and Excel are used to 
calculate the variables contained in this section. 
4.6.2.1 Fragmentation Measures 
This section discusses methods used to test the impact of fragmentation on the price discovery 
process.  We begin by measuring the level of competition among BTC exchanges.  Separate 
fragmentation figures are calculated for USD and Euro exchanges.  Similar to Equation 7 in 
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Chapter 3, fragmentation is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).   It follows 
previous research (Buti et al., 2017; Degryse et al., 2015; Gresse, 2017) and measures the 
extent to which trading activity concentrates around a single exchange.  As a result 
fragmentation for order books using currency c at time t (Fragc,t) is measured as follows:  
                             𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 =   1 −  ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑣𝑣2𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣=1          (35) 
where c represents either the USD or Euro order books, 
  t is the observation day,  
 v represents a particular exchange or order book, 
𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣2 is the squared market share of trading venue v, measured by the 
number of BTC traded in venue v when compared to the market as a 
whole. 
1-HHI is used in order to allow the measure to more obviously measure fragmentation and an 
increase in Frag corresponds to increased fragmentation in the market for any particular stock.   
Next, the study focusses on trading activity within a single exchange. Due to the increasing 
popularity of Bitcoin the market is no longer consolidated around a single exchange.  Instead, 
many exchanges offer order books in which investors can buy and sell BTC. Trading activity is 
measured for a single exchange using the market share of trading volume attributable to each 
exchange (MS).   
MSc,i,t = Volc,i,t /Volc,t       (36) 
where c represents a particular currency, 
  t is the observation day,  
Volc,i,t is the daily transaction volume, in currency c, for exchange i at 
time t, 
Vol c,t is the total daily volume for all exchange in currency c at time t.  
4.6.2.2 Control Variables 
The regressions control for the following factors: volatility, bid-ask spread, and total daily 
volume. These concepts are defined and measured as discussed below and the measures are 
calculated separately for order books of each currency (USD and Euro): 
1. Volatility (σ)i,t – Volatility measured by the standard deviation of returns over the 




i. 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 =  𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1,𝑠𝑠 
)        (37) 
where i represents a particular exchange, 
  t is the observation day,  
s is the time of day t, 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠is the logarithmic return between 5-minute snapshots, 
        𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 is the current midpoint of the best bid-ask spread, 




ii. 𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡���� =  
∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1
𝑆𝑆
         (38)
  
where i represents a particular exchange, 
  t is the observation day,  
s is the time of day t, 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠is the logarithmic return between 5-minute snapshots, 
𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡���� is the average return over the course of the trading day, 
𝐼𝐼 is the number of 5-minute snapshots over the course of the trading day. 
 
iii. 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �
∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 −  𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡����)2𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠=1
𝑆𝑆−1
 38       (39) 
where  i represents a particular exchange, 
  t is the observation day,  
s is the of day t, 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠is the logarithmic return between 5-minute snapshots, 
𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤,𝑡𝑡���� is the average return over the course of the trading day, 
𝐼𝐼 is the number of 5-minute snapshots over the course of the trading day. 
 
2. Bid-Ask Spread (BASp)i,t – Average quoted spread for exchange i over the course of a 
trading day, t. It is calculated as follows:  
i. 𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 =  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵−𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵
      (40) 
                                                 
38 We use  S-1 as this is a sample measure because it is not possible to have all possible outcomes. 
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where i represents a particular exchange, 
  t is the observation day, 
s is the time of day t. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 is the best available ask price, 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 is the best available bid price. 
The bid-ask spread is calculated every 5-minutes of the day and averaged over the 
course of a trading day. 
 
3. Total Volume (Vol)i,t – Total volume is the total Bitcoin trading volume on exchange i 
over the course of a single trading day, t, measured in the transaction’s respective 
currency.  It is calculated as follows: 
i. 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟=1                  (41) 
where i represents a particular exchange, 
  t is the observation day, 
r is the current transaction, 
N is the total number of transactions over the course of trading day t, 
𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the number of shares in transaction r, 
 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the price at which transaction r took place. 
 
4. Average Trade Size (AvgTS)i,t – The average size of a transaction on exchange i over 
the course of a single trading day, t.  This result is reported in the currency in which the 




          (42) 
where i represents a particular exchange, 
  t is the observation day, 
                                                 
39 For control variables 1-4 we use the LN() of the original value.  Logarithms convert changes in variables into 




𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the total daily trading volume, measured in the exchange’s 
respective currency, 
𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the total daily number of trades on exchange i. 
4.6.3 Panel Regression 
The approach to the panel regressions follows the process outlined in Chapter 3.  The base for 
the regression formula is: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑏𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑏1𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +   𝑏𝑏2𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +   𝑏𝑏3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏6𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  +
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                  (43) 
where Frag and MS refer to the aforementioned measures of fragmentation and the remainder 
refer to control variables for volatility (𝜎𝜎), bid-ask spread (BASp), total volume (Vol) and 
average trade size (AvgTs).   
The regression model is extended to include the entity and time fixed effects.  The extended 
model is as follows:  
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏1𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +   𝑏𝑏2𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
 𝑏𝑏6𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 .           (44) 
Regression results are calculated using SPSS. Similar to Chapter 3, quarterly time dummy 
variables are used to control for events that affect each exchange over a quarterly time period.  
Also, exchange dummy variables are used to capture events that are unique to each exchange 
but remain constant over time. Refer to Sections 3.5.3 for a detailed discussion into the 
construction of the regression formula including all time and entity fixed effects. 
4.6.4 Regression assumptions 
In order to draw valid conclusions from the results of the fixed effects panel regression the data 
must fulfil the following four assumptions: normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and 
multicollinearity. Testing of these assumptions is detailed below along with empirical 
measures.  See Section 3.5.3 for detailed information on how each test is conducted. 
4.6.4.1 Normality 
Linear regression assumes that the variables have normal distributions.  Non-normally 
distributed data can distort relationships and significance tests.  Normality tests are conducted 
on both the individual variables as well as the resulting model itself. 
153 
 
Panel A: Bitstamp    Panel B: Kraken 
 
Figure 4-2: Distribution of Dependent Variables 
The residuals for the dependent variables are graphed.  The test is performed on all independent 
and dependent variables.  However, a subset of the results are presented in the section due to 
redundancy in the outcomes.  Figure 4-2 shows the distribution of the IS residuals. Panel A 
contains the results from the Bitstamp exchange while Panel B displays results from Kraken.  
Both panels convey results from USD order books.  There is a clear adherence to the 
assumption of normality, though the relationship is not perfect. 
Figure 4-3 support the normality results in Figure 4-2.  As the fitted line is not perfectly linear, 
Figure 4-3 also shows that there is a slight deviation from normality.  Though the deviation is 





        Panel A: Bitstamp    Panel B: Kraken 
 
Figure 4-3: Normal Probability Plots 
4.6.4.2 Linearity 
Figure 4-4 contains the standardised residual versus predicted value plots for Bitstamp (USD) 
and Kraken (USD) in Panels A and B, respectively.  The residual plot pattern conveys a 
reasonably linear relationship.  Therefore, the linearity assumption holds. 
        Panel A: Bitstamp    Panel B: Kraken 
 
Figure 4-4: Standardised Residuals versus Predicted Values 
4.6.4.3 Homoscedasticity 
Figure 4-4 also provides support for the homoscedasticity assumption. The variance in the 
residuals does not change with different values of the predicted value.  The variability of the 




Figure 4-5 contains information on the variance inflation factors (VIFs).  They are the result of 
regressing one independent variable against the remaining independent variables.  Panel A 
contains the VIFs from a regression on Frag while Panel B contains the VIFs from a regression 
on MS. Once again, repeat results are omitted due to redundancy.  VIF values of 2.053 for MS 
and 2.855 for Frag indicate that the level of multicollinearity among the key regressors is 
minimal.  However, some of the control variables indicate moderate to high levels of 
multicollinearity given by the VIFs that exceed 3 and 5, respectively. 
Table 4-1: Variance Inflation Factors 
Panel A: Frag     Panel B: MS 
    
Note. This table contains information on the variance inflation factors (VIF).  The results are collected 
from performing an OLS regression on the previously dependent variables Frag and MS located in 
Panels A and B, respectively. Note that dummy variable VIF values are excluded from the table. 
 
4.7 Results 
This section presents the results of the study. Initially, descriptive statistics are presented to 
profile the data and measures of the study. Next, the section presents the main result tables 
testing the hypotheses outlined earlier.  The results are discussed before drawing key insights 





LN Volatility 0.333 3.004
LN Spread 0.175 5.729
LN Volume 0.154 6.489





LN Volatility 0.111 9.048
LN Spread 0.181 5.537
LN Volume 0.118 8.486




4.7.1 Descriptive Statistics  
This section presents the descriptive statistics for Bitcoin markets throughout the study period 
of January 1 2017 to March 31 2019. Cryptocurrency exchange participants are predominately 
limited to using their home currency in transactions.  As a result, Euro currency traders are 
largely isolated from trading with USD currency traders. Therefore, the data presented in this 
section are split into USD trading and Euro trading categories.  Separating the order books 
allows the study to investigate the effects of fragmentation resulting from changes to the 
structure of order books, that is, the structure of the market, in which an individual investor can 
participate.  This is an important distinction as Euro traders are less influenced by the structure 
of the USD Bitcoin market.  While the geographical location of the change influences the 
currencies against which its cryptocurrencies transact, exchanges can decide to construct order 
books for several currencies.  For example, of the six cryptocurrency exchanges used in the 
study only two, Bitfinex and Gemini, restrict trading to a single currency.  Many of the sampled 
exchanges also allow trading in other cryptocurrencies.  However, this study focuses on the 
oldest and most established cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. 
Table 4-2 presents descriptive statistics for Bitcoin transactions, with USD and Euro trade data 
found in Panels A and B, respectively.  Daily transactional volume totalled $519 million for 
USD order book trades and €110 million for Euro order book trades indicating that USD order 
books are more popular than Euro order book.  USD trades are also responsible for trading 
approximately 82,836 BTC daily while Euro trades account for only 17,260 BTC.  This implies 
that either Bitcoin trading is more popular in the U.S. or that, of these two currency options, the 
USD is the preferred currency for Bitcoin transactions. The daily transactional volume for the 
sampled exchanges accounts for 81% and 74% of all trading activity in the USD and Euro 
Bitcoin markets, respectively.  Therefore, this study encapsulated a significant proportion of the 
total Bitcoin market and the results reasonably characterise the total market. 
Looking toward the size of the transactions the sample encompasses approximately 81.15% and 
74.21% of the total trading volume, as measured in BTC, for USD and Euro markets, 
respectively.  While the difference is minimal, it implies that the transactions executed in the 
sampled exchanges are larger than those that occur in out-of-sample exchanges.  This is 
supported by the data on the total number of daily trades.  Total daily trades are listed as 
229,060 and 68,614 for USD and Euro markets, respectively.  This encapsulates 78% of all 
USD trades and 83% of all Euro trades.  In USD order books, the six sampled exchanges are 
responsible for 81% of all trading based on daily dollar transactional volume.  Given that is 
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only responsible for 78% of all transactions this data provides further support that the sampled 
USD/BTC order books or typically larger than those of the out-of-sample exchanges.   
However, the opposite appears to be true to Euro/BTC order books.  With 74% of the Euro 
volume and 83% of the total number of transactions, the four samples exchanges are 
responsible for a greater number of smaller transactions.  In spite of these differences, the 
average trade sizes for USD and Euro order book trades are similar at $1,847 and €1,831 
respectively. Accounting for exchange rates over the sample period makes the Euro trades 
slightly more valuable, on average, than USD trades. 
Table 4-2 - Descriptive Statistics (Sample) 
 
Panel A: USD ($)          
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Sample - All
Total Volume (USD) (millions) 519.18     627.65      148.93     299.80     644.16     
Market Share (Sample - USD) 0.81         0.11          0.73         0.85         0.90         
Total Volume (BTC) (thousands) 82.84       54.00        44.30       68.70       104.60     
Market Share (Sample - BTC) 0.81         0.10          0.73         0.85         0.90         
Total Trades Per Day (thousands) 229.06     167.17      117.10     180.54     278.48     
Market Share (Sample - Trades 0.78         0.13          0.72         0.83         0.87         
     Per Day)
Average Trade Size 1,847.29  1,203.33    1,095.57  1,767.84  2,498.39  
Sample - First Half
Total Volume (USD) (millions) 583.80     803.75      96.19       244.03     711.19     
Market Share (Sample - USD) 0.81         0.11          0.72         0.86         0.90         
Total Volume (BTC) (thousands) 97.39       59.21        59.37       83.26       121.34     
Market Share (Sample - BTC) 0.81         0.11          0.73         0.86         0.90         
Total Trades Per Day (thousands) 257.52     204.09      124.44     194.58     326.44     
Market Share (Sample - Trades 0.71         0.14          0.59         0.72         0.85         
     Per Day)
Average Trade Size 1,661.79  1,570.76    763.09     1,280.49  2,481.31  
Sample - Second Half
Total Volume (USD) (millions) 454.55     365.41      192.22     329.83     606.00     
Market Share (Sample - USD) 0.81         0.10          0.74         0.84         0.89         
Total Volume (BTC) (thousands) 68.28       43.62        37.55       56.30       86.35       
Market Share (Sample - BTC) 0.81         0.10          0.74         0.84         0.89         
Total Trades Per Day (thousands) 200.60     112.35      114.08     166.76     259.37     
Market Share (Sample - Trades 0.86         0.06          0.81         0.85         0.90         
     Per Day)




Table 4-2 - Descriptive Statistics (Sample) - continued 
Panel B:  Euro (€) 
 
 
Note. This table contains the means, standard deviations, and medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) and 
third (Q3) quartiles of various measure. Panels A and B contain data based on order books and transactions 
conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  Results are calculated using all transactions in a single 
currency over a single trading day.  ‘Sample – All’ contains results over the entire sample period (1 January 
2017 to 31 March 2019) while ‘Sample – First Half’ and ‘Sample – Second Half uses data from 1 January 
2017 to 14 February 2018 and 15 February 2018 to 31 March 2019, respectively.  Volume (USD/Euro) is 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Sample - All
Total Volume (Euro) (millions) 110.42     634.49      30.86       56.56       100.66     
Market Share (Sample - Euro) 0.74         0.18          0.71         0.80         0.85         
Total Volume (BTC) (thousands) 17.26       10.69        9.92         14.65       20.58       
Market Share (Sample - BTC) 0.74         0.17          0.71         0.80         0.85         
Total Trades Per Day (thousands) 68.61       54.96        38.29       52.84       78.79       
Market Share (Sample - Trades 0.83         0.10          0.79         0.87         0.90         
     Per Day)
Average Trade Size 1,831.53  15,625.74  739.19     1,027.45  1,358.66  
Sample - First Half
Total Volume (Euro) (millions) 141.87     894.56      21.18       48.10       107.88     
Market Share (Sample - Euro) 0.79         0.09          0.76         0.81         0.85         
Total Volume (BTC) (thousands) 19.71       11.11        12.55       17.14       23.04       
Market Share (Sample - BTC) 0.80         0.08          0.76         0.81         0.85         
Total Trades Per Day (thousands) 78.77       70.46        35.93       57.62       92.83       
Market Share (Sample - Trades 0.85         0.06          0.82         0.87         0.89         
     Per Day)
Average Trade Size 2,376.60  22,079.71  590.87     845.77     1,152.16  
Sample - Second Half
Total Volume (Euro) (millions) 78.98       54.23        37.89       69.88       98.40       
Market Share (Sample - Euro) 0.69         0.22          0.63         0.77         0.84         
Total Volume (BTC) (thousands) 14.81       9.65          8.43         11.65       17.47       
Market Share (Sample - BTC) 0.69         0.22          0.63         0.77         0.84         
Total Trades Per Day (thousands) 58.45       29.50        38.83       50.13       68.15       
Market Share (Sample - Trades 0.81         0.12          0.71         0.87         0.91         
     Per Day)
Average Trade Size 1,286.47  468.98      872.46     1,284.11  1,567.79  
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the total USD/Euro volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions and includes both in and 
out-of-sample exchanges. Market Share (USD/Euro) is the proportion of USD/Euro volume captured by 
the sampled exchanges.  Volume (BTC) is the total volume, measured in Bitcoin, (reported in thousands) of 
Bitcoin transactions and consists of data from both in and out-of-sample exchanges. Market Share (BTC) is 
the proportion of BTC volume captured by the sampled exchanges.  Trades Per Day is the total number of 
BTC transactions (reported in thousands) and consists of both in and out-of-sample exchanges. Market 
Share (Trades Per Day) is the proportion of trades captured by the sampled exchanges.   Average Trade 
Size (USD/Euro) is the average size of each transaction, measured in its respective currency (USD/Euro). 
 
Table 4-2 also differentiates between the first and second half of the sample period.  Total 
dollar transactional volume decreases from $584 million to $454 million.  Over the same period 
the USD market share of transactions that the sample captures remain constant at 81% implying 
that the overall Bitcoin market when traded against the USD, is shrinking.  This is to be 
expected as BTC peaked in price at $19,783 on December 17 2017.  This period corresponds 
with the height of BTC’s popularity in the media and precedes a period of significant 
devaluation.   
Figure 4-5 provides support for the conclusion regarding the size of the USD/BTC market.  
Panel A in Figure 4-5 shows a significant increase in the size of the USD/BTC market over the 
study period with a peak in daily trading volume of approximately $2.75 billion around the 
time of the peak BTC price.  Trading volume decreased quickly after this period.   Euro 
exchanges saw a decrease in daily transactional volume from €142 million to €79 million over 
the same period.  Panel B in Figure 4-5 shows an increase in daily volume similar to that of the 
USD market.  Daily Euro volume peaked at approximately €325 million, however, unlike the 
USD market, the Euro market is able to sustain the greater level of volume over a roughly 
three-month period before returning to a more sustainable level. The sample accounts for 79% 
of the trading volume in the first half of the study but decreases to 69% in the second half.  This 
implies that while the Euro/BTC market shrank over the study period, the investors also looked 
for opportunities to trade in smaller competing exchanges.  According to Figure 4-5 both the 
USD and Euro market saw a resurgence in activity around September 2018 and the 2018 
Christmas season. 
While markets shrunk with respect to volume, the average size of transactions increased from 
$1,662 to $2,032.  However, the dollar market share remains constant over the period, and that 
the sample capture 71% of all trades in the first half of the sample and 85.5% in the second 
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half.  Therefore, while the remaining USD/BTC transactions were increasing in size for out-of-
sample exchanges, the sample exchanges experience a reduction in transaction size.  Once 
again, the Euro market behaves quite oppositely.  Average Euro transaction sizes decrease over 
the sample period from €2,376 to €1,286, as do the market share of trades and volume that are 
captured by the sample, which decreased from 79% to 68% and €142 million to €79 million, 
respectively.  This implies an overall decrease in the size of the Euro/BTC market over the 
trading period.  Euro traders migrate to out-of-sample exchanges over the sample period while 
USD traders concentrate on the in-sample exchanges.   
These findings are supported by Figure 4-6 which shows the market shares of all USD and 
Euro transactions that are captured by the sampled exchange.  While USD results present some 
variations the overall sampled market share remains constant, as discussed previously.  
However, the results evidence significant variability in the Euro market over a five-month 
period at the start of 2019.    
Over this period sampled Euro market share drops to a minimum of 19% but return to its 
previous levels shortly after.  This five-month period in the Euro market represents a temporary 
phenomenon and, if removed from the study, would bring the Euro figures more in line with 
the USD figures in that a roughly constant market share of transaction volume captured by the 
sampled exchanges.  Future research and further data collection are needed to derive the 
motivations behind investors’ desire to migrate to a less dominant exchanges and why the 












Panel A:  USD ($) 
 
Panel B:  Euro (€) 
 
Figure 4-5 – Bitcoin Trading Volume (Exchange) 
Note. This graph displays the total transactional volume of Bitcoin. Volume (USD/Euro) is the total 
USD/Euro volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transaction. Panels A and B contain data 
based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  Results are 
calculated using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day over the sample period (1 
January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  Individual exchange data is displayed along with the total daily 
transactional volume which includes out-of-sample exchanges.  The displayed results are based on a 10-





Figure 4-6 – Bitcoin Market Share (Sampled Exchanges) 
Note. This figure presents the market share of total daily transactions that are captured by the sampled 
exchange.  Market shares are presented separately for USD and Euro order books.  Results are 
calculated using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day over the sample period (1 
January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  The displayed results are based on a 10-day moving average. 
 
Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 presents descriptive statistical data on the sampled exchanges.  Data 
for all USD order books including Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Coinbase, Exmo, Gemini and Kraken are 
found in Table 4-3 while Table 4-4 contains Euro order book data for Bitstamp, Coinbase, 
Exmo and Kraken.  Only two of the sampled exchanges, Bitfinex and Gemini, exclusively 
operate USD order books while the remaining exchanges operate in at least two currencies, 




Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics (USD Exchanges) 
Panel A: Bitfinex             Panel B: Bitstamp 
  
 
   Panel C: Coinbase             Panel D: Exmo  
  
 
Note. This table contains the means, standard deviations, and medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) and third 
(Q3) quartiles of various measure for each USD cryptocurrency exchange. Panels A - F contain data for the 
following exchanges: Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Coinbase, Exmo, Gemini and Kraken.  Results are calculated using 
all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 
March 2019).  Volume (USD) is the total USD volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions 
for the exchange. Market Share (USD) is the proportion of USD volume captured by the exchange.  Volume 
(BTC) is the total volume, measured in Bitcoin, (reported in thousands) of Bitcoin transactions for the 
exchange. Market Share (BTC) is the proportion of BTC volume captured by the exchange.  Price (USD) is 
the average transaction price per BTC on the exchange.  σ represents volatility and is the average 5-minute 
standard deviation in basis points.  BASp is the average quoted spread on the exchange.  Trades Per Day is 
the total number of BTC transactions (reported in thousands) for the exchange. Market Share (Trades Per 
Day) is the proportion of trades captured by the exchange.   Average Trade Size (USD) is the average size of 





Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Volume (USD) (millions) 217.42    281.11    42.97      110.85    274.67    66.99      76.77      20.90      39.99      87.26      
Market Share (USD) 0.37       0.09       0.29       0.37       0.44       0.14       0.03       0.11       0.13       0.16       
Volume (BTC) (thousands) 32.59      25.97      14.45      25.22      44.20      11.25      7.76       5.94       9.49       14.51      
Market Share (BTC) 0.37       0.09       0.29       0.37       0.44       0.14       0.03       0.11       0.13       0.16       
Price (USD) 5,536.08 3,544.86 2,756.39 4,646.19 7,377.97 5,517.11 3,562.21 2,757.58 4,613.42 7,389.03 
σ 5.69       7.55       1.49       3.20       6.13       5.49       7.21       1.47       3.14       6.03       
BASp (x100) 0.02       0.02       0.00       0.01       0.03       0.09       0.05       0.05       0.09       0.12       
Trades Per Day (thousands) 66.47      61.65      25.63      45.86      84.85      24.45      21.27      9.89       18.05      32.05      
Market Share 0.26       0.07       0.21       0.27       0.32       0.10       0.03       0.08       0.10       0.12       
    (Trades Per Day)
Average Trade Size 2,563.89 1,102.07 1,569.45 2,522.86 3,443.87 2,353.76 804.64    1,799.31 2,346.85 2,898.53 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Volume (USD) (millions) 88.97      132.87    24.50      43.49      96.17      3.11       3.02         0.67       2.43       4.13       
Market Share (USD) 0.16       0.04       0.13       0.16       0.19       0.01       0.01         0.00       0.01       0.01       
Volume (BTC) (thousands) 13.55      10.74      6.73       10.49      16.94      0.45       0.21         0.24       0.49       0.58       
Market Share (BTC) 0.16       0.04       0.13       0.16       0.19       0.01       0.01         0.00       0.01       0.01       
Price (USD) 5,530.16 3,587.31 2,768.13 4,646.37 7,385.02 5,617.35 3,689.41  2,726.06 4,681.75 7,362.97 
σ 5.22       7.29       1.29       2.90       5.70       5.51       7.13         1.94       3.33       5.96       
BASp (x100) 0.01       0.03       0.00       0.00       0.02       0.29       0.09         0.24       0.28       0.34       
Trades Per Day (thousands) 59.01      43.83      34.53      47.63      68.44      8.46       6.92         4.00       6.44       10.28      
Market Share 0.27       0.09       0.21       0.24       0.32       0.04       0.01         0.03       0.04       0.04       
    (Trades Per Day)
Average Trade Size 1,152.35 689.01    611.10    957.25    1,589.67 393.71    299.49     124.51    368.90    546.84    
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Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics (USD Exchanges) – continued 




The most popular exchange for the USD traders is Bitfinex with an average daily transactional 
volume of $217 million which represents 36.8% of total USD/BTC volume, including out-of-
sample exchanges.  Coinbase and Bitstamp are the next more popular USD exchanges with $90 
million and $67 million in total daily USD transactional volume, respectively. Coinbase and 
Bitstamp represent 16% and 13.5% of all USD/BTC market activity.  With the exception of 
Exmo, Gemini and Kraken are the smallest of the sampled exchanges with approximately 6.8% 
and 7.1% of the total market share, respectively.   Exmo is the smallest sampled USD/BTC 
exchange and accounts for only 0.7% of all USD transactions.  Though a minor exchange, 
Exmo data is included in the study in order to test the robustness of the results with respect to 
the overall size/popularity of the exchange. Euro markets are noticeably more concentrated 
over the sample period.  Kraken is the dominant exchange for EURO/BTC trading an 
encompasses 74% of all Euro/BTC trades.  Bitstamp and Coinbase maintain similar average 
market shares of 12.1% and 11.4%, respectively, while Exmo trails with 1.3%.  Figure 4-5 
displays the exchange specific transactional volume data for both USD and Euro exchanges and 
shows that while the daily transactional volume fluctuates over time, each exchanges ranking 
within its respective currency market remains constant (Figure 4-7). 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Volume (USD) (millions) 34.76      47.13      8.41       20.02      40.17      31.30      30.45      12.04      21.84      41.37      
Market Share (USD) 0.07       0.04       0.05       0.06       0.08       0.07       0.03       0.05       0.07       0.09       
Volume (BTC) (thousands) 5.95       5.25       2.43       4.55       7.86       5.57       3.97       2.96       4.50       7.10       
Market Share (BTC) 0.07       0.04       0.05       0.06       0.08       0.07       0.03       0.05       0.07       0.09       
Price (USD) 5,525.68 3,579.52 2,763.59 4,645.50 7,385.86 5,521.38 3,568.17 2,759.28 4,644.58 7,385.57 
σ 5.27       7.28       1.24       2.96       5.86       5.44       7.17       1.45       3.13       6.08       
BASp (x100) 0.03       0.04       0.01       0.02       0.04       0.09       0.09       0.03       0.06       0.13       
Trades Per Day (thousands) 12.21      12.09      3.85       8.20       15.85      15.86      12.51      6.80       12.87      21.38      
Market Share 0.05       0.02       0.03       0.04       0.06       0.07       0.03       0.05       0.07       0.08       
    (Trades Per Day)
Average Trade Size 2,497.04 1,065.28 1,735.52 2,397.24 3,111.59 1,833.50 780.29    1,089.11 1,919.82 2,467.99 
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Table 4-4: Descriptive Statistics (Euro Exchanges) 
     Panel A: Bitstamp                 Panel B: Coinbase 
   
    Panel C: Exmo                Panel D: Kraken  
  
 
Note. This table contains the means, standard deviations, and medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) and third 
(Q3) quartiles of various measure for each Euro cryptocurrency exchange. Panels A - D contain data for the 
following exchanges: Bitstamp, Coinbase, Exmo, and Kraken.  Results are calculated using all transactions 
in a single currency over a single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  
Volume (Euro) is the total Euro volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions for the 
exchange. Market Share (Euro) is the proportion of Euro volume captured by the exchange.  Volume (BTC) 
is the total volume, measured in Bitcoin, (reported in thousands) of Bitcoin transactions for the exchange. 
Market Share (BTC) is the proportion of BTC volume captured by the exchange.  Price (Euro) is the average 
transaction price per BTC on the exchange.  σ represents volatility and is the average 5-minute standard 
deviation in basis points.  BASp is the average quoted spread on the exchange.  Trades Per Day is the total 
number of BTC transactions (reported in thousands) for the exchange. Market Share (Trades Per Day) is the 
proportion of trades captured by the exchange.   Average Trade Size (Euro) is the average size of each 
transaction in the exchange, measured in its respective currency (Euro). 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Volume (Euro) (millions) 12.05      17.40      2.95       6.34       12.56      12.09      20.73      2.58       5.01       12.12      
Market Share (Euro) 0.12       0.06       0.08       0.12       0.16       0.11       0.06       0.06       0.11       0.15       
Volume (BTC) (thousands) 2.11       1.84       0.98       1.60       2.66       1.96       1.98       0.86       1.38       2.30       
Market Share (BTC) 0.12       0.06       0.08       0.12       0.16       0.11       0.06       0.06       0.11       0.15       
Price (Euro) 4,696.00 2,921.67 2,400.80 3,928.86 6,295.65 4,732.10 2,989.10 2,401.74 3,960.50 6,325.04 
σ 4.82       6.20       1.48       2.87       5.19       4.36       6.41       1.07       2.48       4.76       
BASp (x100) 0.23       0.11       0.14       0.21       0.30       0.04       0.05       0.01       0.02       0.06       
Trades Per Day (thousands) 9.06       11.31      3.39       5.55       9.86       20.71      26.04      8.73       12.35      21.14      
Market Share 0.11       0.05       0.08       0.10       0.14       0.26       0.08       0.20       0.25       0.31       
    (Trades Per Day)
Average Trade Size 1,137.98 465.67    751.34    1,088.48 1,478.33 444.57    214.21    273.64    420.52    606.47    
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Volume (Euro) (millions) 0.78       0.57       0.26       0.79       1.07       48.37      631.56      6.21     12.10      18.10      
Market Share (Euro) 0.01       0.01       0.01       0.01       0.02       0.74       0.18         0.71     0.80       0.85       
Volume (BTC) (thousands) 0.16       0.06       0.12       0.16       0.19       4.32       4.73         2.17     2.82       3.86       
Market Share (BTC) 0.01       0.01       0.01       0.01       0.02       0.74       0.17         0.71     0.80       0.85       
Price (Euro) 4,838.66 3,101.26 2,440.24 4,005.39 6,379.96 16.70      21.49       5.12     9.93       17.98      
σ 5.33       6.16       2.14       3.51       5.71       1.07       0.97         0.39     1.05       1.65       
BASp (x100) 0.68       0.38       0.50       0.59       0.72       0.00       0.00         0.00     0.00       0.00       
Trades Per Day (thousands) 1.71       1.65       0.63       1.24       2.27       68.61      54.96       38.29   52.84      78.79      
Market Share 0.03       0.02       0.01       0.02       0.03       0.83       0.10         0.79     0.87       0.90       
    (Trades Per Day)
Average Trade Size 636.08    435.41    343.24    534.33    830.18    1,831.53 15,625.74 739.19 1,027.45 1,358.66 
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Panel A: USD ($) 
 
Panel B: Euro (€) 
 
Figure 4-7 - Market Share (Exchange) 
Note. This graph displays exchange market share data. Market Share (MS) is the exchange-specific 
market share, measured as a proportion of total volume.   Panels A and B contain data based on order 
books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  Results are calculated using 
all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 
31 March 2019).  Individual exchange data is displayed.  Displayed results are based on a 10-day 
moving average. 
 
In both Panels A and B of Figure 4-7, the dominant exchange maintains dominance over the 
sample period.  Within the USD market the dominant exchange, Bitfinex, experiences some 
significant loss in market share during the middle of 2017 but begins to recover and reassert its 
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dominance towards the end of July 2017.  During this mid-2017 period, all non-dominant 
sampled exchanges attract additional liquidity and build market share.  Figure 4-7 provides 
support for the notion that competing exchanges in the USD market can entice customers to 
migrate from the dominant exchange, Bitfinex, to their order books.  This pattern repeats itself 
over the 2019 period where Bitfinex begins to lose market share while competing exchanges 
increase their market share of the trading volume.  Towards March of 2019, the market shares 
for both Bitfinex and Coinbase converge indicating an increase in fragmentation as traders 
move away from a single dominant exchange. 
A similar pattern is seen in the Euro market.  While the dominant exchange, Kraken, maintains 
its dominance over the sample period, it does temporarily lose significant market share to 
Bitstamp and Coinbase around the end of 2017/start of 2018.   However, as previously 
mentioned, Kraken loses significant market share toward the end of 2018.  But traders preferred 
to move to out-of-sample exchanges during this period as indicated in Figure 4-7 where we see 
a decrease in market share for Kraken, while the market shares for Bitstamp and Coinbase 
remain fairly constant.  In summary, the USD market is converging with competing exchanges 
able to attract liquidity way from the dominant exchange, Bitfinex, while the Kraken is able to 
sustain its dominance over the Euro market. 
While Bitfinex and Kraken dominate their respective market in terms of daily trading volume, 
data on the number of daily transactions illustrates a more competitive landscape.  In the USD 
market Coinbase is competing with Bitfinex regarding the number of daily transactions.  On 
average, Bitfinex executes 25.9% daily transactions while Coinbase executes 27.2%.  However, 
given that the average transaction size of $1,152 is significantly smaller for Coinbase when 
compared to $2,563 for Bitfinex, Bitfinex is able to maintain its position as the top USD/BTC 




Panel A: USD ($) 
 
Panel B: Euro (€) 
 
Figure 4-8 - Number of Daily Trades by Exchange 
Note. This graph displays information on the number of daily Bitcoin (BTC) transactions. The total 
number of BTC transactions and consists of both in and out-of-sample exchanges.   Panels A and B 
contain data based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  
Results are calculated using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day over the 
sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  Individual exchange data is displayed along with the 
total volume which includes out-of-sample exchanges.  The displayed results are based on a 10-day 
moving average. 
 
Once again, the analysis shows a more dominant relationship in the Euro market.  Kraken 
dominates by daily transactional volume and is also able to transact 83% of all Euro/BTC 
trades over the sample period.  The next best result comes from Coinbase who transact roughly 
26.3% of all transactions, according to Table 4-4.  However, while Coinbase executes the 
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second largest number of transactions, it also executes the smallest transaction, on average, of 
€444.  Even Exmo, who is only responsible for 2.5% of all trades, has an average trade size of 
€636.  In the Euro market Bitstamp and Coinbase both attract roughly 12% of all Euro volume.  
However, Bitstamp attracts fewer larger transactions while Coinbase is responsible for 
executing a greater number of smaller transactions.  These results are further supported by 
Figure 4-9. 
Panel A: USD ($) 
 
Panel B: Euro (€) 
 
Figure 4-9 - Average Trade Size by Exchange 
Note. This graph displays information on the average sizes of transactions. Average Trade Size 
(USD/Euro) is the average size of each transaction, measured in its respective currency (USD/Euro). 
Panels A and B contain data based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), 
respectively.  Results are calculated using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day 
over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  Individual exchange data is displayed along 
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with the total market which includes out-of-sample exchanges.  The displayed results are based on a 10-
day moving average. 
 
Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 report results regarding the correlations amongst the independent 
variables in the study for USD and Euro markets, respectively. When looking at the key 
fragmentation measures, Frag and Frag (Others), it is evident that the exchanges in the study 
have a significant impact on the microstructure of the Bitcoin market within their respective 
currency’s order book.  Correlation coefficients closer to zero identify order books that are less 
dominant by a single exchange.  Table 4-5 Panel A reports a correlation coefficient of 0.68 
while Table 4-6 Panel A reports a result of 0.59.  The exchange specific correlation coefficients 
report that the USD and Euro order books are dominated by the Bitfinex and Kraken 
respectively.    Correlation coefficients of -0.02 for Bitfinex and -0.05 for Kraken indicate that 
the overall market microstructure relies heavily on this inclusion of these exchanges within 
their order books.  Other exchanges, if removed from the fragmentation measure, have a 
negligible impact on the structure of the market as indicated by their near-perfect positive 
correlations between Frag and Frag (Others).  This is further supported by the correlation 
coefficients between Frag and the remaining independent variables.  Table 4-5 Panel B and 
Table 4-6 Panel D, representing the dominant USD and Euro exchanges of Bitfinex and 
Kraken, respectively, display larger variations between coefficients for the two Frag measures.  
Less influential markets displayed in the remaining panels report only minimal differences.  
Additional findings pertaining to the correlation coefficients are discussed in the regression 
results below. 
 
Table 4-5: Correlations (USD Exchanges) 
Panel A: All            Panel B: Bitfinex 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Frag 1 (1) Frag 1
(2) Frag (Others) 0.68 1 (2) Frag (Others) -0.02 1
(3) MS (USD) -0.11 0.62 1 (3) MS (USD) -0.91 0.40 1
(4) σ -0.68 -0.45 0.08 1 (4) σ -0.69 0.01 0.65 1
(5) BASp 0.05 -0.19 -0.46 0.02 1 (5) BASp 0.01 -0.13 -0.08 -0.02 1
(6) Vol -0.67 -0.46 0.07 0.95 -0.07 1 (6) Vol -0.67 0.05 0.65 0.97 -0.11 1
(7) AvgTS -0.26 0.05 0.45 0.34 -0.38 0.39 1 (7) AvgTS -0.69 0.31 0.76 0.79 -0.35 0.84 1
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Table 4-5: Correlations (USD Exchanges) - continued 
 
Panel C: Bitstamp           Panel D: Coinbase 
 
Panel E: Gemini                    Panel F: Exmo 
 
Panel G: Kraken 
 
Note. This table contains the correlation coefficients between various measure for each USD exchange 
in the sample. Panel A contains correlation measures based on all USD exchanges while the remaining 
figures in Panels B - G contain exchange specific data.  Results are calculated using all transactions in a 
single currency over a single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  
Frag is the result of calculating 1 minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman using exchange volume data.  Frag 
(Other) is similar to Frag except it excludes market share data for the current exchange.  MS is the 
exchange-specific market share, measured as a proportion of total volume.   σ is the average 5-minute 
standard deviation in basis points.  BASp is the average quoted spread on the exchange.   Vol is the total 
USD volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions and includes both in and out-of-
sample exchanges. AvgTS is the average size of each transaction in the exchange, measured in its 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Frag 1 (1) Frag 1
(2) Frag (Others) 0.99 1 (2) Frag (Others) 0.97 1
(3) MS (USD) 0.03 0.18 1 (3) MS (USD) -0.13 0.10 1
(4) σ -0.69 -0.69 -0.05 1 (4) σ -0.69 -0.66 0.17 1
(5) BASp -0.15 -0.15 0.01 0.28 1 (5) BASp 0.21 0.23 0.06 -0.22 1
(6) Vol -0.67 -0.68 -0.11 0.96 0.15 1 (6) Vol -0.67 -0.65 0.12 0.96 -0.33 1
(7) AvgTS -0.59 -0.56 0.13 0.76 -0.07 0.80 1 (7) AvgTS -0.67 -0.62 0.21 0.89 -0.29 0.92 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Frag 1 (1) Frag 1
(2) Frag (Others) 0.99 1 (2) Frag (Others) 1.00 1
(3) MS (USD) 0.09 0.19 1 (3) MS (USD) 0.15 0.15 1
(4) σ -0.67 -0.66 -0.02 1 (4) σ -0.67 -0.67 -0.07 1
(5) BASp 0.09 0.05 -0.43 0.10 1 (5) BASp 0.17 0.17 -0.45 -0.22 1
(6) Vol -0.67 -0.67 -0.03 0.93 0.06 1 (6) Vol -0.67 -0.67 -0.20 0.96 -0.28 1
(7) AvgTS -0.36 -0.34 0.23 0.57 -0.04 0.65 1 (7) AvgTS -0.21 -0.21 0.66 0.46 -0.58 0.41 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Frag 1
(2) Frag (Others) 0.99 1
(3) MS (USD) 0.05 0.13 1
(4) σ -0.66 -0.66 -0.14 1
(5) BASp 0.06 0.02 -0.47 0.01 1
(6) Vol -0.67 -0.68 -0.12 0.93 -0.14 1
(7) AvgTS -0.37 -0.35 0.30 0.46 -0.67 0.58 1
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Table 4-6: Correlations (Euro Exchanges) 
Panel A: All            Panel B: Bitstamp 
 
Panel C: Coinbase           Panel D: Exmo 
 
     Panel E: Kraken 
 
Note. This table contains the correlation coefficients between various measure for each USD exchange 
in the sample. Panel A contains correlation measures based on all Euro exchanges while the remaining 
figures in Panels B - E contain exchange specific data.  Results are calculated using all transactions in a 
single currency over a single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  
Frag is the result of calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman using exchange volume data and subtracting 
this value from 1.  Frag (Other) is similar to Frag except it excludes market share data for the current 
exchange.  MS is the exchange-specific market share, measured as a proportion of total volume.   σ is 
the average 5-minute standard deviation in basis points.  BASp is the average quoted spread on the 
exchange.   Vol is the total Euro volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions and 
includes both in and out-of-sample exchanges. AvgTS is the average size of each transaction in the 
exchange, measured in its respective currency (Euro). 
 
Figure 4-10 groups all the correlation coefficients in the study.  It ignores any correlations 
between Frag and Frag (Others) as the measures are constructed in a similar fashion and often 
result in (nearly) perfect positive correlations. Note that the majority of variable pairs are not 
highly correlated with each other.  However, there is a subset of variables with higher 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Frag 1 (1) Frag 1
(2) Frag (Others) 0.59 1 (2) Frag (Others) 0.99 1
(3) MS (Euro) -0.18 0.66 1 (3) MS (Euro) -0.02 0.10 1
(4) σ -0.02 -0.05 0.01 1 (4) σ 0.00 0.08 0.67 1
(5) BASp -0.24 -0.38 -0.36 0.12 1 (5) BASp -0.52 -0.53 -0.23 -0.07 1
(6) Vol 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.84 -0.07 1 (6) Vol 0.18 0.24 0.48 0.86 -0.17 1
(7) AvgTS 0.15 0.41 0.44 0.39 -0.02 0.36 1 (7) AvgTS 0.17 0.23 0.57 0.71 -0.47 0.70 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Frag 1 (1) Frag 1
(2) Frag (Others) 0.99 1 (2) Frag (Others) 1.00 1
(3) MS (Euro) -0.01 0.13 1 (3) MS (Euro) 0.32 0.33 1
(4) σ -0.08 0.02 0.69 1 (4) σ 0.06 0.06 -0.18 1
(5) BASp -0.56 -0.57 -0.27 -0.13 1 (5) BASp -0.53 -0.53 -0.46 0.02 1
(6) Vol 0.18 0.26 0.49 0.84 -0.26 1 (6) Vol 0.18 0.18 -0.36 0.85 -0.09 1
(7) AvgTS 0.21 0.30 0.72 0.79 -0.51 0.73 1 (7) AvgTS 0.33 0.33 0.26 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Frag 1
(2) Frag (Others) -0.05 1
(3) MS (Euro) -0.96 0.21 1
(4) σ -0.04 -0.68 -0.07 1
(5) BASp -0.50 -0.13 0.41 0.18 1
(6) Vol 0.18 -0.51 -0.32 0.85 0.04 1
(7) AvgTS 0.01 -0.63 -0.11 0.85 0.01 0.79 1
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Figure 4-10 - Correlation Coefficient Distribution 
Note. This figure contains a histogram of correlation coefficients found in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6. 
Correlation coefficients are grouped into categories that are 0.2 wide.  The x-axis label indicates the 
maximum allowable value for each category.  Note that correlations = 1 where parameters are compared 
against themselves are removed from this figure.   
4.7.2 Fragmentation and Price Discovery 
This section reports on the results of the fragmentation and price discovery measures that form 
the basis for this chapter. Panel A in Table 4-6 indicates that the microstructure of the USD 
Bitcoin market has remained consistent over the study period.   Frag is reported as 0.8 across 
the entire sample period while the first and second half Frag measures are reported to be 0.79 
and 0.8, respectively.  This is evidence that the overall level of competition is constant across 
the sample period and that no major fragmenting events occurred caused by one exchange 
growing in popularity relative to its competitors.  This is further supported by the Market Share 
(MS) measures in Table 4-6 Panel A which also remain stable at 0.13 and 0.14.   
However, the Euro Bitcoin markets, whose fragmentation measures are presented in Panel B of 
Table 4-6, show that microstructure of the market is not constant over the sample period.  
Fragmentation (Frag) across the sample period is reported to be 0.7 while the same measure is 
reported to be 0.64 and 0.76 over the first and second half of the sample period, respectively.  
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The increase in Frag over time is representative of an increase in fragmentation throughout the 
sample period.   The MS further supports this finding results in Table 4-7 Panel B which show 
that, on average, each exchange captures 18% of the total transactional volume while first and 
second half measures again support an increase in fragmentation with MS results of 0.2 and 
0.17, respectively.  This is further proof that transactional volume moved away from the 
dominant exchange, Kraken.  Over time, European investors begin to favour satellite exchanges 
and the market becomes less centralised around a single dominant exchange. 
Table 4-7: Market Fragmentation Measures 
Panel A: USD ($) 
  
Panel B: Euro (€) 
  
Note. This table reports the means, standard deviations, and medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) and 
third (Q3) quartiles of the fragmentation measures used in the study. Panels A and B contain data based 
on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  Results are calculated 
using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day.  ‘Sample – All’ contains results over 
the entire sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019) while ‘Sample – First Half’ and ‘Sample – 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
1-HHI
Sample - All 0.797 0.063    0.748 0.806 0.843 
Sample - First Half 0.795 0.071    0.733 0.806 0.850 
Sample - Second Half 0.800 0.053    0.765 0.806 0.833 
Market Share (USD)
Sample - All 0.135 0.125    0.046 0.107 0.172 
Sample - First Half 0.135 0.127    0.044 0.109 0.171 
Sample - Second Half 0.135 0.123    0.048 0.106 0.173 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
1-HHI
Sample - All 0.701 0.122    0.624 0.693 0.756 
Sample - First Half 0.639 0.093    0.566 0.642 0.711 
Sample - Second Half 0.763 0.116    0.682 0.733 0.828 
Market Share (Euro)
Sample - All 0.185 0.202    0.031 0.115 0.226 
Sample - First Half 0.198 0.226    0.017 0.090 0.297 
Sample - Second Half 0.172 0.173    0.034 0.126 0.179 
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Second Half uses data from 1 January 2017 to 14 February 2018 and 15 February 2018 to 31 March 
2019, respectively. Frag is the result of calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman using exchange volume 
data and subtracting this value from 1.  All exchanges reference the same ‘Frag’ figure for a given 
transaction day.  MS is the exchange-specific market share, measured as a proportion of total volume. 
 
The consistency in the USD Bitcoin market can partly be explained by the fact that there is no 
single dominant USD exchange.  Table 4-3, Panel A reports Bitfinex as being the dominant 
USD Bitcoin exchange with a market share of 37% while Table 4-4 Panel D reports Kraken as 
the dominant Euro exchange with an average market share of 74%.  As a result, there is more 
room for the evolution of the Euro market where competing exchanges can attract investors 
from the dominant exchange.  Competition amongst USD exchanges is more realised upon the 
opening dates in the sample periods.  This is further supported by the Frag measures in Table 
4-7 which indicate more competition amongst USD exchanges compared to Euro exchanges, as 
indicated by the higher Frag value. 
Upon initial analysis the information shares (IS) results contained in support the previous 
notion that the USD Bitcoin market is less centralised than the Euro Bitcoin market. Table 4-8, 
Panel A reports that on average USD exchanges individually contain 17% of all price adjusting 
information while Panel B reports that individual Euro exchanges contribute 25% of all price 
adjusting information.  This is further supported by the individual exchange IS measures.  
Three of the six USD exchanges contain informational content in the double figures, ranging 
from 0.15 to 0.52.  Bitfinex is a US-based exchange and is the leading informational source of 
US/BTC price information.  The majority of price adjusting information in the Euro Bitcoin 
market, however, originates from the Kraken exchange which boasts an IS of 0.85.  Kraken, 
which is headquartered in Europe, is also the only Euro exchange whose informational content 
reaches double figures. The remaining exchange, Bitstamp, Coinbase and Exmo represent only 
7%, 6%, and 2% of the informational content, respectively, in the Euro Bitcoin market.  
This provides support for H4-1 and indicated that no single exchange is responsible for 
advertising all price-relevant information.   It also provides support for H4-4 in that the leading 
source of price adjusting information for a particular fiat currency/BTC pair are exchanges that 





Figure 4-11 – Intra-Market Fragmentation (Bitcoin) 
Note. This graph displays the fragmentation levels of both USD and Euro markets. Fragmentation (Frag) 
is the result of calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman using exchange volume data and subtracting this 
value from 1Results are calculated using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day 
over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  
 
Figure 4-11 provides a visual representation of the change in market microstructure across 
USD and Euro order books.  While both USD and Euro markets show inter-day variability in 
the level of fragmentation within their respective order books, the USD market shows greater 
consistency in the level of fragmentation while the overall upward trend in the Euro market 
measure of fragmentation indicated greater fragmentation over time as Kraken loses some of its 




Table 4-8: Information Share  
Panel A: USD ($) 
  
Panel B: Euro (€) 
  
Note. This table reports values for Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share (IS) for each exchange 
(Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Coinbase, Exmo, Gemini and Kraken).  It reports means, standard deviations, and 
medians (Q2) as well as the first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartile value.  Results are calculated for each 
exchange over a single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  Panels 
A and B contain IS data based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), 
respectively.  All consists of data from each exchange operating under its respective currency.   
 
Figure 4-12 provides further support for the centralisation of information in the Euro Bitcoin 
market.  USD IS data contained in Panel A shows a greater dispersion of price adjusting 






Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
  All 0.167    0.178    0.034    0.080    0.233    
Bitfinex 0.518    0.058    0.486    0.523    0.558    
Bitstamp 0.153    0.030    0.133    0.150    0.171    
Coinbase 0.236    0.041    0.211    0.233    0.257    
Exmo 0.011    0.002    0.010    0.011    0.013    
Gemini 0.039    0.009    0.034    0.038    0.044    
Kraken 0.041    0.010    0.035    0.041    0.047    
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
  All 0.250    0.349     0.034    0.061    0.367    
Bitstamp 0.068    0.027     0.052    0.063    0.077    
Coinbase 0.061    0.021     0.047    0.058    0.070    
Exmo 0.021    0.008     0.015    0.018    0.023    
Kraken 0.851    0.050     0.833    0.861    0.880    
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Panel A: USD ($) 
 
Panel B: Euro (€) 
 
Figure 4-12 - Information Share by Exchange 
Note. This graph displays the values for Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share (IS) for each exchange 
(Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Coinbase, Exmo, Gemini and Kraken).  Results are calculated for each exchange 
over a single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  Panels A and B 
contain IS data based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  
The displayed results are based on a 10-day moving average. 
 
4.7.3 Regression Results 
This section reports on the results of the regression analysis conducted in this study.  
Regression results are found in Table 4-9 to Table 4-11 with Panels A and B containing results 
for USD and Euro order books, respectively.  Beginning with the market share (MS) measure, 
the results support H4-2 in that increased market share for an exchange is positively related 
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with an increase in the informational contents of the respective exchange’s trades.   
Coefficients range from 0.05 to 0.685 in Panels A and B of Table 4-9.   
Table 4-9: Regression Results (No Fixed Effects) 
Panel A: USD ($) 
 
  
Bitfinex Bitstamp Coinbase Exmo Gemini Kraken
Constant -0.158 -0.027 -0.155 -0.007 0.112 0.136
(-1.15) (-0.41) (-1.7) * (-1.06) (7.06) *** (7.52) ***
Frag 0.445 0.115 0.178 0.009 0.051 0.047
(6.43) *** (6.31) *** (6.41) *** (5.98) *** (7.66) *** (7.6) ***
MS 0.610 0.372 0.460 0.205 0.050 0.059
(11.86) *** (13.35) *** (14.5) *** (6.99) *** (5.12) *** (5.36) ***
σ -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0.008 0.007
(-0.66) (-1.37) (-1.09) (-1.96) ** (10.67) *** (8.47) ***
BASp 0.006 0.015 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(3.19) *** (8.3) *** (-1.57) (4.41) *** (-3.67) *** (-0.38)
Vol 0.002 -0.001 0.015 0.000 -0.007 -0.008
(0.29) (-0.22) (2.73) *** (0.75) (-9.06) *** (-9.18) ***
AvgTS 0.008 0.004 -0.016 0.000 0.003 0.002
(0.81) (0.91) (-2.76) *** (0.31) (3.45) *** (1.99) **
Fixed Effects None None None None None None
Adjusted R^2 0.340 0.364 0.236 0.327 0.244 0.272
N 820 820 820 820 820 820
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Table 4-9: Regression Results (No Fixed Effects) - continued 
Panel B: Euro (€) 
 
Note. This table contains the results of the panel regression analysis with no fixed effects.  Panels A and 
B contain data based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  
Results are calculated for each exchange using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading 
day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  Frag is the result of calculating the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman using exchange volume data and subtracting this value from 1.  MS is the 
exchange-specific market share, measured as a proportion of total volume.   σ is the average 5-minute 
standard deviation in basis points.  BASp is the average quoted spread on the exchange.   Vol is the total 
USD/Euro volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions and includes both in and out-of-
sample exchanges. AvgTS is the average size of each transaction in the exchange, measured in its 
respective currency (USD/Euro).  σ, BASp, Vol and AvgTS have been transformed using the natural 
logarithm (ln). T-statistics can be found in parentheses below each regression coefficient.  *,** and *** 
identify results of 90%, 95%, and 99% statistical significance, respectively.  Information on the relevant 
fixed effects, adjusted R^2 and number of observations are also reported. 
 
The results are also robust for time fixed effects as shown in Panels A and B of Table 4-10, 
where coefficients range from 0.081 to 0.619.  The results with time fixed effects in Table 4-10 
Bitstamp Coinbase Exmo Kraken
Constant -0.164 -0.038 -0.105 -0.325
(-2.52) ** (-0.68) (-1.56) (-1.92) *
Frag 0.176 0.092 0.168 0.495
(12.92) *** (6.67) *** (12.02) *** (5.68) ***
MS 0.356 0.314 0.552 0.685
(10.04) *** (9.61) *** (2.66) *** (9.35) ***
σ -0.016 -0.003 -0.011 0.006
(-4.42) *** (-0.82) (-3.55) *** (1.18)
BASp 0.026 0.008 0.021 0.013
(5.84) *** (5.56) *** (4.27) *** (3.73) ***
Vol 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.003
(1.63) (2.87) *** (1.19) (0.5)
AvgTS 0.011 -0.001 0.001 -0.007
(2.01) ** (-0.22) (0.65) (-0.75)
Fixed Effects None None None None
Adjusted R^2 0.255 0.255 0.239 0.411
N 820 820 820 820
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are significant at the 1% level across all exchanges in both the USD and Euro markets, except 
for the Exmo Euro exchange.  USD markets show greater consistency in the reported MS 
coefficients.  More dominant USD exchanges with a greater market share of the transactional 
volume, such as Bitfinex and Bitstamp, are more likely to attract informed trades than less 
dominant exchanges.  These results can be supported by the works of (Chowdhry & Nanda, 
1991) who find that informed traders find greater difficulty participating in exchanges with less 
transactional volume.    
These results are consistent with those in Chapter 3 where informed investors transacting in a 
dark pool experience a lower probability of execution and must return to the displayed order 
book to locate a counterparty to the transaction in a timely fashion.  Informed investors are 
more likely to transact on the same side of the order book and therefore require a greater pool 
of uninformed traders with whom they can trade.  Exchanges with lower levels of trading 
volume will have lower levels of uninformed trading activity.  This results in less informational 
content to their trades as informed investors migrate to more liquid exchanges where the risk of 
finding a counterparty to the transaction is reduced.  However, some informed trading will 
always follow the uninformed investors. Therefore, the results support hypothesis H4-2 and are 
consistent with the notion that greater market share is positively correlated with greater 
informational content in trades as there are more uninformed traders with whom the informed 
can transact.  The results are also consistent with the idea that the informational content of 
transactions on more liquid exchange, that is those who capture a greater market share of 
transaction, is more sensitive to increases in market share.  Increased sensitivity occurs as their 
large pool of uninformed investors is more likely to attract additional informed trade given the 
already greater probability of execution on these exchanges. 
Overall market microstructure, as measured by Frag, has a positive relationship with the 
informational content of an exchange’s transactions.  This result is indicated by the positive 
regression coefficients for Frag across all sampled exchanges in both USD and Euro Bitcoin 
markets.  Regression coefficients range from 0.01 to 0.495 in Table 4-9 and Table 4-10 and are 
consistently significant at the 1% level.  These findings support hypothesis H4-3 in that the 
increased fragmentation of order books is positively related to increases in the informational 
content of an exchange’s trades.  The results can be explained by the theory presented by 
Mendelson (1987) who propose that smaller exchanges have difficulty in attracting informed 
activity without a sufficient pool of uninformed trades with which the informed can interact.  
Therefore, greater fragmentation leads to the migration of uninformed traders to the new 
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exchanges.  While some informed activity can follow the uninformed to the new exchanges, 
once again the level of uninformed activity is not enough to support these trades. The lack of 
support is due to an insufficient number of counterparties to the informed trades at the desired 
price level.  This is consistent with the previous findings for MS which report that while 
increased market share does lead to more informed activity on an exchange, the increase in 
informational content in lower for less liquid exchanges due to their lower levels of uninformed 
trading compared to more dominant exchanges. 
The lower Frag coefficients for less liquid exchanges such as Exmo also supports the notion 
that these exchanges find it more difficult to locate a counterparty for the informed traders 
when compared to more liquid exchanges (Mendelson, 1987). So when markets fragment and 
smaller exchanges entice some investors to transact in their order books, the increases in 
fragmentation they cause can support some level of informed trading activity, though not as 
must as more liquid exchanges.  But once again, these smaller exchanges largely attract 
uninformed traders.   
Table 4-10: Regression Results (Time Fixed Effects) 
Panel A: USD ($) 
 
Bitfinex Bitstamp Coinbase Exmo Gemini Kraken
Constant -0.237 -0.079 -0.151 -0.002 0.133 0.148
(-1.32) (-1.08) (-1.54) (-0.29) (7.44) *** (7.59) ***
Frag 0.439 0.132 0.180 0.011 0.050 0.045
(4.31) *** (6.08) *** (5.43) *** (5.59) *** (6.57) *** (6.04) ***
MS 0.619 0.399 0.430 0.185 0.081 0.083
(9.2) *** (11.34) *** (8.64) *** (5.59) *** (6.04) *** (5.42) ***
σ -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 0.000 0.008 0.007
(-1.23) (-2.66) *** (-1.81) * (-1.15) (10.88) *** (7.4) ***
BASp 0.019 0.023 0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(3.39) *** (6.83) *** (3.09) *** (4.06) *** (-4.35) *** (-0.52)
Vol -0.002 0.000 0.010 0.000 -0.008 -0.008
(-0.25) (0.004) (1.708) * (-0.045) (-9.38) *** (-8.882) ***
AvgTS 0.025 0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.002 0.001
(2.21) ** (0.58) (-0.64) (-1.45) (2.44) ** (1.01)
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time Time Time
Adjusted R^2 0.347 0.382 0.249 0.334 0.265 0.277




Table 4-10: Regression Results (Time Fixed Effects) - continued 
Panel B: Euro (€) 
 
Note. This table contains the results of the panel regression analysis with time fixed effects.  Panels A 
and B contain data based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), 
respectively.  Results are calculated for each exchange using all transactions in a single currency over a 
single trading day over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  Frag is the result of 
calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman using exchange volume data and subtracting this value from 1.  
MS is the exchange-specific market share, measured as a proportion of total volume.   σ is the average 
5-minute standard deviation in basis points.  BASp is the average quoted spread on the exchange.   Vol 
is the total USD/Euro volume (reported in millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions and includes both in 
and out-of-sample exchanges. AvgTS is the average size of each transaction in the exchange, measured 
in its respective currency (USD/Euro).  σ, BASp, Vol and AvgTS have been transformed using the 
natural logarithm (ln). T-statistics can be found in parentheses below each regression coefficient.  *,** 
and *** identify results of 90%, 95%, and 99% statistical significance, respectively.  Information on the 
relevant fixed effects, adjusted R^2 and number of observations are also reported. 
 
Since these less liquid order books attract more uninformed traders and informed ones from 
other displayed order book, the concentration of informed to uninformed investors increases in 
Bitstamp Coinbase Exmo Kraken
Constant -0.159 -0.002 0.001 -0.145
(-2.2) ** (-0.04) (0.02) (-0.79)
Frag 0.161 0.093 0.140 0.404
(8.47) *** (4.85) *** (7.74) *** (4.22) ***
MS 0.347 0.342 0.012 0.604
(7.58) *** (7.54) *** (0.04) (7.72) ***
σ -0.017 0.000 0.002 0.010
(-3.46) *** (-0.05) (0.44) (1.34)
BASp 0.032 0.008 0.019 0.010
(4.88) *** (4.31) *** (3.31) *** (1.28)
Vol 0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.001
(1.02) (1.617) (-0.91) (-0.159)
AvgTS 0.011 0.002 0.007 -0.006
(1.71) * (0.3) (2.72) *** (-0.61)
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time
Adjusted R^2 0.255 0.260 0.286 0.418
N 820 820 820 820
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the dominant exchange, supporting both H4-2 and H4-3. This dilution in informed trading 
means that major exchanges like Bitfinex in the U.S. and Kraken in Europe lose more 
uninformed than informed order flow.  As a result of the increased concentration of informed 
traders, the informational content of trading activity in the dominant exchange increases by a 
greater amount than their less liquid competitors.  This, again, supports the findings in this 
study which reports consistently higher Frag regression coefficients for exchanges with higher 
market shares than those with smaller market shares.   Even with a loss in market share, more 
liquid exchanges are still able to support larger degrees of informed trading due to their 
significant uninformed trading pool. 
However, the increase in the informational content of exchanges resulting from increased 
fragmentation does not come without a cost.  Greater informed trading on an exchange is 
consistent with greater levels of information asymmetry (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991; 
Madhavan, 1995).   
Table 4-11: Regression Results (Time Fixed Effects & Frag (Other)) 




Bitfinex Bitstamp Coinbase Exmo Gemini Kraken
Constant -0.284 -0.074 -0.139 -0.002 0.133 0.148
(-1.6) (-1.02) (-1.43) (-0.28) (7.44) *** (7.61) ***
Frag (Other) 0.608 0.132 0.179 0.011 0.050 0.045
(4.76) *** (6.13) *** (5.43) *** (5.59) *** (6.52) *** (6.07) ***
MS 0.279 0.362 0.367 0.184 0.071 0.076
(7.93) *** (9.87) *** (6.94) *** (5.58) *** (5.13) *** (4.97) ***
σ -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 0.000 0.008 0.007
(-0.41) (-2.61) *** (-1.76) * (-1.14) (10.87) *** (7.41) ***
BASp 0.018 0.023 0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(3.22) *** (6.82) *** (3.07) *** (4.06) *** (-4.37) *** (-0.55)
Vol -0.004 0.000 0.010 0.000 -0.008 -0.008
(-0.55) (-0.036) (1.635) (-0.047) (-9.354) *** (-8.89) ***
AvgTS 0.024 0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001
(2.09) ** (0.6) (-0.58) (-1.44) (2.49) ** (1.03)
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time Time Time
Adjusted R^2 0.351 0.382 0.249 0.334 0.265 0.277
N 820 820 820 820 820 820
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Table 4-11: Regression Results (Time Fixed Effects & Frag (Other)) - continued 
Panel B: Euro (€) 
 
Note. This table contains the results of the panel regression analysis with time fixed effects and using an 
alternative measure of intra-market fragmentation, Frag (Other).  Frag (Other) is the result of calculating 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman using exchange volume data and subtracting this value from 1.  Frag (Other) 
is similar to Frag except it excludes market share data for the current exchange.  Panels A and B contain 
data based on order books and transactions conducted in USD ($) and Euro (€), respectively.  Results 
are calculated for each exchange using all transactions in a single currency over a single trading day 
over the sample period (1 January 2017 to 31 March 2019).  MS is the exchange-specific market share, 
measured as a proportion of total volume.   σ is the average 5-minute standard deviation in basis points.  
BASp is the average quoted spread on the exchange.   Vol is the total USD/Euro volume (reported in 
millions) of Bitcoin (BTC) transactions and includes both in and out-of-sample exchanges. AvgTS is the 
average size of each transaction in the exchange, measured in its respective currency (USD/Euro).  σ, 
BASp, Vol and AvgTS have been transformed using the natural logarithm (ln). T-statistics can be found 
in parentheses below each regression coefficient.  *,** and *** identify results of 90%, 95%, and 99% 
statistical significance, respectively.  Information on the relevant fixed effects, adjusted R^2 and number 
of observations are also reported. 
 
Bitstamp Coinbase Exmo Kraken
Constant -0.151 0.003 0.002 -0.093
(-2.1) ** (0.05) (0.03) (-0.58)
Frag (Other) 0.160 0.095 0.140 0.616
(8.57) *** (5.06) *** (7.74) *** (4.82) ***
MS 0.295 0.307 0.005 0.238
(6.36) *** (6.53) *** (0.02) (8.87) ***
σ -0.017 0.000 0.002 0.021
(-3.38) *** (0.05) (0.44) (2.79) ***
BASp 0.032 0.008 0.019 0.011
(4.82) *** (4.29) *** (3.31) *** (1.47)
Vol 0.003 0.005 -0.003 -0.016
(0.91) (1.446) (-0.914) (-2.696) ***
AvgTS 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.002
(1.81) * (0.43) (2.72) *** (0.22)
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time
Adjusted R^2 0.256 0.262 0.286 0.422
N 820 820 820 820
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As a result, fragmentation negatively impacts the uninformed investors as the informed take 
advantage of satellite exchanges to cream-skim the most profitable orders, leaving behind 
trades executing at less favourable prices.  This notion of cream-skimming is consistent with 
results reported Easley et al. (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997)and with the 
findings presented in Chapter 3 surrounding dark pools.  Regression results show that an 
exchange’s information share is positively related to its bid-ask spread.  The concentration of 
informed activity, and the resulting increase in information asymmetry, lead to wider bid-ask 
spreads as investors attempt to protect themselves against increased risk resulting from 
exposure to more investors with superior information.   
Table 4-11 provides additional support for the H4-2 and H4-3.  It contains a variant of the Frag 
measure, Frag (Other), which measures fragmentation in the market using only competing 
BTC exchanges.  Therefore, it excludes the impact that the current exchange has on the 
structure of the market.  Once again, MS coefficients are positive and range from 0.071 to 0.367 
across USD and Euro exchanges.  All coefficients are significant at the 1% level except for the 
European Exmo order book. Due to this, the European Exmo coefficient is excluded from the 
reported MS coefficients above.  Frag(Other) coefficients are all positive and range from 0.011 
to 0.616.  Once again, the coefficients for MS and Frag (Other) are larger for more active 
exchanges.   
In summary, increased market fragmentation either leads to an increase in the concentration of 
informed investors on the dominant exchange or the introduction of informed investors on 
smaller satellite exchanges.  As a result, investors can no longer look towards a single exchange 
to gather all relevant price adjusting information.  Further, the process of price discovery which 
entails forming an accurate opinion of price levels becomes more difficult as a market becomes 
more fragmented.  Investors protect themselves against the risk of information asymmetry and 
adverse selection by widening bid-ask spreads, leading to a degeneration of market quality 
factors such as bid-ask spreads.  The widening of bid-ask spreads is seen as a negative outcome 
to fragmentation as it increased the cost of a round-trip transaction for investors. 
 
4.8 Summary of Results 
The results of the hypothesis testing are summarised in Table 4-7. The study tested six main 
hypotheses some with multiple sub parts. The analysis and results support all of the 
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hypothesised relations. However, due to the assumption tests in Section 4.5.4.4, the final 
coefficients may be affected by the presence of multicollinearity in the independent variables. 




H4-1:  When multiple exchanges offer the ability to 
transact in the same asset, price adjusting 
information is spread across multiple exchanges 
and does not originate from a single source. 
4-8 Accept 
H4-2: Market share is positively related to the 





H4-3: Market fragmentation is positively related to the 





H4-4: USD (Euro) exchanges contribute more information 





This study investigates the applicability of equity-based principles to instances of competitive 
market fragmentation in a relatively new asset class, cryptocurrencies.  Using transaction and 
order-book data on the most dominant cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, it follows de Jong et al. (2001) 
and calculates a multivariate version of Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share. The results 
confirm that an exchange’s market share and the level of competitive fragmentation are 
positively related to the informativeness of exchange prices (Madhavan, 1995).  
Consistent with the previous equity market study reported in Chapter 3, the result is explained 
by the migration of informed investors to competing exchanges. This, in turn, increases events 
of information asymmetry as individual exchange transaction prices become more informative.  
However, as permanent price-adjusting information is dispersed across an increasing number of 
exchanges, gathering all relevant information surrounding asset prices becomes more difficult 
and the price discovery process deteriorates.  These results support the findings of Chapter 2 
which presents a taxonomy of market fragmentation in Figure 2-12. Innovations that leads 
markets to fragment are altruistically motivated in their desire to reduce information asymmetry 
among investors.  However, the reality is quite the opposite.  Much like the fragmenting events 
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in equity markets presented in Chapter 3, fragmentation in cryptocurrency markets increases 
levels of information asymmetry in the market.  Benefits experienced by informed investors are 




Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications 
This chapter summarises the results of the thesis and presents the overall conclusion of the 
research.  Section 5.1 discusses the motivation behind the thesis and briefly summarises the 
major findings.  Section 5.2 reports the key results of the thesis and provides a summary of its 
contributions to the field of research.  Section 5.3 discusses the theoretical, practical, and 
educational implications of the thesis.  Section 5.4 identifies the limitations of the results 
presented in the thesis.  Finally, Section 5.5 suggests directions for future market fragmentation 
research.   
5.1 Summary of Research  
This research examines fragmentation in financial asset markets.  Market fragmentation is 
traditionally a result of increased competition among providers of various products and 
services.  Competition is viewed as an integral component of a healthy market.  This is evident 
in governments’ establishment of anti-trust policies that prevent monopolies in various 
financial, product, and service markets.  The goal of this thesis is to explore various forms of 
fragmentation in financial asset markets and test whether current levels of competition are 
beneficial for investors.  In particular, this thesis tests whether competition impedes or supports 
a market’s ability to accurately price assets.  Accurate pricing is important to investors as they 
are more likely to participate in markets whose prices are efficient and incorporate all publicly 
available information. 
This thesis focuses on understanding the motivating factors that influence the fragmentation of 
financial asset markets.  It aims to identify patterns in the motivations behind different forms of 
market fragmentations as well as the degree of innovation they entail.  It also establishes a 
relationship between similar events of market fragmentation within various financial asset 
classes.  A desire to test the connection between established theory on market microstructure 
and its implications for the price discovery process is also a motivating factor behind the 
research.   
This thesis begins with a study of the innovations that cause markets to fragment.  The initial 
study categorises multiple forms of market fragmentation.  It then builds upon the work of  
Avlonitis et al. (2001) and Tufano (1989) to develop a taxonomy explaining the motivating 
factors behind key fragmenting events.  It introduces ‘pricing’ into the taxonomy as a new, 
externally driven and temporal, fragmentation event. The taxonomy proposes that reductions in 
transaction costs play a primary role in motivating innovations that lead to an instance of 
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competitive and substitutionary fragmentation in traditional financial assets.  Regulatory 
changes are also a significant factor in market fragmentation, particular in equity markets.  
Reductions in asymmetric information either play a supporting role or are viewed as a 
consequence of market fragmentation. Technological shocks, regulatory changes and 
globalisation are responsible for more recent fragmenting events involving dark pools, 
cryptocurrencies, and high-frequency trading.   
Next, the thesis selects one of the key motivating factors, reductions in information asymmetry 
or price discovery, and empirically explores its connection to market fragmentation.  Equity 
and cryptocurrency markets are chosen as the setting for empirical research due to their 
abundance of competitive fragmentation events.  Equity markets represent more traditional 
studies and contain a wealth of existing research which can be applied to the study.  On the 
other hand, cryptocurrency markets allow for testing of the efficacy of equity-based market 
microstructure research in relation to a relatively new financial product. 
This research examines whether the microstructure of equity and cryptocurrency markets 
relates to the informational content of exchange prices and/or mid-quotes.  It also examines 
whether increased fragmentation in order books leads to greater difficulty in consolidating all 
permanent price adjusting information and thus impedes the price discovery process.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used for the first time in studies of this nature in 
order to measure the construct of each respective market.  Traditional measures of 
fragmentation such as market share are also used, but unlike HHI measures, they only indicate 
the popularity of a particular exchange or type of exchange.  HHI provides a better measure of 
the structure of the overall market as it takes into account the extent to which investor activity 
is dispersed across multiple exchanges. 
The first empirical study focuses on competitive market fragmentation in equity markets, and 
tests established research principles surrounding rational expectations theory and the efficient 
market hypothesis. The study uses Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share and Gonzalo and 
Granger’s (1995) component share as the primary measures of the informational content of 
exchange trade prices and mid-quotes.  Results support existing theory on price discovery in 
equity markets and show that lit exchange trade prices contain substantially more information 
than dark exchange trade prices (Zhu, 2014).  Both lit and dark forms of fragmentation 
incentivise the migration of informed trading to satellite lit exchanges.  This has negative 
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implications on the price discovery process as markets must consolidate information from 
multiple exchanges in order to maintain efficient price levels.   
The second empirical study investigates the applicability of equity-based research principles to 
instances of competitive market fragmentation in a relatively new asset class, cryptocurrencies.  
Using transaction and order-book data on the most dominant cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, it follows 
de Jong (2001) and calculates a multivariate version of Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share. 
The results confirm that an exchange’s market share and the level of competitive fragmentation 
are positively related to the informativeness of exchange prices (Madhavan, 1995).  Consistent 
with the previous equity market study, the result is explained by the migration of informed 
investors to competing exchanges. This, in turn, increases events of information asymmetry as 
individual exchange transaction prices become more informative.  However, as permanent 
price-adjusting information is dispersed across an increasing number of exchanges, gathering 
all relevant information surrounding asset prices becomes more difficult and the price 
discovery process deteriorates.  
In summary, the empirical results suggest that competitive market fragmentation is detrimental 
to the price discovery process.  While competing exchanges primarily attract uninformed 
trading, some informed investors leave the dominant exchange as well.  Doing so, they take 
with them important information that contributes to the accurate pricing of financial assets.  
This makes it more difficult for the market and its investors to compound all price adjusting 
information into asset prices, thereby impeding price discovery.  The results also suggest that 
while competitive market fragmentation is partially motivated by the desire to reduce 
information asymmetry, the result is often the opposite.  Information asymmetry increases as 
some informed investors follow the uninformed to competing exchanges in order to capitalise 
on their informational advantage.  As uninformed investors migrate to competing exchanges, 
the proportion of informed to uninformed trading increases on some exchanges and also 
contributes to increased levels of information asymmetry.   Finally, consistencies in the results 
between equity and cryptocurrency markets suggest that established equity-based theories 
apply to alternate financial assets markets. 
5.2 Conclusions to Research Questions 
This section discusses the main findings in detail and relates the hypothesis testing and results 
back to the initial research questions identified in Chapter 1. The first research question asks: 
RQ1: What are the motivating factors that lead to the fragmentation of financial markets? 
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The taxonomy in Figure 2-12 proposes that reductions in transaction costs play a primary role 
in motivating innovations that lead to an instance of competitive, fragmentation based on 
customer type, and substitutionary fragmentation in traditional financial assets. Reductions in 
asymmetric information either play a supporting role or are viewed as a consequence of market 
fragmentation. Technological shocks, regulatory changes and globalisation are responsible for 
more recent fragmenting events involving dark pools, cryptocurrencies, and high-frequency 
trading.  The introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 
November of 2007 increased levels of competitive market fragmentation among lit (quoting) 
and dark (non-quoting) equity markets.  Technological shocks also acted as a catalyst which led 
to the formation of new exchanges and financial asset classes, notably cryptocurrencies.  The 
results also show that competitive market fragmentation leads to the development of products 
which modify existing offerings.  Fragmentation based on customer type lead to extensions of 
existing offerings and substitutionary fragmentation is responsible for the development of 
completely new innovations. 
The remainder of the discussion focuses primarily on the empirical results from the studies 
reported in Chapters 3 and 4.  Research questions 2 and 3 are explored in Chapter 3 and 4 
respectively.  They are as follows: 
RQ2: How does competitive market fragmentation affect the equity market’s ability to 
efficiently price assets and convey price disseminating information to the public? 
RQ3: How does competitive market fragmentation affect the cryptocurrency market’s ability to 
efficiently price assets and convey price disseminating information to the public? 
The results show that both equity and cryptocurrency markets react similarly to changes in 
market microstructure.  Fragmentation negatively affects both markets in terms of price 
discovery, which answers both RQ2 and RQ3.  While activities on individual exchanges 
become more informative, the dispersion of information across multiple exchanges makes it 
more difficult to collect all relevant price adjusting information. This is a novel finding as it 
provides credibility to the application of established equity market research, notably the 
rational expectations theory and efficient market hypothesis, to non-equity assets.  As a result, 
it supports the need for future studies that apply established theory to financial assets which 
lack a similar research pedigree. The remainder of this section discusses the key findings and 
how they relate to the empirical tests contained within this thesis.   The key findings to 




Table 5-1: Summary of Key Findings 





1. (A) Information that contributes to price discovery is 




1. (B) Increased competition amongst exchanges attracts 




2. Competing exchanges attract proportionally more 




3. Mid-quotes are more informative than transaction prices.  
Their importance increases with greater levels of 




4. Trades in pre-trade transparent (lit) exchanges contain 






The first key finding is that permanent, price adjusting information is found on all exchanges 
(Table 5-1 - 1A). The study finds support for H3-3A and H3-3B that consolidated markets, 
consisting of all exchanges which transact in a particular asset, contain more information than 
the dominant exchange.  This implies that informed investors have an incentive to venture 
away from their historical trading venues.  Unfortunately for price discovery, they take with 
them valuable information and make it more difficult to compound into prices all relevant 
information.  This is not only true for equity investors, but cryptocurrency investors as well 
according to results for H4-1.  The implication is that investors behave similarly, regardless of 
the asset they are trading, when faced with varied levels of competition amongst the exchanges 
in which they can trade. 
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This is further evident in key finding 1B which states that competing exchanges attract some 
level of informed trading. H3-4A (H3-5A) state that increased levels of competition among 
(non) quoting exchanges deteriorates the quality of price information on the primary exchange.  
This is again explained by the migration of informed investors to alternative trading venues.  
Exchanges that entice investors to trade within their order book will attract some level of 
informed trading.  The argument is that informed investors use these new markets to spread 
around their orders to better conceal any information that may be extracted from their 
transactions (Mendelson, 1987).  H4-2A provides validation that informed investors behave 
similarly regardless of the asset class in which they are trading.  This associated with higher 
levels of adverse selection in the lit market and is consistent with the notion that the most 
profitable uniformed trades are being ‘skimmed’ by informed liquidity providers 
(Bessembinder & Kaufman, 1997; Easley et al., 1996). 
The second key finding states that exchanges attract proportionally more uninformed 
investment trades than informed ones.  Results support H3-5B and H3-6B which state that 
competition among exchanges, regardless of their pre-trade transparency requirements.  This 
concentrates informed trading on some exchanges and improves the quality of their price 
signals.  Exchanges cannot support exclusively informed trading as it would reduce the 
probability of execution.  Informed investors trades are positively correlated with the value of 
the asset and, as a result, would cluster on the heavy side of the market (Zhu, 2014).  
Uninformed transactions, however, are more likely to find a counterparty to their trade as they 
can transact against informed and uninformed orders.  Once again, H4-3 shows that this 
phenomenon is not unique to equity investors. 
The third key finding proposes that not only are mid-quotes more informative than transaction 
prices, but they also become increasingly more informative as markets fragment. The results of 
H3-2A and H3-2B support this finding.   Fragmentation, both within and across markets, 
encourages informed investors to congregate on quoting exchanges while uninformed investors 
opt for trading in dark pools.  While this improves the quality of the information in lit markets, 
it comes at the cost of increased adverse selection risk.  Under such conditions, informed 
investors prefer to supply liquidity due to their informational advantage and target the most 
profitable uninformed trades.   The final key finding proposes that trades in pre-trade 
transparent markets are more informative than trades in dark pools is supported by the outcome 
of H3-1, H3-6A and H3-6B. 
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The findings coincide with the results modelled by Zhu (2014) and show that the migration of 
trades from lit to dark markets (inter-market fragmentation) is predominately uninformed.  By 
disproportionally attracting uninformed investors, inter-market fragmentation increases the 
overall quality of the information in lit exchanges.  Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of 
greater adverse selection risk as investors face more sophisticated competition.  This 
encourages informed investors to use their informational advantage to supply liquidity to the 
market and benefit from less-informed investors in lit exchanges (L. Ye, 2016). 
In summary, increased market fragmentation either leads to an increased in the concentration of 
informed investors on the dominant exchange or the introduction of informed investors on 
smaller satellite exchanges.  As a result, investors can no longer look towards a single exchange 
to gather all relevant price adjusting information.  Therefore, the process of price discovery, 
that is, the process of forming an accurate opinion of prices levels, becomes more difficult as 
market fragmentation increases.  This occurs as investors protect themselves against the risk of 
information asymmetry and adverse selection by widening bid-ask spreads, leading to a 
degeneration of market quality factors such as bid-ask spreads.  The widening of bid-ask 
spreads is seen as a negative outcome to fragmentation as it increased the cost of a round-trip 
transaction for investors. The results show that the popularity of dark pools (inter-market 
fragmentation), as measured by market share of dark pools, is positively related to dark market 
fragmentation.  Competition among dark pools increases when there is significant liquidity to 
support multiple exchanges. Liquidity must be largely uninformed as informed traders are more 
likely to congregate on the heavy side of the market.  This exposes informed investors to 
increased levels of non-execution risk since they cannot locate enough uninformed liquidity 
against which to transact. As a result, informed investors continue to prefer trading in the lit 
exchanges and by doing so increase the quality of information on those exchanges at the cost of 
greater adverse selection risk. 
5.3 Implications of the Research 
The findings entailed in this thesis have several implications for future theory, practice, 
regulatory policy, and education. 
5.3.1 Implications for Theory 
This research makes a theoretical contribution by establishing a taxonomy for market 
fragmentation.  It builds upon Avlonitis et al. (2001) and Tufano (1989) and introduces the 
three P’s of market fragmentation: process, product, and pricing.  Unlike process and product 
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events, fragmentation in pricing is an externally driven event that results from the deviation of 
established equilibrium prices.  It is the only externally driven form of fragmentation and, 
unlike the others, is a temporary reaction to market conditions.  The research also shows that 
process-based fragmenting events stem from the modification or extension of existing services.  
However, product-based events result in new offerings that are unlike what is currently 
available in the market.  Also, reductions in transaction costs play a dominant role in 
motivating innovation which leads to market fragmentation.   
This research also makes a contribution to existing research by applying market microstructure 
theory to price discovery in equity markets.  The findings validate Zhu (2014) and confirm that 
informed investors use lit markets, as opposed to dark pools, for the majority of their 
transactions.  It also confirms existing research that increased fragmentation leads to greater 
information asymmetry, thereby exposing uninformed investors to greater adverse selection 
risk (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1991; Madhavan, 1995).  As a reaction to greater risk exposure, and 
to deter informed investors from ‘cream-skimming’ the most profitable trades, markets react by 
widening bid-ask spreads (Easley et al. (1996); Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997)). 
The research also implies that existing equity-based theories surrounding rational expectations 
theory and the efficient market hypothesis apply to cryptocurrency markets.  Fragmentation 
measures such as market shares and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, when combined with 
established informational measures, lead to similar results in both equity and cryptocurrency 
markets.   This implies that informed investors react similarly to changes in market 
microstructure regardless of the financial asset in which they are investing.  This is a novel 
finding and opens the possibility for the use of other equity-based theory in relation to 
cryptocurrency markets.   
5.3.2 Implications for Policy and Practice 
This research implies that increased competitive market fragmentation results in the 
degradation of an investor’s ability to formulate accurate prices.  With price-adjusting 
information spread across multiple exchanges, gathering all the information necessary to 
construct accurate prices becomes more difficult and costly.  This means that investors trading 
in consolidated markets, where the number of exchanges in which they can transact is kept to a 
minimum, will find it easier to identify and incorporate information contained within 
transaction prices.    
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Since consolidated markets are more efficient and more accurately convey prices that resemble 
the true value of the assets, they are more supportive of uninformed trading.  This means that 
less sophisticated investors will find it easier to trade in consolidated markets since the 
advertised prices in these markets are more accurate.  However, more sophisticated and 
informed investors will find it more profitable to trade in fragmented markets.  Fragmented 
markets make it easier for informed investors to conceal the intentions behind their trades.   
Protecting private information is important to informed investors as it provides them with 
compensation for taking on the responsibility of gathering costly information.  Since it is more 
difficult to distinguish between superior information and noise in fragmented markets, 
informed investors can use these markets to better leverage their superior information.  
The results surrounding market fragmentation are also important from a regulatory standpoint.  
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, recent regulatory changes in Europe, such as the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), have a significant influence on the level of 
competitive market fragmentation.   European equity market investors are increasingly relying 
on alternatives to the primary exchange, such as multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), to 
conduct transactions.  Many of these venues report the results of successful transactions 
independently.  Very few exchanges, most notably dark pools, report their transactions to a 
central consolidated tape.  This makes collecting permanent price-adjusting information more 
difficult as investors must have access to, and consolidate transaction results across many 
exchanges to help markets maintain accurate prices levels.  The lack of a published 
consolidated order book also means that incorporating relevant quote data into transactions 
prices is also more difficult.  As a result, there is a greater margin of error in advertised and 
historical trade prices.  This opens regulatory agencies to a debate about whether policies must 
be put in place to provide investors with a more centralised source for trade and order book 
information.  
Policies regarding more centralised access to trade and order book information are also relevant 
with regards to levelling the playing field between retail and institutional investors.  
Institutional investors are viewed as more sophisticated with regards to their ability to gather 
superior private information as well as access multiple exchanges simultaneously with the aid 
of computer software.  While little can and should be done surrounding the generation of 
private information, the results in this thesis open the floor to a debate about whether retail 
investors should have more access to tools which source liquidity from multiple exchanges.  
Compensation for costly information gathering is a reward to informed investors for their 
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contribution to market efficiency.  However, informed investors receive additional benefits 
because they afford to invest in told that allow them greater access to liquidity.  The question 
remains as to whether institutional investors are deserving of greater access to liquidity, 
compared to retail investors, simply because they are more likely to be able to afford it. If 
regulators do not intend to provide retail investors with the same accessibility to liquidity that 
institutional investors can afford, then this leads to the question of whether governments should 
play a role in restricting the number of exchanges.   
Finally, there are currently no government-mandated reporting policies for cryptocurrency 
exchanges.  The results of this thesis show that cryptocurrency markets are similar to equity 
markets in the way they react to fragmenting events.  As investment in cryptocurrencies 
continues to grow, the results imply that regulatory bodies should include cryptocurrency 
exchanges in their discussion of trade reporting and investor protection policies.   
5.3.3 Implications for Education 
Stable environments provide little insight into the nature of financial market forces as very little 
changes when markets are at an equilibrium.  At a minimum, before and after snapshots are 
necessary to measure change and the effect the change has on markets.  Luckily, the past two 
decades contain a plethora of fragmenting events.  These events stem from changes in 
regulations, advancements in technologies, and opportunities to establish a foothold in the 
market by offering investors an incentive to migrate across trading platforms.  The more 
dynamic nature of fragmented markets provide opportunities and cases through which students 
can observe and discuss concepts like the asymmetry of information, information flows, price 
formation, ‘cream-skimming’, informed vs uninformed investors, the role of liquidity and the 
role and impact of regulation.   
The taxonomy presented within this thesis will help students better recognise the driving forces 
behind market fragmentation.  Understanding the motivational factors behind innovations that 
lead to market fragmentation allows students to understand why such changes are necessary.  It 
will also help them identify gaps in existing process and product offerings allowing them to 
anticipate potential future market microstructure changes.   
The results also open the debate for the efficacy of increased competition in markets.  
Economics and finance texts propose that monopolies lead to unfavourable conditions for 
investors and competition can help improve these conditions.  However, this research proposes 
that educators should question whether unlimited competition is beneficial under all 
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circumstances.  In fact, the results open the debate for the benefits of controlled competition in 
the absence of sufficient investor protection policies.  In financial asset exchanges, increased 
competition leads to the dispersal of price-adjusting information.  This leads to less efficient 
pricing in financial assets.  Therefore, unrestricted competition negatively impacts market 
conditions by increasing transactions costs and exposes investors to greater asymmetric 
information risk.  This implies that educators should be more cautious when promoting the 
benefits of competition as more choice does not always improve conditions for investors.  
5.4 Limitations 
The results presented in this thesis are partially limited by the scope of the data used.  Chapter 3 
collects data on the top twenty stock across six countries to construct a European dataset that more 
closely resembled the cross-border nature of European equity trading.  However, the inclusion of 
additional stocks from the sample countries would further contribute to the generalisability of the 
results.  As would incorporating stocks from countries that are outside of the sample.  Smaller 
stocks and stocks from smaller countries are likely to exhibit different properties in fragmented 
markets due to the thinner information environment for these stocks. Expanding the scope is a 
potential avenue for future research. 
A similar argument regarding the scope of the dataset can be made for the cryptocurrency study in 
Chapter 4.  This study would benefit from the inclusion of additional cryptocurrencies, such as 
Litecoin and Peercoin, to test whether the results are robust across multiple cryptocurrencies.  The 
cryptocurrency study is also limited to trades in USD and Euro.  However, the Japanese Yen is the 
second most active sovereign currency used in Bitcoin trading as of March 2019  (see Figure 2-7).  
Also, this study focusses on independently operated exchanges.  However, as shown in Figure 2-6, 
the peer-to-peer market where users trade Bitcoin directly with each other is the most active type of 
exchange as of March 2019.  Peer-to-peer exchanges do not operate using a limit order book and do 
not employ broker-dealers.  Instead, they more resemble the over-the-counter market where 
customers negotiate trade prices directly with each other.  Nevertheless, a future study of the 
informational content of such trades could prove insightful. 
The study in Chapter 3 could also benefit from a wider time-frame.  In particular, data before the 
introduction of MiFID on 1 November 2007 would allow for a study of market conditions when 
fragmenting events were less common.  This period also represents a more consolidated market 
structure and would allow for better juxtaposition against periods of increased fragmentation.   
The equity study, in Chapter 3, also ignores any transactions reported to the consolidated tape 
which do not explicitly identify the exchange in which the trade took place.  While this means 
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that some dark liquidity transactions are ignored, it leads to a more accurate measure of 
fragmentation as we do not have to employ a proxy to distribute the volume from non-
exchange specific transactions to specific exchanges.  Future studies could explore the 
information content these more opaque dark trades.  
Finally, the results of Chapters 3 and 4 are subject to some distortion due to the presence of 
moderate levels of multicollinearity.  However, in Chapter 4, most of the multicollinearity 
exists among the control variables as opposed to the key fragmentation regressors. 
5.5 Future Research 
Future research can begin by addressing the limitations presented in the previous section.  
Increasing the breadth and depth of datasets would allow for greater generalizability of the 
results.  It would also allow for more opportunities for comparison across time and assets.   
Researchers could expand on the studies in Chapters 3 and 4 to allow for non-linearity in the 
key measures of fragmentation.  Studies such as Degryse et al. (2015) and Comerton-Forde and 
Putniņš (2015) identify that fragmentation improves liquidity and price discovery, respectively, 
so long as the market share of dark pools does not exceed 10%.  Expanding the model to test 
for the non-linear nature of HHI based fragmentation measures would provide insight into the 
ideal level of competition across a market, rather than two competing exchanges.  This 
information would be helpful for regulators in establishing policies that potentially improve 
retail investor access to liquidity originating from multiple exchanges. 
Corbet et al. (2018) study the direction and intensity of informational spillovers across assets, 
including various cryptocurrencies.  Future research would benefit from testing whether a 
particular cryptocurrency’s market microstructure influences the value of substitute 
cryptocurrencies.  These results would allow researchers to gain insight into whether 
cryptocurrencies uniquely establish their prices of if their prices are influenced by competing 
cryptocurrencies.  If the research resulted in a single cryptocurrency as the information leader, 
it would imply that investors need only monitor one cryptocurrency market to gain an accurate 
representation of the value of all competing cryptocurrencies.   
While Corbet et al. (2018) study the spillover across different cryptocurrencies, they do not 
isolate for the effects of the different fiat currencies used in the transactions.  Further research 
could help identify which fiat currency, if any, leads the market as a source of permanent price-
adjusting information.  This would have significant implications regarding the breadth and 
scope of information investors must observe to determine efficient price levels. 
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Finally, both of the empirical studies presented in this thesis can be improved by allowing for 
directional testing within their hypotheses.  As it stands, the study can only identify the 
presence of positive and negative relationships between fragmentation and price discovery.  By 
improving upon the model, future research can prove that fragmentation leads to changes in the 
informativeness of prices in exchanges or vice versa. 
In conclusion, a broader question to consider is can the lessons from this study of fragmented 
financial asset markets be applied to the price formation and information content in other assets 
markets. For instance, are fragmented commodity markets, like gold or other resources, optimal 
or suboptimal in terms of information asymmetry and price determination? There is a potential 
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Appendix 1: Dark Pools 
A1.1 Dark Pools 
Dark pools are trading venues that, unlike traditional exchanges, do not post bid and ask quotes.  
A1.1.1 Public Crossing Networks 
Public crossing networks are the most traditional of all dark pools.  They are the pools to which 
most buy-side firms connect and typically form when agency-only brokerage firms seek 
alternative sources of revenues, such as commissions. A key feature of public crossing 
networks is that client orders do not interact with those of the dark pool operator.  Public 
crossing networks rely on their ability to offer liquidity through a unique model, which can be 
difficult, and as a result have seen few entrants over recent years.   
Public crossing networks generally match orders on a continuous basis, that is, as orders arrive, 
without conveying an investor’s buy or sell intentions to anyone.  However, there does exist a 
subset of firms that match orders based on advertisements. In these advertisement-based pools 
an alert goes out to the traders informing them of a potential match.  Systems vary in the way 
alerts are sent.  In some cases, both sides receive an alert for the potential match and neither 
party is committed to the order.  In other cases, one side will be committed while the party who 
receives the alert has the option of whether or not to execute the trade. 
Major public crossing networks include POSIT, Instinet, and Liquidnet, which are some of the 
first entrants into market.40 
A1.1.2  Internalization Pools 
Internalization pools are designed to internalize an operator’s trade flow.  Their purpose is to 
save the trading venue money by allowing orders to be crossed internally rather than sent 
outside to external trading venues and incurring transaction fees.  Internalization pools are also 
operated by buy-side firms as a means of generating additional commissions.  The primary 
difference between internalization pools and public crossing networks is that internalization 
pools allow for client orders, from both retail and institutional clients, to interact with the 
proprietary order flow of the operator.   
Major internalization pools include Credit Suisse’s Crossfinder and Goldman Sachs’ Sigma X. 
                                                 




A1.1.3 Ping Destinations 
Ping destinations are, in some ways, the complete opposite of public crossing networks. Client 
orders interact exclusively with the owner’s propriety order flow as opposed to with each other, 
making the Ping Destination a new form of market-maker.  They are also quite unique in the 
sense that they only accept Immediate or Cancel(IOC) orders, which require interaction with 
venue owned shares. If only client trades were crossed then the probability of execution would 
be extremely low due to the unlikelihood of two opposing orders entering the pool at the exact 
same time.   
Ping destinations rely on quantitative models operating in a black box to make decisions as to 
whether or not to accept an IOC order.  The majority of their customers are sell-side firms that 
use dark pool aggregators or Smart Order Routing Technology (SORT) to locate sources of 
liquidity. 
A1.1.4 Exchange Based Pools 
Two sources of dark liquidity are combined in this category as they share many defining 
characteristics.  The first are dark pools that are registered as MTFs by the operating exchange 
and include Turquoise Dark and Xetra Midpoint.  The second are implicitly created pools 
formed as the result of the introduction of hidden order types on the operating exchange.  
Hidden orders differ from iceberg or reserve orders in that not even a portion of the order is 
made visible on the lit exchange, thus preventing any changes to displayed quotes.   
A1.1.5 Consortium Pools 
Consortium pools differ from the aforementioned venue classifications in that they are 
established by a group of partnering brokers.  They are similar to public crossing networks 
except they are not typically run by agency-only firms.  They also resemble internalization 
pools except they are established as separate organization, and as such fall under regulatory 
guidelines that require for increased transparency in their activities.   
A1.2 Are They New? 
While the dark pool as a distinct venue may be a new phenomenon the concept of ‘dark’ or 
‘hidden’ liquidity is not new.  Reserve/Iceberg orders predate dark pools and allow investors to 
submit large volume orders to the market in increments while publicly displaying only a 
specified portion of the total order size.  Reserve/Iceberg orders, however, are not entirely 
hidden because a portion of the order is still made public. Hidden order types are also a 
historical transaction type that allow for dark liquidity within a lit order book.  Other forms of 
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dark liquidity include floor broker orders and specialist capital on floor-based exchanges, 
working orders handled by agency brokers or broker-dealers, dealer capital and stand-alone as 
well as broker and exchange/ECN operated crossing networks (Buti et al., 2011). 
Dark pools as a separate entity are also a decades old phenomenon. However, it is only recently 
that they have been absorbing a significant market share of order flow, thus gaining attention 
on a global scale (Degryse et al., 2009).  Crossing networks originate from the early 1970s and 
consist of phone-based networks between buy-side traders.  Though we must note that the 
liquidity being provided is not completely dark as the broker requires knowledge of the 
transaction in order to find a counter-party.  Nevertheless, since the intentions of the parties are 
not made public until after the trade is completed, they, like upstairs market transactions, are 
still considered a source of dark liquidity.    In the 1980s electronic networks such as Instinet 
and POSIT were introduced which eliminated the need for human interactions and thus 
improved the anonymity of crossing network transactions.   
There are currently over 40 dark pools operating separately in both the U.S. and in Europe with 
consolidated market shares of 14.4% and 33%, respectively.41  Their recent growth is attributed 
to the introduction of new regulations, such as RegNMS in the U.S. and MiFID in Europe, that 
result in an environment that is more conducive to the formation and expansion of alternative 
trading venues.   Growth in the popularity of dark liquidity is also attributed to improvements 
in technology, such as algorithmic order routing, which directs order flow to various trading 
venues while protecting investors’ interests by taking into account prices, liquidity, and market 
impact, among other variables. (Degryse et al., 2009)   
A1.3 Vs. The Over-The-Counter/Upstairs Market  
The upstairs market, also known as the over-the-counter-market, refers to when trading occurs 
within a broker-dealer firm as opposed to a traditional exchange.  Upstairs market trades, like 
those originating from dark pools, are protected under regulatory policy and subject to the best-
execution rule.  This rule stipulates that prices given to customers must not be less favourable 
than those offered to investors by visible order book operators.  As a result, the best-execution 
rule states that prices must fall within best bid and ask spread of the primary or consolidated 
market.  
                                                 





The main difference between the two trading venues is that dark pools operate using an 
electronic trading system which requires no broker or dealer involvement, resulting in complete 
pre-trade transparency.  Since dealers in the upstairs market contact other dealers in order to 
source liquidity there is potential for some information leakage.   In his paper ‘Do Dark Pools 
Harm Price Discovery?’ {Zhu, 2014 #432}Zhu (2014)acknowledged that although this type of 
liquidity is not usually classified as dark, it is still a source of non-displayed liquidity.  Another 
difference between dark pools and the upstairs market is said to be the trading cost, which is 
theoretically lower in dark pools (Lefebvre, 2010). 
A1.4 How are Transactions Executed? 
The following illustrates the steps involved in completing a transaction within a dark pool: 42 
 
i. The trader who would like to buy/sell the security calls his broker or places an order 
over the electronic system of the broker. 
ii. The broker internalizes the order and looks for suitable matches within his network. 
This work is sometimes done by computer algorithms which can break the order up 
into several pieces and locate the most appropriate venues for executing the 
transactions. 
iii. The transaction details are forwarded to clearing and settlement houses.  
iv. The confirmation of the trade and trade details are then provided to the two parties. 
A1.4.1 Matching Frequency 
Dark pool orders can be matched in the following ways: 
Continuous cross: Orders are matched as they enter the system. 
 
Periodic cross: Orders are processed in batches at pre-determined times throughout the 
day.  These are among the first types of dark pools.  Over time companies began 
offering more frequent crossing opportunities until they finally began offering 
continuous crossing.  Posit Match is an example of an existing periodic crossing pool.   
Advertisement based: Alerts are provided to one or both parties of the transaction.  
Systems vary in the way alerts are sent.  In some cases both sides receive an alert for the 
potential match and neither party is committed to the order.  In other cases one side will 
                                                 
42 Steps sourced from (Achuthakumar, 2009). 
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be committed and the party who receives the alert has the option of whether or not to 
execute the trade. 
A1.4.2 Price Determination 
Regulatory policy, specifically the best-execution rule, dictates that transactions in a dark pool 
environment cannot be executed at a price that is less favourable than that offered to customers 
of traditional exchanges.  As such, transactions are executed at a price referencing one of the 
following: 
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) (U.S.)  - The best bid and ask prices as determined 
by the consolidated national market. 
 
Primary Best Bid and Offer (PBBO) - The best bid and ask prices as determined by the 
exchange of primary listing. 
 
European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO) – The best bid and ask prices as determined by 
the consolidated European market. 
While the NBBO is the standard in the US, European dark pool operators have the option of 
referencing either the PBBO or EBBO.  Originally most operators referenced the PBBO 
however recent trends have shown that there has been a preference to switch to the EBBO.43 
Though all pools allow for trades to be executed at the midpoint, some venues also allow 
transactions at the best bid or best ask.  The benefit from executing at the best bid/ask is 
increased probability of execution by moving towards a price for which an outstanding limit 
order may exist. This strategy is most effective when there are no orders at the midpoint but 
plenty of limit orders are available at a higher ask/lower bid price. In order to further cater 
towards the heterogeneous needs of investors some pools have also allowed for more specific 
transaction pricing.  For example, a trader who wishes to purchase stock but does not place 
significant value on immediacy can specify ‘midpoint-1 cent’.  On the other hand, a trader who 
values immediacy can place an order at ‘midpoint+1 cent’ and increase the probability and 
speed of finding a match.  In most cases investors can also specify a limit price in order 
increase the probability of execution (Ray, 2010).  
                                                 
43 See ‘Instinet first to float EBBO’ (http://www.thetradenews.com/newsarticle.aspx?id=8293). 
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Prices are generally decided upon after a match has been made.  An order enters a dark pool 
and either immediately or after some time finds a counter-party to the trade.  At that point the 
electronic system references the designated BBO and decides upon a price for the transaction.  
There are some instances in which prices are determined before the match has been made.  
Instinet, for example, operates a closing cross that matches orders at the closing price.  
However, in order to prevent predatory trading, it closes crosses for any company that makes 
an announcement after markets have already closed (M. Ye, 2012).  
A1.4.3 Types of Orders 
Dark pools allow for the use of the following order types: 
 
Market order – The order is filled in reference to the prevailing BBO. 
 
Limit order – The order is filled at a price no worse than the customer specified limit in 
reference to the prevailing BBO. 
 
Immediate or Cancel (IOC): The order is either filled in its entirety, in reference to the 
prevailing BBO, or removed from the liquidity pool.  Many dark pools no longer allow 
this feature as it can be used for gaming purposes to try and detect available liquidity. 
A1.4.3.1 Order Attributes 
The following is a list of key trade attributes that modify the order type:  
 
Mid-Point: The order is pegged to the prevailing mid-price of the NBBO/EBBO/PBBO 
quote.  
 
Pegged order: The order is pegged to any point inside the spread (e.g. bid, ask). 
 
Minimum Quantity: The order cannot interact with orders smaller than this quantity for 
the first fill. 
 
Persistent minimum quantity: The minimum quantity is forced throughout the life of the 
order and not just for the first fill. 
 




Do not interact with: Exclude various counter parties including other dark pools or 
liquidity partners. 
 
Send/Do not send IOI: Refrain from sending Indication of Interest messages to other 
dark pools or liquidity partners.  These messages are used to find available liquidity 
from external sources.  They do not often include information about the size of the order 
or whether the party is a buyer or seller.  Many dark pools no longer allow this feature 
as it can be used for gaming purposes to try and fish out available liquidity. 
A1.4.4 How is Liquidity Accessed?  
Orders sent to a dark pool first interact with the resident dark order book.  If the necessary 
liquidity is not available, they are then sent to either the proprietary lit order book, in the case 
of exchange based pools, or to the dark order books of partnering companies.  In order to 
increase the probability of execution 44   for their clients many dark pool operators have 
developed liquidity sharing agreements with their competitors. The result is a mutually 
beneficial relationship which satisfies clients’ needs for liquidity while maintaining a steady 
customer base that would otherwise be lost in the face of high rates of non-execution.  Finally, 
if the order is still not filled the remainder is sent to the primary exchange.  This type of 
strategy does require the client to have access to some Smart Order Routing Technology 
(SORT). 45  As such this is often feasible for institutional investors but not so for retail clients 
who could not financially justify the investment. 
In order to maintain an acceptable likelihood of execution some dark pools have developed 
liquidity partnerships with competing trading venues, as mentioned above. 46  The result is that 
if an order cannot be completed on the proprietary dark order book it is immediately sent to the 
partnering order book.  A key benefit of this is improved probability of execution for retail 
clients who do not have access to SORT. It has been estimated that up to 99% of a crossing 
network’s transactions are crossed against clients’ transactions from an external dark pool 
(Nimalendran & Ray, 2014).  
                                                 
44 Probability of execution is found to be lower in a crossing network and has been noted as being one of the 
largest costs associated with dark liquidity trading (M. Ye, 2010). 
45 The increase in use of SORT technology (Hendershott & Riordan, 2013)in aggregating dark liquidity has 
resulted in participation rates of 15-25%(Altunata, Rakhlin, & Waelbroeck, 2010) ). 




It should be noted, however, that investors often have the option to refrain from sending their 
orders to particular venues, including primary lit exchanges.  The main reason for this is that 
some investors may want to refrain from transacting in what are known as ‘toxic’ pools.47  
Toxic pools are those that do not restrict the type of activity that occurs in the pool and, as a 
result, subject clients to predatory behaviour.   
A1.4.5 Trade Reporting 
In accordance with the post-trade transparency regulations of MiFID, trades must be reported 
within 30 seconds to a designated trade reporting facility (TRF), such as Markit BOAT, once 
the transaction has been finalised (Nimalendran & Ray, 2014). Dark pools have the option of 
allowing their identity to be known when reporting the transaction.  If a pool chooses to refrain 
from reporting their identity the transaction will be flagged as either OTC or SI in the TRF’s 
consolidated tape.   
If a large order is executed in pieces the individual trades must be reported as they occur.  
Providing a minimum quantity with the order will therefore help prevent those interested in 
gaming from identifying that there may be a large order in the market as they are not likely to 
place large orders during ‘fishing’ expeditions. 
Prior to MiFID, trades originating from dark pools would either be reported to a primary 
exchange, such as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, 48 or would not be reported publicly at all.  
One of MiFID’s key directives is to increase the level of transparency in the market and make 
sure that all trades are reported, though the identities of the reporting firm can continue to 
remain secret.   
Unfortunately, allowing trade reporting firms to refrain from having their firm specified as the 
source of the transaction has introduced a degree of difficulty into academic research on dark 
pools.  This inability to locate the source of the transaction has made it difficult to measure just 
how fragmented the market has become since the rise in the popularity of dark liquidity.  While 
total dark volume can be measured it cannot be done on a trading venue by trading venue basis.  
According to Thomson Reuters Market Share Reporter, roughly 49% of the total dark trading 
activity in Europe cannot be traced to an originating venue.49  
                                                 
47 For additional information see (Mittal, 2008) – ‘Are you playing in a toxic dark pool?’. 
48  See ‘Liquidnet Europe signs up with Markit BOAT’ 
(http://www.securitiestechnologymonitor.com/issues/19_61/22379-1.html). 




Appendix 2: Features of Cryptocurrencies 
A2.1 Features of Cryptocurrencies 
This section describes some of the key features of virtual currencies, the broader category 
under which cryptocurrencies operate.  When possible, characteristics that distinguish 
cryptocurrencies from the broader definition will be noted. 
A2.1.1 Value 
As mentioned previously digital currencies do not base their value in any sovereign currency.  
Much like commodities such as gold and oil they use the forces of supply and demand to 
determine value.  Unlike commodities, however, they do not maintain any intrinsic value and 
are deemed worthless in the absence of a functioning exchange where their value can be 
transferred to another asset.  This is due to the fact that digital currencies are not considered to 
be a financial obligation the firm issuing the currency.   
Traditional forms of monetary policy do not apply within the scope of digital currencies and 
cannot be used to adjust the value of a given currency.  Cryptocurrency schemes take things a 
step further and use computer algorithms to manage currency supply, thus not allowing for 
human intervention.  Bitcoin, the most prominent form of cryptocurrency, maintains such a 
supply policy.  
A2.1.2 Distributed Ledger 
Outside of the determination of value, the next most prominent feature of digital currency 
schemes involves the process in which funds are transferred across parties.  Prior to the 
establishment of cryptocurrencies, and distributed ledgers, the only way for two parties to 
exchange funds between each other without using a financial intermediary was to use cash.  If 
you wanted to exchange funds between accounts you would need the support of both the 
central bank and at least one retail institutions; two retail institutions of the parties involved are 
members of different banks.  The central bank is responsible for clearing and settling payment 
requests from its participants, though this step is only necessary in the presence of multiple 
retail outlets within the transaction.  They maintain a central ledger and keep track of the 
balances of its members.  Retail institutions must also adjust their own ledgers to reflect the 
changes resulting from the transaction.  This system relies on the validity of these central 
ledgers and their ability to maintain an accurate account of transactions and protect against 
potential security breaches. 
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The distributed ledger is one of the pivotal technological developments that allows for the 
facilitation of peer-to-peer transactions, negating the need for a trusted third party.  Rather than 
maintaining a central ledger in a single location a distributed ledger exists across many 
computers and servers worldwide and contains a complete history of the currency’s 
transactions.   Blockchain, a form of computing technology that utilises cryptography, is used 
to verify and validate the status of any given copy of the ledger in order to identify 
discrepancies and protect against fraudulent transactions.  As multiple copies of the ledger exist 
worldwide data fraud for the purposes of theft is maintained to a minimum as fraudulent 
transactions can be identified when attempting the clear and settle the transaction. 
Market participants have access to digital wallets in which to store currencies.  When a 
transaction is initiated the payer’s wallet will forward a series of cryptographic keys to the 
payee’s wallet.  The funds must then be verified before being added to the payee’s wallet.  
Once the transaction has proven to be successful a record of the transaction is added to the 
general ledger, of which multiple copies exist on computers and servers across the world.  
Figure A2-1 contains a visual representation of the differences in transacting in centralised 
versus non-centralised environments. 
Centralised digital currencies, such as e-money, require the participation of an array of partners 
and service providers to maintain functionality.  These members include, but are not limited to, 
the primary issuer of the funds, hardware and software providers, clearing and settlements 
service providers and of course the end user.  Cryptocurrency programs, however, are not 
operated by a central body.  Instead, certain intermediaries and exchanges promote the use of 
the currency in order to facilitate transactions and earn an operations fee.  One of the most 
common intermediaries is the ‘wallet’ provider who helps facilitate the transfer of funds 
between participants as well as sovereign currencies.  The wallet itself stores the cryptographic 





Figure A2-1: Taxonomy of Digital Currency Transactions 




A2.1.3 Types of Distributed Ledgers 
There are three major types of distributed ledgers, each of which have their own benefits and 
drawbacks (Buterin, 2015).  
Public ledgers maintain non-centralised ledgers accessible to all those with internet access.  
This system does not limit who is able to submit new transactions, view old transactions, and 
participate in the settlement process, including the validation of ledgers and verification of 
account balances.  Participations are largely identified by aliases and are awarded currency for 
participating in the verification process.  It is this compensation that has resulted in the 
formation of Bitcoin mines; large servers who maintain a copy of the distributed ledger and 
settle/verify transactions in order to maintain the integrity of the ledger.  Bitcoin, Litecoin, 
Ethereum, as well as all other cryptocurrencies, fall into this category. 
Private ledgers require authorization from a designated body in order to participate.  They are 
used to maintain accounts within a single company or entity.  As computers can be assigned to 
the various roles there is no need to compensate participants for maintaining the system. 
Hybrid ledgers are typically available to the public but maintained by a pre-determined list of 
individuals or companies.  These participants are usually formally affiliated with the currency, 
from an operational standpoint, or are end-point users (customers) 
The amount and type of information that is contained within the ledger varies across providers.  
In the majority of cases, only a minimal amount of information is stored, including the 
transaction amount and non-identifying party indicators (Bitcoin, Litecoin etc.).  Few ledgers 
maintain detailed information including unique payer and payee identifiers and account 
balances. 
A2.2  Key Cryptocurrencies 
Currently, some of the key competitors to Bitcoin include Dash, Ethereum, Litecoin, Peercoin, 
Nxt, and Ripple.   Figure 2-10 displays the total market capitalisation of Bitcoin as well as the 
largest altcoins.  Currently, Bitcoin is maintaining its dominance over the market followed by 
Ethereum and Ripple (XRP).  Below we present a brief description of each of the 
aforementioned altcoins as well as the innovations they have introduced. 
Dash began its life as DarkCoin in 2014 it was later renamed to Dash in 2015 due to the 
potential for its name to be associated with illegal activities.  Dash distinguishes itself by 
allowing for greater anonymity during transactions.  It presents users with the option to use the 
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Darksend method which allows for the complete anonymisation of transactions. It does so by 
‘mixing’ the addresses senders with the addresses of the recipients (Duffield & Diaz, 2015).  
The Ethereum platform, and its Ether currency, was first developed in 2013 by Buterin (2013).  
As the first Turing complete cryptocurrency it allows users to create smart contracts with 
custom parameters.  Unlike Bitcoin which generated blocks every 10 minutes, Ethereum 
generates new blocks every 15 seconds. 
Litecoin was originally announced in 2011 by Charles Lee.  In 2017, Litecoin gained 
significantly in popularity due to its technological innovations which allows for the processing 
of payments in fractions of a second. 
Peercoin was first presented in a whitepaper by King and Nadal (2012).  It was the first 
cryptocurrency to use a combination of proof-of-work and proof-of stake mining.  These 
concepts pertain to the method in which voting power is allocated across users.  Proof-of-stake 
allocations voting power based on the value of collateral that miners present, which is usually 
the number of coins in their position.  Proof-of-work allocates voting power based on each 
miner’s computing power. 
Nxt was launched in 2013 by an unknown developer.  In this system, users are used alongside 
miners to verify transactions.  Unlike other cryptocurrencies, Nxt does not generate new 
currency blocks over time.  Rather, all coins were allocated to the original 73 investors.  As a 
result, miners and other users who assist in transactions are awarded fees for their efforts as 
opposed to coins. 
Ripple was originally developed in 2012 and was originally intended to facilitate with 
international transfers quickly and at a low price.  In recent years Ripple was modified and now 
no longer operates on a distributed basis, opting instead for centralised servers to verify 
transactions. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
